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ABSTRACT
Bowman v. Monsanto Co. signaled the end of an era of seed 
saving. Farmers must buy new seed for replanting or risk patent 
infringement. The familiar rhetoric of oppressed farmers belies the 
fact that Monsanto’s success rests in part on farmers prizing its 
innovations. Current trends indicate that this reliance on Monsanto 
will continue. The Supreme Court correctly found for Monsanto. 
However, future cases must iron out the kinks in the Bowman
decision. Despite the Court’s best intentions, inadvertence cannot 
shield farmers from patent infringement. The Court must also make it 
clear that patentees cannot use licensing restrictions to claw back 
rights that patent exhaustion has extinguished.  
Beyond patent exhaustion, the Supreme Court in Federal Trade 
Commission v. Actavis recently held that the exercise patent rights, 
even if validly obtained and infringed, are subject to scrutiny under 
the rule of reason. The “scope of the patent” approach that shielded 
Monsanto from scrutiny under antitrust law and patent misuse in the 
past should be reexamined. The effects-focused approach under 
Actavis will help yield outcomes that better track policy goals. That 
approach should contain three features. First, it should be based on 
a coherent theory of harm. Second, that theory should be supported
by evidence that the harm can be effected. Third, the approach 
should contain heuristics to make it administrable, such as harm to 
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competition and innovation and a shifting of the burden of 
production in appropriate cases informed by judicial experience and 
economic learning.  
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INTRODUCTION
The rhetoric of antagonism against Monsanto is a familiar one. 
Monsanto has been accused of turning farmers into serfs and 
dominating our food supply.1 Yet the Supreme Court recently found 
                                                     
1. See, e.g., James Ming Chen, An Agricultural Law Jeremiad: The 
Harvest Is Past, the Summer Is Ended, and Seed Is Not Saved, 2014 WIS. L. REV.
235, 235 (“The saving of seed exerts a powerful rhetorical grip on American 
agricultural law and policy. . . . Seed-saving advocates protest that compelling 
farmers to buy seed every season effectively subjects them to a form of serfdom.”); 
James Matson, Minli Tang & Sarah Wynn, Seeds, Patents and Power: The Shifting 
Foundation of Our Food System 37 (Nov. 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2525120 
(“[F]armers have become captive buyers of commercial seed.”); Vandana Shiva, The 
Seeds of Suicide: How Monsanto Destroys Farming, GLOBAL RES. (Mar. 13, 2014), 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-seeds-of-suicide-how-monsanto-destroysfarming/ 
5329947 (“Control over seed is the first link in the food chain because seed is the 
source of life. When a corporation controls seed, it controls life, especially the life of 
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for Monsanto, holding that it was illegal for a farmer to buy soybean 
seeds from a grain elevator for replanting.2 The progeny seed would 
infringe Monsanto’s patents over traits that enabled soybeans to 
survive the application of Roundup herbicide, also produced by 
Monsanto.3 Instead the farmers could only use grain elevator seed for 
their intended purpose—animal feed or consumption.4  
The central legal issue in Bowman was patent exhaustion. The 
doctrine was developed to prevent patentees from extracting further 
tolls from items that they paid for as well as to facilitate the creation 
of secondary markets for the items sold.5 As the Court put it, because 
“‘the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent 
rights to that item,’”6 the purchaser or any subsequent owner could 
“‘use [or] sell’ the thing as he sees fit.”7 Users, however, cannot 
                                                                                                               
farmers. . . . Monsanto has become the ‘Life Lord’ of our planet, collecting rents for 
life’s renewal from farmers, the original breeders.”).
2. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1766 (2013).  
3. Id. at 1764; see also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining glyphosate inhibits the metabolic activity of the enzyme 
5-enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate synthase (EPSPS), which converts sugars into 
amino acids needed for plant growth); Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The RE39,247E patent (the ‘247E patent) claims a DNA 
molecule containing a genetic code for an enzyme that enables Roundup Ready 
crops to withstand glyphosate-based herbicides, glyphosate-tolerant plant cells as 
well as seeds and plants comprising the DNA molecules, and a method of 
controlling weeds by planting the transformed seeds and spraying glyphosate over 
the fields in which those seeds were planted. Id. The 5,352,605 patent (the ‘605 
patent) claims chimeric gene expressed in plant cells and for the plant cells 
comprising that chimeric gene. Id.  
4. See Saby Ghoshray, Food Safety and Security in the Monsanto Era: 
Peering Through the Lens of a Rights Paradigm Against an Onslaught of Corporate 
Domination, 65 ME. L. REV. 491, 521 (2013) (stating that grain elevators sell seed 
for feed and other purposes, but not for replanting, and that seed from grain 
elevators is known as “junk seed,” containing seed of different maturities unsuitable 
for planting). 
5. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 
513 (1917) (stating that a patentee’s reward should be commensurate to his 
contribution and that “he should not be permitted by legal devices to impose an 
unjust charge upon the public in return for the use of it”); id. at 516 (forbidding a 
patentee from “send[ing] its machines forth into the channels of trade of the country 
subject to conditions as to use or royalty to be paid, to be imposed thereafter at the 
discretion of such patent owner. The patent law furnishes no warrant for such a 
practice, and the cost, inconvenience, and annoyance to the public which the 
opposite conclusion would occasion forbid it”).
6. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766 (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG 
Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008)). 
7. Id. (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249-50
(1942)). 
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make new copies of the patented invention.8 Hence, Bowman could 
not avail himself of patent exhaustion because the progeny seed that 
grew from the seed he had bought was an unauthorized “making.”9
The Court was correct to find for Monsanto. The Roundup 
Ready trait in soybean seeds “carries forward into each successive 
. . . generation.”10 Giving Bowman an unfettered right to grow new 
seed would reduce Monsanto’s patent rights to a single sale, as each 
seed would become a mini-factory of infringement. Farmers may 
quibble about specific licensing terms, but spending patterns show 
support for transgenic seed.11 Our food is grown more efficiently, 
with less harm to the environment, and is infused with more 
nutritional punch than ever before.12 We owe these blessings to 
Monsanto and other agrobiotech companies like it. The modified 
seed helps farmers ease the squeeze that comes from growing 
demand and shrinking available farmland.  
Monsanto’s record and its plans for the future show that 
rational market choice has played a part in its success. Roundup and 
Roundup Ready, the transgenic trait that confers resistance to 
Roundup, has entered the public domain. However, Monsanto is 
already in the process of offering next generation genome 
sequencing, data analysis and genetic prediction for its technology in 
seed traits.13 Monsanto has also transitioned to its new offering, 
Roundup Ready 2 Yield, and its microbial-based herbicide and 
pesticides technology in its pipeline could displace current chemical 
alternatives as the next industry standard.14
Still, the Bowman decision is problematic for at least two 
reasons. First, the Court wrongly focused on Bowman’s intention to 
free ride and stressed that inadvertent or de minimis infringement 
might shield farmers inflicted by transgenic pollution they did not 
want.15 It did so arguably to avoid criticism that the Bowman decision 
would toss farmers like tussled-up sheep to the wolves. But intent 
                                                     
8. Id. at 1764. 
9. Id. at 1767-68.
10. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
11. See infra Section I.C.  
12. GM Crop Use Continues to Benefit the Environment and Farmers, PG 
ECON. (May 6, 2014), http://www.pgeconomics.co.uk/page/36/-gm-crop-use-
continues-to-benefit-the-environment-and-farmers. 
13. Maxx Chatsko, 3 Reasons Monsanto Company’s Stock Could Rise,
MOTLEY FOOL (August 25, 2014) http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/08/ 
25/3-reasons-monsanto-companys-stock-could-rise.aspx. 
14. Id.
15. See infra Section II.A. 
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and control are irrelevant to infringement.16 Bowman has made it 
uncertain at what point farmers who passively benefit from a trait 
using routine farming practices infringe the patents that cover it. This 
uncertainty is unfair to farmers—and to patentees—who must now 
punt on patent liability. 
Second, the Court flirted with correcting the Federal Circuit’s
controversial conditional sale doctrine during oral arguments but 
ultimately decided to duck the issue.17 The conditional sale doctrine 
allows patentees to restrict uses that can be made of the patented 
invention. The doctrinal basis is a simple but insidious one: since 
patentees can exclude others from all uses, it follows that they can 
parcel out any part of those uses with take-it-or-leave-it conditions.
Those who take it, whether as licensees or purchasers, must adhere to 
the restrictions or risk a stinging patent infringement suit. The 
problem with the conditional sale doctrine is that it is an end-run 
around patent exhaustion, which extinguishes a patentee’s right to 
patent remedies once an authorized sale has been made.18 Buyers 
should be entitled to use, sell, or otherwise dispose of those items.19
The doctrine turns innocents into infringers.  
The Court’s silence in Bowman emboldens patentees, who can 
continue to rely on the conditional sale doctrine to convert every sale 
into a license. This unfairly overcompensates patentees and could 
create patent hold-ups downstream if the patentee sued users who 
had sunk investments into developing infrastructure to comply with 
                                                     
16. See, e.g., Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
17. Numerous commentators and at least one court have categorically said 
that the conditional-sale doctrine contravenes patent policy and precedent and is bad 
law. See infra Section II.B.  
18. See infra Section II.B; Daryl Lim, Self-Replicating Technologies and 
the Challenge for the Patent and Antitrust Laws, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 131, 
195 (2013) (“[F]armers would be liable for patent infringement if they used those 
seeds in a manner prohibited by the patentee, even though they were using the seeds 
bought (rather than new seeds grown), as long as the patentee had restricted the 
permissible uses through its license agreement.”).  
19. Lim, supra note 18, at 195 (“The Court’s express expunging of 
Mallinckrodt in Bowman v. Monsanto would have been helpful in clarifying the law. 
More importantly, it would have provided a critical avenue out for these farmers, 
whose rights must now be tested and defined by further litigation.”); Li Guo, Self-
Replicating Technologies: Do They Exhaust Patent Rights?, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y
197, 211 (2013) (“It remains unclear to what extent a patent owner can use a 
conditional license to impose restrictions on downstream purchasers to avoid patent 
exhaustion or whether the Quanta opinion has affirmatively rejected the view that 
one can contract around the doctrine.”).  
564 Michigan State Law Review  2015:559 
the patented technology.20 The doctrine is no longer good law and 
should be abrogated. 
Living with Monsanto requires vigilance against abuses of its 
patent rights. Until recently, jurisprudence advocating the “scope of 
the patent” approach shielded patentees from scrutiny under the 
antitrust laws and patent misuse under all but a sliver of 
circumstances. For antitrust law, that changed after the Supreme 
Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, which held that 
patent rights, even if validly obtained and infringed, are subject to 
antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason.21 In so doing, the Court 
rejected the “scope of the patent” approach which had traditionally 
shielded patentees behind a per se rule of legality and accepting any 
anticompetitive harm as part and parcel of the exercise of patent 
rights.  
Post-Actavis, the view that patentees should be granted broad 
rights to reward innovation and to allow coordination of derivative 
streams of innovation must be qualified by the Court’s reiterating 
that “patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the 
‘scope of the patent monopoly.’”22 Patent misuse jurisprudence 
tracking the “scope of the patent” approach contains the same 
formalistic flaws and should be rethought as well.  
Operationalizing Actavis requires courts to balance the 
consequences of intervention on the one hand with inaction on the 
other. This effects-focused approach will help yield outcomes that 
better track policy goals and should contain three features.  
First, it should be based on a coherent theory of harm. The 
discussion focuses on the foreclosure of access to Monsanto’s traits 
and articulates how foreclosure might be problematic as a matter of 
both antitrust and patent policy. Foreclosure raises antitrust concerns 
when it raises prices, lowers output, or diminishes the quality of 
goods offered. Patent misuse is concerned about foreclosure as well. 
However, unlike antitrust law, it safeguards against abuses of the 
patent system that impede technological progress, with protecting 
competition as a secondary goal.  
                                                     
20. Richard H. Stern, Post-Sale Patent Restrictions After Mallinckrodt—An 
Idea in Search of Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 4 (1994); Brief of BSA,
The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21-22,
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796) (warning that patent 
hold-ups in the downstream market could occur if the defendant incurred sunk costs 
by adopting the technology).  
21. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). 
22. Id. at 2231. 
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Second, that theory should be supported by evidence that the 
harm can be effected. Complainants in antitrust litigation already 
must show actual or circumstantial evidence of harm. That 
framework can easily be applied in cases involving Monsanto and 
others like it. Patent misuse does not require its complainant to show 
market power unless tying has been alleged. It is sufficient to prove 
that the conduct supporting the theory of harm had in fact occurred.  
Third, the approach should contain heuristics to make it 
administrable. Antitrust law requires the showing of antitrust injury 
and offers judges the use of a truncated rule of reason in appropriate 
circumstances. The former requires plaintiffs to show harm to the 
competitive structure rather than to the plaintiff alone. The latter 
allows the initial burden to be shifted to the antitrust defendant to 
explain the restraint or conduct where judicial experience and 
economic learning indicate a strong likelihood of anticompetitive 
harm. In patent misuse cases, the defendant similarly stands before 
the court as a proxy for the public interest. Where appropriate, the 
court may truncate the inquiry by shifting the burden onto the 
patentee to explain its conduct. This will incentivize the party best 
placed to provide the information to the court to do so.23
I. A NECESSARY “EVIL”
Every movement has its icons. Agrobiotech has several. In 
1994, genetically modified Flavr Savr tomatoes hit supermarket 
shelves.24 With their ripening process delayed, they lasted longer 
                                                     
23. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 16-18 (1995), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm#t34 (“Application of the rule 
of reason generally requires a comprehensive inquiry into market conditions. 
However, that inquiry may be truncated in certain circumstances. If the Agencies 
conclude that a restraint has no likely anticompetitive effects, they will treat it as 
reasonable, without an elaborate analysis of market power or the justifications for 
the restraint. Similarly, if a restraint facially appears to be of a kind that would 
always or almost always tend to reduce output or increase prices, and the restraint is 
not reasonably related to efficiencies, the Agencies will likely challenge the restraint 
without an elaborate analysis of particular industry circumstances.”). 
24. GL Woolsey, GMO Timeline: A History of Genetically Modified Foods,
ROSEBUD (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.rosebudmag.com/truth-squad/gmo-timeline-a-
history-of-genetically-modified-foods#sthash.XByFPD6i.dpuf; G. Bruening & J.M. 
Lyons, The Case of the FLAVR SAVR Tomato, CAL. AGRIC., July-Aug. 2000, at 6, 7, 
available at http://californiaagriculture.ucanr.org/landingpage.cfm?article=ca. 
v054n04p6 (“Demand for [the FLAVR SAVR tomato] was high and remained high, 
but the product was never profitable . . . .”).
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than conventional tomatoes.25 Soon after, a gene engineered to resist 
the papaya ringspot virus saved the Hawaiian papaya industry from 
ruin.26 Genetically modified corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, and 
sorghum offer farmers the opportunity to grow crops with better soil 
quality, reduced erosion, and less insecticide use.27 Grains feed us 
both directly and indirectly when they are processed into feed for 
animals that nourish us with their flesh.28 So successful are 
genetically modified crops that the National Research Council has 
urged greater use of genetic modification to more crops for more 
purposes.29
Up until the late nineteenth century, seed varieties were 
publicly funded and freely distributed.30 However, the free-seed 
program crowded out private breeders from the marketplace, and 
breeders lacked the incentive to invest in plant productivity.31 To 
encourage private investment, Congress passed the Plant Protection 
Act in 1930, extending patent-like protection for asexually 
reproducing seeds, and the Plant Variety Protection (PVP) Act 
protecting sexually reproducing seeds in 1970.32 As public funding 
                                                     
25. See Bruening & Lyons, supra note 24, at 6. 
26. Pamela C. Ronald & James E. McWilliams, Genetically Engineered 
Distortions, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2010, at A19 (“[Eighty] percent of Hawaiian 
papaya is genetically engineered, and there is still no conventional or organic 
method to control ringspot virus.”).
27. Id.  
28. Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 9 (“Grain is the foundation for 
many foods, including a wide array of traditional and processed foods. It is also 
important for feeding livestock. Most of the calories in the human diet are supplied, 
directly or indirectly, by grain. . . . Much of the world’s grain production is used to 
feed livestock and poultry, which in turn provide meat, dairy products and eggs 
(animal protein) for human consumption.”).
29. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE IMPACT OF GENETICALLY 
ENGINEERED CROPS ON FARM SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 219 (2010); 
Ronald & McWilliams, supra note 26, at A19 (noting that modifications could allow 
crops to be grown in “difficult conditions throughout the world. . . . Drought-tolerant 
cassava, insect-resistant cowpeas, fungus-resistant bananas, virus-resistant sweet 
potatoes and high-yielding pearl millet are just a few examples of genetically 
engineered foods that could improve the lives of the poor around the globe”).
30. See Lim, supra note 18, at 140. 
31. Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed 
Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 268-69 (2003); JACK RALPH 
KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 64 (1988).  
32. Plant Patent Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-245, 46 Stat. 376 (codified 
with some differences in language at 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2012)); Plant Variety 
Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, §§ 51-52, 84 Stat. 1542, 1548 (codified 
as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2422 (2012)). 
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stagnated, universities relied more heavily on patent revenues as well 
as major seed companies to finance their research.33 Seed companies 
in turn demanded more control over access to trait and variety 
technology and integrated more functions such as breeding, 
production, and marketing in the process.34  
The march toward privatizing agrobiotech research and 
development continued with the passing of the Bayh–Dole Act in 
1980, which enabled public and university research institutions to 
patent their results and exclusively license private corporations.35 In 
2001, the Supreme Court held that seeds could be protected by 
overlapping utility patents with PVP protection.36 PVP protection 
confers less robust protection than utility patents because they allow 
farmers to save seeds for replanting his own acreage and provides for 
a research exception for private, noncommercial uses of protected 
seed.37
                                                     
33. JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, USDA, AGRIC. INFO. BULLETIN NO. 786,
THE SEED INDUSTRY IN U.S. AGRICULTURE: AN EXPLORATION OF CROP SEED 
MARKETS, REGULATION, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
47-49 (2004), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/260729/aib786_1_.pdf;
see also Lim, supra note 18, at 146 (“Once the backbone of seed germplasm 
research, public expenditure leveled off in the 1970s and began to decrease by the 
mid-1990s. In contrast, private investment in seeds and genetic trait research 
doubled from $146 million to $305 million between 1979 and 1980, and domestic 
soybean production has increased 96% and yields per acre have increased 55%. By 
2010, private investment rose to $2 billion. Private spending continues to outpace 
government spending.” (footnotes omitted)). 
34. See Matson, Tang &  Wynn,  supra  note  1, at  8  (“Over time, seed
companies began to integrate plant breeding, production, conditioning, and 
marketing functions, and continued to replace the public sector as a source of seed 
for farmers.”).
35. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-20 (1980) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2012)). 
36. J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135 
(2001) (“Denying patent protection . . . simply because such coverage was thought 
technologically infeasible in 1930 . . . would be inconsistent with the forward-
looking perspective of the utility patent statute.”); see also Elizabeth I. Winston, 
Sowing the Seeds of Protection, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 445, 448 (noting that unlike the 
PVP, utility patent protection covers traits found in multiple seed varieties); Rita S. 
Heimes, Post-Sale Restrictions on Patented Seeds: Which Law Governs?, 10 WAKE 
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 98, 109 (2010) (stating that this case “signaled a shift in 
enforcement of plant intellectual property rights from litigation against corporate 
competitors to lawsuits against the end-user farmer”). PVP protection does not 
require a showing of nonobviousness or written disclosure. 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2012). 
37. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2543-2544; see also UNIDROIT, Intellectual Property 
Rights and Contract Farming, at 9, Study 80A/Doc. 1/Add. 18 (Aug. 2014),
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2014/study80a/wg04/s-80a-
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The results were evident. A recent empirical study showed that 
average corn yields rose thirteen-fold, mostly through gene 
technology.38 Traited crops have “reduced chemical pesticide use by 
37%, increased crop yields by 22%, and increased farmer profits by 
68%.”39 Farmers have been buying seeds from seed companies since 
1965, and nearly all soybean acreage is planted with annually 
purchased seed.40
Farmers routinely buy much of their seed annually for various 
reasons. In some cases, replanting results in inferior varieties. Hybrid 
crops such as corn and sorghum lose their traited qualities with 
subsequent crops, and farmers must buy new seed each season to 
keep the trait potency strong.41 Corn farmers have been exclusively 
growing commercial hybrids for more than half a century.42
With crops such as soybeans that “breed true,” preventing seed 
saving becomes important for agrobiotech interests because the seeds 
produced replicate genetically identical traited seeds.43 This means 
                                                                                                               
01-add18-e.pdf (“The seed saving exemption as currently codified in US law 
remains more generous than its counterparts in many other UPOV-based regimes. 
The US seed-saving exemption does not require the seed-saving farmer to pay a fee 
to the PVP owner for the saved seed, while other jurisdictions (such as Europe, 
under the Community Plant Variety regime) do require payment.”).
38. Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 6 (“From 1930 to the mid-
1990s, average U.S. corn yields rose seven-fold, from 20 bushels per acre to 140 
bushels per acre. Today, yields average about 160 bushels per acre, and can 
sometimes reach 260 bushels per acre in prime corn-growing locations. Genetic 
improvements, including the development of high-performance ‘hybrid’ corn 
varieties, account for much of the gain (although mechanization, chemical 
fertilizers, pesticides, seed treatments, irrigation, and seed placement strategies have 
also played key roles).” (footnotes omitted)). 
39. Wilhelm Klümper & Matin Qaim, A Meta-Analysis of the Impacts of 
Genetically Modified Crops, PLOS ONE, Nov. 2014, at 1, 1, available at
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pon
e.0111629&representation=PDF. 
40. Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 7. 
41. See Aoki, supra note 31, at 250. 
42. Dan Charles, Top Five Myths of Genetically Modified Seeds, Busted,
NPR (Oct. 18, 2012, 11:51 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/ 
2012/10/18/163034053/top-five-myths-of-genetically-modified-seeds-busted (“By 
the time Monsanto got into the seed business, most farmers in the U.S. and Europe 
were already relying on seed that they bought every year from older seed 
companies. . . . This shift started with the rise of commercial seed companies, not 
the advent of genetic engineering. But Monsanto and GMOs certainly accelerated 
the trend drastically.”).
43. See Richard Jefferson, Science as Social Enterprise: The CAMBIA BiOS 
Initiative, INNOVATIONS, Fall 2006, at 13, 14, available at http://www.bios. 
net/daisy/patentlens/3068/version/default/part/AttachmentData/data/Science_as_Soc
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that each seed becomes a mini-factory capable of making every new 
sale the seed seller’s last. Without proper patent protection, biotech 
companies may have simply focused on hybrid crops.44 It was this 
worry that pulsed through the Supreme Court’s deliberations as it 
weighed the merits of a patent lawsuit by the world’s largest 
agrobiotech company against a pro se seventy-five-year-old soybean 
farmer from Indiana.45
A. Bowman v. Monsanto
Monsanto’s Roundup herbicide contains glyphosate, a 
chemical that kills vegetation by inhibiting the metabolic activity of
an enzyme necessary for growth.46 Roundup offers farmers a simple 
one-stop solution. It is effective against most weeds, can be applied 
at all stages of growth, and is easily integrated into conservation 
tillage and narrow row spacing.47 Roundup can be paired with 
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready seeds, which contain a synthetic gene 
and plant cells containing a promoter that endows crops with 
glyphosate resistance.48 The gene sequence is unaffected by 
glyphosate, allowing the seed to continue the sugar-conversion 
function required for cell growth.49 The Roundup Ready technology 
                                                                                                               
ial_Enterprise-_The_CAMBIA_BiOS_Initiative.pdf (“[S]eeds of most crop plants 
breed true . . . .”).
44. Tamar Haspel, Unearthed: Are Patents the Problem?, WASH. POST
(Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/unearthed-are-
patents-the-problem/2014/09/28/9bd5ca90-4440-11e4-9a15-
137aa0153527_story.html. 
45. Andrew Pollack, Farmer’s Supreme Court Challenge Puts Monsanto 
Patents at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/16/ 
business/supreme-court-to-hear-monsanto-seed-patent-case.html?pagewanted=all. 
46. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(describing EPSPS, which is necessary for the conversion of sugars into amino 
acids).  
47. Janet Carpenter & Leonard Gianessi, Herbicide Tolerant Soybeans: 
Why Growers Are Adopting Roundup Ready Varieties, 2 AGBIOFORUM 65, 65 
(1999); see also Roundup Ready® Soybeans, STINE, http://www.stineseed.com/ 
soybeans/traits/roundup-ready/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (allowing farmers to 
“spray Roundup® agricultural herbicides in-crop from emergence through flowering 
for unsurpassed weed control, proven crop safety and maximum yield potential”). 
48. N.C. Farmers’ Assistance Fund, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 740 F. Supp. 2d 
694, 696 (M.D.N.C. 2010).  
49. McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1338 (“ROUNDUP READY® soybean seeds 
produce both a ‘natural’ version of EPSPS that is rendered ineffective in the 
presence of the glyphosate in ROUNDUP® herbicide, and a genetically modified 
version of EPSPS that permits the soybean seeds to grow nonetheless. 
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was quickly adopted and became an industry standard in 
agriculture.50
Since 1996, Monsanto has itself sold Roundup Ready soybean 
seeds and licensed the Roundup Ready technology to seed partners
who insert the trait into their own seed varieties.51 In either case, 
farmers buying the seeds must adhere to a number of restrictions, 
including single-season planting.52 Farmers may sell progeny seed to 
grain elevators. Monsanto does not require these grain elevators to 
screen its buyers for their intended use of the seed.53 The seed, 
known as commodity seed, are a mix of undifferentiated seeds of 
different maturities and therefore unsuitable for planting a crop.54
For his first crop, Bowman bought seed from Pioneer Hi-Bred, 
one of Monsanto’s licensed seed partners, and adhered to the single-
season restriction.55 For the riskier late-season crop, Bowman bought 
commodity seed from a grain elevator to avoid paying the premium 
                                                                                                               
ROUNDUP®, or other glyphosate-based herbicides, can thus be sprayed over the 
top of an entire field, killing the weeds without harming the ROUNDUP READY® 
soybeans.”).
50. UW EXTENSION, WISCONSIN FARMERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CALL FOR 
GLYPHOSATE (ROUNDUP) STEWARDSHIP (2013), available at http://extension. 
psu.edu/pests/weeds/control/glyphosate-wi.pdf; see also Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 
249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750 (N.D. Miss. 2001) (“Roundup Ready® seed technology 
was first marketed commercially in time for the 1996 planting season. Although 
relatively new to the agricultural market, Roundup Ready® seeds have already 
earned a reputation as an effective product, and are considered to be a significant 
technological advancement to place in the hands of growers, resulting in greater 
efficiency.”). 
51. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see
also McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1339 (“Under this license, seed companies gain the 
right to insert the genetic trait into the germplasm of their own seeds (which can 
differ from seed company to seed company), and Monsanto receives the right to a 
royalty or ‘technology fee’ of $6.50 for every 50–pound bag of seed containing the 
ROUNDUP READY® technology sold by the seed company. Monsanto also owns 
several subsidiary seed companies that comprise approximately 20 percent of the 
market for ROUNDUP READY® soybeans.”).
52. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1344-45; McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1339 (limiting 
planting to single season; “[t]o not supply any of this seed to any other person or 
entity for planting[;] . . . [t]o not save any crop produced from this seed for 
replanting, or supply saved seed to anyone for replanting[; t]o not use this seed or 
provide it to anyone for crop breeding, research, generation of herbicide registration 
data or seed production”).  
53. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345 (“Based on Monsanto’s statements, the only 
permissible reading of the Technology Agreement for purposes of this appeal is that 
it authorizes growers to sell seed to grain elevators as a commodity.”).
54. Id.
55. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 (2013). 
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on Roundup Ready seed.56 After Bowman applied glyphosate to 
confirm their resistance, he treated his second crop with it.57 He 
saved that crop for replanting as a second crop over eight years.58 In 
all this, Bowman was open and explained his practices to 
Monsanto’s representatives when asked.59
Monsanto sued for infringement, winning in the lower courts.60
The district court and Federal Circuit based their analysis on two 
grounds. First, the sale of all Monsanto’s seeds was conditional on 
adhering to the single-season planting restriction, leaving Monsanto 
with the right to control the replication of the trait in the seed sold.61
Since farmers who buy the seed can only give what they own, neither 
the grain elevator nor Bowman possessed the right to replicate the 
trait. Second, even if the right in the seed sold was exhausted, the 
seed that Bowman grew was never sold, and exhaustion could not 
affect it.62 The “making” was unauthorized and therefore infringing.63
The case centered on the scope of patent exhaustion. 
Bowman’s bone of contention was that exhaustion should not apply 
because he was simply “using seeds in the normal way farmers do”
and that “allowing Monsanto to interfere with that use would create 
an impermissible exception to the exhaustion doctrine for patented 
                                                     
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1346 (“Bowman did not attempt to hide his 
activities, and he candidly explained his practices with respect to his second-crop 
soybeans in various correspondence with Monsanto’s representatives.”).
60. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 (S.D. Ind. 2009); 
Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1349.
61. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1344-45. 
62. Id. at 1347-48; see also N.C. Farmers’ Assistance Fund, Inc. v. 
Monsanto Co., 740 F. Supp. 2d 694, 697 (M.D.N.C. 2010) (“‘The claims of the ‘605
patent have been construed numerous times by other district courts, as well as the 
Federal Circuit, in cases involving the replanting of saved Roundup Ready 
soybeans. These cases have concluded that Claims 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the ‘605 patent 
cover saved Roundup Ready soybeans. Thus, there is ample case law holding that 
replanting saved Roundup Ready® crops is a direct infringement of the ‘605
patent.’” (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Parr, 545 F. Supp. 2d 836, 841 (N.D. Ind. 
2008)); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[W]e 
must presume that Monsanto’s ‘435 patent reads on the first-generation seeds, it also 
reads on the second-generation seeds.” (footnote omitted)). 
63. Bowman, 133 S. Ct at 1764; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) 
(“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports 
into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, 
infringes the patent.”).
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seeds.”64 It seems trite to say that replication is part of the natural 
cycle of any living organism, particularly if those organisms are 
seeds.65 For Bowman, it was reasonable to expect that a farmer who 
buys seed should be entitled to use seed qua seed.66 This argument 
has intuitive appeal. One who buys a cow expects to own its calf. 
The Court rejected this argument. The quid pro quo of arguing 
every seed embodies future generations is that the buyer must pay for 
every seed through a billion-dollar sale.67 If Bowman could make and 
sell endless copies of the seed bought, Monsanto’s patents would be 
telescoped into a single sale. The Court reasoned that “[w]ere the 
matter otherwise, Monsanto’s patent would provide scant benefit.”68
                                                     
64. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1763. 
65. See Ghoshray, supra note 4, at 510 (“Relying on more than 10,000 
years of history of human civilization, what has been traditionally recognized and 
understood by mankind as ordinary pursuit should be the controlling authority in 
determining what constitutes normal usage for the purpose of determining- what 
activities by the buyer are permitted under sale of a patented product. Implicit in this 
interpretation is the recognition that patent exhaustion occurs when a purchaser buys 
a patented item for the purpose of using it in the ordinary pursuit of life.”); SUZANNE 
ASHWORTH, SEED TO SEED: SEED SAVING AND GROWING TECHNIQUES FOR 
VEGETABLE GARDENS 15 (Kent Whealy & Arllys Adelmann eds., 2d ed. 2002) 
(describing how farmers select “heirloom varieties” based on favorable traits which 
allowed crop diversity adapted to different regions, soil types, climates, local pests, 
diseases, and cultures by the process of phenotypic selection, where seeds from the 
healthiest and most productive plants were selectively saved).
66. Tabetha Marie Peavey, Bowman v. Monsanto: Bowman, the Producer 
and the End User, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 465, 487 (2014) (“Seeds, such as 
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® soybean, present similar concerns and are particularly 
troubling not only because their only real purpose is to reproduce, but also because 
all the aspects of the patented biotechnology are passed to subsequent 
generations.”).
67. See, e.g., Brief for the American Seed Trade Association as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 16, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 
553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937) (arguing that the price for that transaction would 
be “so prohibitively expensive that few farmers could afford to purchase it”); see 
also Lim, supra note 18, at 172-73 (“The problem with this argument is that both the 
buyer and seller of a Russian doll know exactly how many baby dolls are sheathed 
within its wooden bosom, and its market price is set accordingly. With [self-
replicating technologies] in general, and with soybeans in particular, no such 
number can be determined ex ante, or can be assumed to be infinite. . . . If 
exhaustion does apply, progeny seeds will quickly compete with seed sold by 
Monsanto or its seed company licensees, depressing the market price toward the 
competitive price. Anticipating this, owners would charge a price for the first sale 
based on the present discounted value of its expected future income. The 
prohibitively high price would lead to market failure, unless farmers formed a 
consortium wealthy enough to induce a sale.”).
68. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1767. 
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After Monsanto sold its first seed, other seed companies could 
produce the patented seed to compete with Monsanto, and farmers 
would need to buy seed only once.69 Besides being inconsistent with 
the twenty-year period of exclusivity that patentees generally enjoy, 
telescoping Monsanto’s commercialization into a single sale could 
lead to a less-competitive seed market and one that discourages 
disclosure of new technologies. Instead of licensing other seed 
companies, Monsanto might vertically integrate downstream and 
keep its technologies secret.70
According to the Court, exhaustion severs the legal rights 
tethering the patented article to patentees, preventing them from 
extracting further economic rents from downstream commerce.71
Thus, “‘the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all 
patent rights to that item.’”72 At the same time, the user does not 
acquire the right to replicate the item because “‘a second creation’ of 
the patented item ‘call[s] the monopoly, conferred by the patent 
grant, into play for a second time.’”73 The Court concluded that “it is 
really Bowman who is asking for an exception to the well-settled 
rule that exhaustion does not extend to the right to make new copies 
of the patented item.”74
                                                     
69. Id. (explaining that the exhaustion doctrine application would negate 
Monsanto’s reward). 
70. Lim, supra note 18, at 173.  
71. Bowman, 133 S. Ct at 1766. From the patentee’s perspective, “patent 
exhaustion limits a patentee’s right to control what others can do with an article 
embodying or containing an invention.” Id. From the buyer’s perspective, “the sale 
confers on the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, ‘the right to use [or] sell’ the 
thing as he sees fit.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Univis Lens 
Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942)). 
72. Id. (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 
625 (2008)). 
73. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961)); id. (“Consistent with that rationale, the 
doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights only as to the ‘particular article’ sold; it leaves 
untouched the patentee’s ability to prevent a buyer from making new copies of the 
patented item. . . . That is because the patent holder has ‘received his reward’ only 
for the actual article sold, and not for subsequent recreations of it.” (citations 
omitted)). 
74. Id. at 1763. 
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B. The “Make-Use” Dichotomy  
This “make-use” dichotomy allows patentees to secure returns 
on their inventions.75 Bowman presented the Court with a novel 
issue: Was using the self-replicating function illegal if that function 
was one of its primary purposes? The Court’s response was that 
replication was a form of “use” but pointed to the fact that it had 
“always drawn the boundaries of the exhaustion doctrine to exclude 
that activity, so that the patentee retains an undiminished right to 
prohibit others from making the thing his patent protects.”76
Allowing replication “would result in less incentive for innovation 
than Congress wanted. Hence [its] repeated insistence that 
exhaustion applies only to the particular item sold, and not to 
reproductions.”77
In contrast to Bowman, the trail of vaporized business models 
indicates that the Court is not mesmerized by pleas of longstanding 
practice if the industry is able to subsist on narrower rights.78 In
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., the Court 
refused to find infringement of a patent directed to methods of 
delivering electronic data even when the steps were designed to be 
performed by different parties to circumvent the law on direct 
infringement.79 That result eviscerated many multi-actor method 
claims, but the solution lay in proper claim drafting and not in 
                                                     
75. See Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 22 (“Widespread ‘seed 
saving’ may depress seed prices and revenues, and may at some point pose an 
existential threat to the seed companies themselves.”).
76. Bowman, 133 S. Ct at 1768 (citing Cotton–Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 
U.S. 89, 93-94 (1882) for its “holding that a purchaser could not ‘use’ the buckle 
from a patented cotton-bale tie to ‘make’ a new tie”).
77. Id.
78. For parallel examples in copyright law, see Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355-56 (2013) (holding that textbooks sold more 
cheaply in Thailand could be imported into and offered in competition with more 
expensive local ones); Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2502-03
(2014); Tanya Agrawal & Jonathan Stempel, Video Streaming Service Aereo Files 
for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2014, 2:26 PM), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2014/11/21/us-aereo-bankruptcy-idUSKCN0J513K20141121 
(“That decision effectively forbade New York-based Aereo’s business model, an 
attempt to offer a less-expensive alternative to cable television.”).  
79. 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014) (rebuking the Federal Circuit for 
“fundamentally misunderstand[ing]” basic principles of patent law and holding that 
it could not justify finding infringement on the Federal Circuit’s theory of divided 
infringement even though there was misappropriation).  
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stretching direct infringement to cover the legal loophole.80 In 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the 
Court invalidated claims over isolated, naturally occurring DNA 
segments while allowing synthetic DNA sequences and stressing that 
the decision did not implicate claims over gene manipulation 
methods, application of the knowledge of the isolated DNA 
sequences, and the patentability of sequences where nucleotide order 
had been altered.81  
The same could not be said of Bowman. The Court recognized 
that exhaustion did not include “uses”—even time-honored ones—
that allowed the user to create replicas that would compete with the 
patentee’s primary market—in this case, Monsanto’s market for 
traited seeds.82 This was because 
in short order, other seed companies could reproduce the product and 
market it to growers, thus depriving Monsanto of its monopoly. And 
farmers themselves need only buy the seed once, whether from Monsanto, 
a competitor, or (as here) a grain elevator. The grower could multiply his 
                                                     
80. Bridget Hayden, John T. Kennedy & David H. Tseng, Post Limelight v. 
Akamai, Are Multi-Actor Method Patent Claims D.O.A.?, DORSEY (June 3, 2014), 
http://www.dorsey.com/eu-post-limelight-akamai-multi-actor-patent-claims/ 
(“[Akamai] renders many multi-actor method claims D.O.A. as no single supplier for 
many of today’s e-commerce (and other) solutions infringes such claims by 
‘controlling or directing’ the actions of one or more vendors, suppliers or customers 
as is often necessary to practice every step of such claims.”); MICHAEL DZWONCZYK,
BULLETPROOFING METHOD CLAIMS FOR POST-LIMELIGHT ENFORCEMENT 9 (2014), 
available at http://www.sughrue.com/files/Publication/2c8b4990-0c73-4330-b50e-
625e2877f3c2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d9d2bf57-98b6-4080-a8d8-
64e9de4463f3/01-18-14%20Final%20Naples%20Paper%20(2).pdf (“The use of 
system claims, single-actor method claims and method claims that omit all but the 
most essential features of the inventive process remain commercially valuable both 
now and after the Court’s ultimate decision [in] Limelight. Claiming nonessential 
elements that can be carried out by second or third entities, or those that can be 
easily exported, may very well deprive a patent holder of the right to enforce an 
important method claim.”).  
81. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119-20 (2013); see also Supreme Court’s Decision Is 
a Gene-Patent Gambit Says Professor Daryl Lim at Chicago’s John Marshall Law 
School, PR WEB (June 18, 2013), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/6/ 
prweb10842966.htm (noting that patents on human gene sequences accounted “for 
[only] 10% of all gene patents,” and that “biotech firms like Myriad have valuable 
data on gene mutations locked away as trade secrets”); D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics, 
Inc. [2014] FCAFC ¶ 218 (Austl.) (finding isolated nucleic acid patent eligible).  
82. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766 (“If the purchaser of that article could make 
and sell endless copies, the patent would effectively protect the invention for just a 
single sale.”).
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initial purchase, and then multiply that new creation, ad infinitum—each 
time profiting from the patented seed without compensating its inventor.83  
For this reason, the Court concluded that exhaustion was 
limited to the items sold “to avoid . . . a mismatch between invention 
and reward.”84 Even Bowman agreed that it was the “‘well settled’”
principle “‘that the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the right 
to ‘make’ a new product.’”85
Commercial expectations also informed the inquiry. Seeds 
purchased from grain elevators are not for replanting.86 They are of 
different maturities and intended for animal feed and processing.87
Further, existing markets for grain and processed soybean product 
indicate that traited seed have non-infringing uses.88 Unlike 
conventional seeds, there is no legitimate expectation that those 
seeds could be used to produce another harvest. Part of the reason is 
practical: The commingled seed was unsuitable for farming use.89
Part of the reason is legal: Every new generation of seeds that 
contains the glyphosate-resistant trait is infringing, regardless of 
whether glyphosate is actually used.90
Monsanto managed to frame the issue as “all or nothing,” a
tactic that ultimately helped it win the case. Cauterizing the right to 
replant seed with patented traits comported with orthodoxy on 
infringement for unauthorized “making.” However, this result does 
not make it self-evident that easing up on the level of control given 
to Monsanto would necessarily diminish a societally optimal level of 
innovation. What the Court in Bowman did was to provide a neat 
                                                     
83. Id. at 1767.
84. Id.  
85. Id. at 1766 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 37, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 
(No. 11-796)); id. (“Bowman himself disputes none of this analysis as a general 
matter.”).
86. Id. at 1763 (“Bowman purchased soybeans intended for consumption 
from a grain elevator; planted them; treated the plants with glyphosate, killing all 
plants without the Roundup Ready trait; harvested the resulting soybeans that 
contained that trait; and saved some of these harvested seeds to use in his late-season 
planting the next season.”).
87. Ghoshray, supra note 4, at 552. 
88. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765 & n.1.
89. See Ghoshray, supra note 4. 
90. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766 (“[T]he exhaustion doctrine does not 
enable Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s 
permission.”). 
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solution to appropriating investment returns without having to rely 
on less administrable alternatives.91
For instance, making an example of a few farmers in breach of 
licensing agreements by pursuing contractual remedies may, in 
reality, have been sufficient to deter others from replanting traited 
seeds. However, contracts require privity between the parties, 
offering limited protection.92 Restrictions on alienation could also 
impose great transaction costs.93 The risk would be that enforcement 
costs could eventually make it commercially unviable for Monsanto 
to license its patents and lead it to protect inbred parent lines as trade 
secrets, as many in fact do.94
Trade secrets are not an option for crops like soybean that 
“breed true.” Like drugs, seed traits and varieties are self-disclosing 
and therefore cannot be kept secret.95 A Chinese woman who was 
                                                     
91. Lim, supra note 18, at 183-86 (explaining why other alternatives not 
listed below, such as PVP protection and first-mover advantages, are unsuitable). 
92. Brief for Respondents at 51-55, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796) 
(noting that in a world where soybeans “could be purchased from another grower or 
a grain elevator, plucked from a field or road, or snatched off the back of a truck,”
patent owners would have to establish “contractual privity with every person who 
might try to misappropriate its patented technology”).
93. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The 
First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 541 (2011) 
(“[T]he ‘infringement’ action permits enforcement of the restriction at much lower 
transaction costs than the endless series of breach of contract actions.”).
94. Roger A. McEowen, Legal Issues Related to the Use and Ownership of 
Genetically Modified Organisms, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 611, 636 (2004) (“The practice 
of protecting inbred parent seed under trade secret law has been adopted as a 
strategy by several breeders of proprietary lines of inbred lines.”); see also Norman 
W. Hawker, Competition Issues Arising from Generic Biotech Crops, 18 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 137, 139 (2013) (“[C]orn (maize) and sorghum are generally produced 
commercially as hybrids in most areas of the world, and the open-pollinated 
varieties in commercial use are not generally covered by patents.”).
95. Jeremy N. Sheff, Self-Replicating Technologies, 16 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 229, 242 (2013) (“Self-replicating technologies don’t merely teach competitors 
how to practice a new invention, they supply such competitors with a factory as 
well. So for novel technologies that we believe have characteristics of public goods 
and therefore warrant a proprietary right to the inventor in the first place, self-
replication poses an additional barrier to such appropriation. Granting an inventor a 
property right only in the first generation of a self-replicating technology merely 
pushes the free-rider problem that patent protection purportedly solves down to 
subsequent generations.” (footnote omitted)); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising 
Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313 (2008) 
(“For products that are inherently self-disclosing (the wheel, say, or the paper clip), 
trying to keep the idea secret is a lost cause. We don’t need trade secret law to 
encourage disclosure of inherently self-disclosing products—inventors of such 
products will get patent protection or nothing.”); Katherine J. Strandburg, What 
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recently charged in a plot to steal U.S. corn technology by smuggling 
corn seed in boxes of microwave popcorn packed in luggage is a 
reminder of how vulnerable to misappropriation these technologies 
are.96
Monsanto also owns patents on technology that result in sterile 
seed, known as genetic use restriction technology (GURT), and in 
theory could use that technology to prevent unauthorized 
propagation of its technology. In the face of adverse public opinion, 
however, Monsanto has committed not to use it.97 GURT also 
exchanges one problem for another. Useful research that might 
otherwise have been channeled into improving agronomic or 
nutritional qualities could be diverted to devising appropriate GURT 
“locks” on seed.98  
From a patent policy perspective, GURT is also suboptimal 
since there is no date on which the technology enters the public 
domain and becomes freely accessible.99 If challenged, a colorable 
claim could be made that GURT amounts to an impermissible 
restriction on patent exhaustion because it eliminates the possibility 
of resale and reuse of progeny seed. If so, state law contracts 
purporting to facilitate transactions of GURT seeds between 
Monsanto and its seed distributors could be preempted. 
In addition to contracts and GURT, there is the option of 
compulsory licensing. Other countries have explored compulsory 
                                                                                                               
Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
81, 104-18 (distinguishing between self-disclosing and non-self-disclosing 
inventions). 
96. MoFo Tech, Seeds Worth More than Gold, JDSUPRA (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/seeds-worth-more-than-gold-24973. 
97. See Samuel K. Moore, Terminating the Terminator, CHEMICAL WK. 
Oct. 13, 1999, at 9; Terminator Genes: Fertility Rights, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1999, at 
104. At the time the announcement was made, Monsanto’s Chief Executive Officer 
explained that “[t]hough we do not . . . own any sterile seed technology, we think it 
is important to respond . . . by making clear our commitment not to commercialize 
gene protection systems that render seed sterile.” Letter from Robert B. Shapiro, 
CEO, Monsanto, to Gordon Conway, President, Rockefeller Found. (Oct. 4, 1999), 
available at http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/monsanto-ceo-to-
rockefeller-foundation-president-gordon-conway-terminator-technology.aspx.  
98. Chen, supra note 1, at 252 (“Because every investment in GURTs 
diverts resources that could have been aimed at improving crops’ agronomic and 
nutritional attributes, the whole enterprise reeks of enforcing legal rights at the 
expense of actual innovation.”).
99. Lim, supra note 18, at 183 (“[T]his solution has the distinct 
disadvantage that unlike patents that expire after twenty years, the technology lock 
is perpetual.”).
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licensing as a means to provide a blanket solution to replanting 
traited seed.100 The compulsory licensing scheme could also create a 
clearinghouse for stacked traits. Seed companies could obtain 
licenses to multiple traits rather than negotiate with each trait 
patentee individually, thus lowering transactions costs.101 The U.K. 
regime allows farmers owning less than 150 acres to save their seed 
in return for a license fee charged through seed cleaners.102 Brazil 
charges grain elevators that benefit from higher seed yields.103
Argentina taxes farmers’ crops.104 The administration of that regime 
could be similar to collecting societies like the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), charged with 
collecting licensing fees for copyrighted works.105
The main obstacle is political. The Judiciary Committee has on 
three occasions considered and rejected proposals for farmers to save 
seed and pay license fees that would be administered by an office in 
                                                     
100. A compulsory license scheme would not be limited to “essential” traits
and would therefore be broader in application to a compulsory licensing remedy 
under the antitrust essential facilities doctrine. See id. at 208 (discussing the essential 
facilities doctrine and advocating for its application to allow derivative products to 
be offered); see also discussion infra Section IV.A.
101. The need to lower transaction costs has also led commentators to argue 
for a liability regime in transacting plant breeder rights overseas. For one such 
perspective, see Viola Prifti, The Breeding Exemption in Patent Law: Analysis of 
Compliance with Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, 16 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
218, 235 (2013) (“If a liability regime were not implemented, plant breeders would 
be forced to enter into negotiations in order to obtain commercial licensing. In this 
case, the costs involved in private bargain may overcome those of public 
intervention. This is mainly because negotiations may fail or involve higher 
transaction costs than governmental intervention. This risk is particularly urgent 
when plant breeders need to access genetic material which is owned by different 
patentees. Even if all the licenses were issued, the time dedicated to negotiation 
procedures would undoubtedly delay the coming of new varieties into the market. In 
a liability regime, this would not occur since breeders would be free to access 
relevant patented material subject to the reward mechanism.”).
102. Jay P. Kesan, Licensing Restrictions and Appropriating Market Benefits 
from Plant Innovation, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1081, 1090
(2006). 
103. US-Latin Accord on GM Crops a Timely Warning for Australia,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2004), http://www.cpa.org.au/z-archive/g2004/1174gm.html. 
104. Id.
105. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 5 
(1979). However, note that copyright collecting societies have thousands of 
members upstream, compared to few upstream trait distributors and even fewer trait 
owners. 
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the Department of Agriculture.106 For instance, the Seed Availability 
and Competition Act of 2013 was shot down in Committee.107
Another reason for its unsuitability is the considerable bureaucratic 
costs imposed by creating an agency to deal with the financial and 
administrative aspects of the royalties.  
Bowman exemplifies the tension in patent law between 
inventors and the public.108 The public desires to minimize the tax 
imposed by the patent system on the items they buy, sell, and use.109
In the case of Roundup Ready, Monsanto’s licensing restrictions on 
replanting, together with the widespread adoption of its seed, 
profoundly changed longstanding replanting practices. Inventors 
desire sufficient control of their invention to prevent free riding and 
appropriate rewards for their time and effort.110 Patents allow patent 
owners to control the manufacture, use, and sale of the patented 
invention. For agrobiotech, patents are critical both to the existence 
and growth of the industry.111 Studies show a strong correlation 
                                                     
106. These three occasions were in 2011, 2009, and 2004. See Seed 
Availability and Competition Act of 2013, H.R. 193, 113th Cong.; see also Kevin E. 
Noonan, House Considers Alternative Patent Royalty Scheme for Genetically 
Engineered Seed, PATENT DOCS (Jan. 14, 2013), available at http:// 
www.patentdocs.org/2013/01/house-considers-alternative-patent-royalty-scheme-
for-genetically-engineered-seed.html (“But regardless of which side has the better
policy argument in that debate, Rep. Kaptur’s bill is not a remedy required by the 
politics or economics of the situation. Indeed, it would just impose another 
government bureaucracy on U.S. agriculture that would not promote either 
agriculture or technological progress.”).
107. Benjamin M. Cole, Brent J. Horton & Ryan Vacca, Food for Thought: 
Genetically Modified Seeds as De Facto Standard-Essential Patents, 85 U. COLO. L.
REV. 313, 375 n.394 (2014) (“The Seed Availability and Competition Act of 2013 is 
unlikely to pass, as it has been stuck in the House Agriculture Committee since 
January 4, 2013.”); Brent J. Horton, How Corporate Lawyers Escaped Sarbanes-
Oxley: Disparate Treatment in the Legislative Process, 60 S.C. L. REV. 149, 171 
(2008) (“[I]f committee members disfavor the bill for any reason, they can do 
nothing and allow the bill to languish in committee.”).
108. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13-14 (2003).  
109. In theory, the dynamic efficiency gains to society from the patent 
system should outweigh the static efficiency losses it imposes through higher market 
prices and lower market output. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW § 3.3, at 38 (7th ed. 2007). 
110. Patents typically cover intangible knowhow with high costs of initial 
production and low unit costs of subsequent reproduction. Patent law confers limited 
exclusive rights to incentivize investment by allowing patent owners to appropriate 
the gains enjoyed by society attributable to the invention. See id. § 3.3, at 38-39.
111. James H. Davis & Michele M. Wales, The Effect of Intellectual 
Property on the Biotechnology Industry, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE 
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between patent protection and the increase in yield and production.112
Given that their livelihood depends on successful patent 
enforcement, we can expect agrobiotech to respond in a muscular 
way if their core interests are challenged. 
The Bowman opinion masks a surprising fact. Monsanto’s
patents were due to expire in 2014, just over a year later.113 Why 
would Monsanto take its fight to the Supreme Court over those soon-
to-expire patents? One answer is the precedential value of the 
opinion. Monsanto obtained a court order for Bowman to pay 
$85,000 in damages114—an amount that does not even begin to cover 
its attorney fees.115 What was truly valuable for Monsanto was the 
defense of the Federal Circuit’s holding below, upholding the 
legality of its business model.  
C. Roundup Ready Goes Generic: Why It’s Business as Usual for 
Monsanto 
Even with the expiry of its flagship product, Monsanto’s
fortunes are anything but on the wane. Monsanto spends $2.6 million 
                                                                                                               
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 427, 433 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (“If other companies 
were permitted to copy biotechnology or pharmaceutical products as soon as they 
were approved, no rational drug company would expend the cost and effort of 
developing new drugs.”); Jasemine Chambers, Note, Patent Eligibility of 
Biotechnological Inventions in the United States, Europe, and Japan: How Much 
Patent Policy is Public Policy?, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 223, 224 (2002) 
(noting the critical role of the patent system in growing the biotechnology industry).  
112. A. Bryan Endres & Carly E. Giffin, Necessity Is the Mother, but 
Protection May Not Be the Father of Invention: The Limited Effect of Intellectual 
Property Regimes on Agricultural Innovation, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 203, 
248 (2012) (noting that the United States, unlike the other countries studied,
protected the process to develop the genetically improved seed and the plant itself 
under the utility patent regime). 
113. See Hawker, supra note 94, at 140 n.15 (“Monsanto also relies on third 
party patents, however, including U.S. Patent No. 5,717,084 (filed June 6, 1995) 
(issued Feb. 10, 1998) and U.S. Patent No. 5,728,925 (filed Apr. 28, 1995) (issued 
Mar. 17, 1998), that do not expire until 2015.”).
114. See Vernon Bowman, Indiana Grain Farmer: Monsanto “Grabbing at 
Straws,” HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 20, 2013, 5:43 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2013/02/20/vernon-bowman-farmer-vs-monsanto_n_2727067.html. 
115. See Jim Kerstetter, How Much Is That Patent Lawsuit Going to Cost 
You?, CNET (Apr. 5, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/how-much-is-
that-patent-lawsuit-going-to-cost-you/. 
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a day on research and development.116 In 2014, its seed and genomic 
sales are valued at $10.3 billion, and it owns traits covered by 1,700 
patents.117 It expects to double its profits by 2019 relying almost 
entirely on its seed and genomics businesses.118
Monsanto’s continued success has much to do with American 
society’s dependence on it. As with nearly every other industry, 
farming is heavily dependent on technology and will remain so for 
the foreseeable future. The days of agrarian self-sufficiency are 
largely a relic of the past. The Supreme Court noted the trend toward 
“a progressive division of labor and separation of function” as early 
as 1949 in Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb:
Economic progress . . . is characterized by a progressive division of labor 
and separation of function. Tools are made by a tool manufacturer, who 
specializes in that kind of work and supplies them to the farmer. The 
compost heap is replaced by factory produced fertilizers. Power is derived 
from electricity and gasoline rather than supplied by the farmer’s mules. 
Wheat is ground at the mill. In this way functions which are necessary to 
the total economic process of supplying an agricultural product, become, 
in the process of economic development and specialization, separate and 
independent productive functions operated in conjunction with the 
agricultural function but no longer a part of it.119
In short, farmers today buy seeds in the same way that they buy 
fertilizer and farming equipment through external sources.120
Soybeans stacked with Roundup Ready makes weed control a 
simpler and cheaper chore.121 Some farmers and their advocates 
equate seed saving with farming.122 That notion is a mistaken one. 
                                                     
116. See Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, MONSANTO, 
www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/why-does-monsanto-sue-farmers-who-save-
seeds.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2015). 
117. Dan Mitchell, Why Monsanto Always Wins, FORTUNE (June 26, 2014,
4:03 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/06/26/monsanto-gmo-crops/. 
118. Id.
119. 337 U.S. 755, 761 (1949). 
120. Chen, supra note 1, at 235 (“Farmers today often buy seed, just as they 
buy other agricultural inputs. That way lies the path of economic and technological 
progress.”).
121. Id. at 260 (“The alternative to blanket applications of broad-spectrum 
herbicide readily explains the popularity of herbicide-resistant crops. Herbicides and 
herbicide-resistant crops are substitutes for physical labor of the most demoralizing 
sort. Without herbicides, the farmer has no choice but to remove weeds by raw 
force.”); see also UW EXTENSION, supra note 50. 
122. Chen, supra note 1, at 235.  
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Farmers routinely purchase new seeds for hybrid crops such as corn 
because they lose trait vigor in subsequent harvests.123
Farmers who wish to save their seed have the option of 
developing organic and heirloom varieties. These “offer none of the 
traits that make proprietary varieties so popular. But they can be 
saved.”124 More importantly, even though organic produce is sold at 
higher prices than their genetically modified counterparts, seed 
sellers are generally unwilling to invest in creating new and 
improved organic varieties, making them a poor source for trait 
innovation.125 In the real world, hunger cannot be solved on an 
organic basis. 
Market demand for row crops has risen dramatically due to 
desertification, crops being used as biofuel, and simply having more 
mouths to feed.126 The demand for U.S. crops takes the form of direct
exports or indirect exports, such as through products derived from 
animals that feed on the grains.127 Estimates point to having to double 
grain production by 2050 to keep up with demand.128 At the same 
time, rapid population growth has led to a halving of agricultural 
land per capita compared to fifty years ago.129 Failure to keep pace 
will mean price shocks and economic volatility. 
                                                     
123. Layla Katiraee, Patents and GMOs: Should Biotech Companies Turn 
Innovations over to Public Cost-Free?, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (Apr. 22, 2014),
http://geneticliteracyproject.org/2014/04/22/patents-and-gmos-should-biotech-
companies-turn-innovations-over-to-public-cost-free/. 
124. Chen, supra note 1, at 256 (“For farmers whose self-actualization 
hinges on the ability to save seed, these varieties offer an emotional and 
philosophical refuge.”).
125. See ORGANIC SEED ALLIANCE, STATE OF ORGANIC SEED 38 (2011),
available at http://seedalliance.org/index.php?mact=DocumentStore,cntnt01, 
download_form,0&cntnt01pid=7&cntnt01returnid=139. 
126. Neil D. Hamilton, Harvesting the Law: Personal Reflections on Thirty 
Years of Change in Agricultural Legislation, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 563, 567 (2013) 
(“The rapid change in the use of farm products is best reflected by the use of over 
forty percent of the U.S. corn crop for ethanol to burn as vehicle fuel.”); see also
Adam Garmezy, Patent Exhaustion and the Federal Circuit’s Deviant Conditional 
Sale Doctrine: Bowman v. Monsanto, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR
197, 214 (2013) (“Providing the proper incentives for private investment in 
biotechnology is especially important because of rapid global population growth and 
increased desertification.” (footnote omitted)). 
127. See Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 11. 
128. Deepak K. Ray et al., Yield Trends Are Insufficient to Double Global 
Crop Production by 2050, PLoS ONE, June 2013, at 1, available at http://www. 
plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0066428#pone--Ǧ
0066428--Ǧg002. 
129. See Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 11. 
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This puts pressure on farmers to produce more per acre and 
work their fields through more difficult conditions to meet that 
demand.130 Genetic modification provides the solution farmers need. 
A 2014 study revealed that herbicide and insect resistance increased 
yields by 9% and 25% respectively, raising profits by as much as 
69% compared to farmers who did not use genetically modified 
crop.131
Farmers have been adopting Roundup Ready’s successor, 
Roundup Ready 2 Yield (RR2Y) since 2009.132 Monsanto developed 
better trait-insertion techniques to develop the RR2Y trait.133 It offers 
higher yield, an average 4.5 bushels per acre over Roundup Ready 
soybeans, along with glyphosate resistance.134 RR2Y was planted on 
fifty million acres in the first four years, was planted on an additional 
forty million acres in 2013,135 and will be planted on an anticipated 
                                                     
130. Margo A. Bagley, The Wheat and the (GM) Tares: Lessons for Plant 
Patent Litigation from the Parables of Christ, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 683, 688 
(2013) (“Other touted GM benefits include improved agricultural performance under 
poor conditions, higher yields, and an increased ability for farmers to meet the needs 
of a hungry world.”).
131. The Biggest Study So Far Finds That GM Crops Have Large, 
Widespread Benefits, ECONOMIST (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.economist.com/ 
news/science-and-technology/21630961-biggest-study-so-far-finds-gm-crops-have-
large-widespread-benefits-field; see also Brief for Economists as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 3, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) 
(No. 11-796) (noting a $3.3 billion increase in soybean-related income in 2010). 
132. Andrew Pollack, As Patent Ends, a Seed’s Use Will Survive, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/business/18seed.html 
(“Monsanto said it was confident that most farmers and seed companies would move 
to Roundup Ready 2, which uses the same bacterial gene but places it in a different 
location in the soybean DNA. Monsanto said that Roundup Ready 2 crops would 
have higher yields, and that other desirable traits would be added to those crops over 
time.”).
133. Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, MONSANTO, 
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/roundup-ready-patent-expiration.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2015). 
134. Genuity® Roundup Ready 2 Yield® Soybeans, GENUITY
http://www.genuity.com/soybeans/Pages/Genuity-Roundup-Ready-2-Yield.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (“Roundup Ready 2 Yield soybeans have developed 
more 3-, 4- and 5-bean pods per plant than the competition. . . . Studies show that 
Roundup Ready 2 Yield soybeans develop greater root biomass, more nodes on the 
main stem and larger shoot biomass than original Roundup Ready® soybean 
products.”).
135. Sadfar Abbas, Genuity Roundup Ready 2 Yield Soybeans,
AGRIBUSINESS (June 16, 2013), http://www.agribusiness.com.pk/genuity-roundup-
ready-2-yield-soybeans/ (“After four years on the market, more farmers than ever 
are using [Genuity® Roundup Ready 2 Yield® soybeans] on their farms.”).  
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hundred million acres by 2019.136 Monsanto’s next generation 
offerings include Roundup Ready 2 Xtend, with dicamba and 
glyphosate resistance, and VistiveGold, with oleic and omega-3 
oils.137
The technology does not come cheap. The annual bill for seed 
technology alone is estimated to be $3.5 billion in R&D costs.138 An 
argument may be made that if personal saving without selling were 
allowed, the seed need only be bought once. This was the 
arrangement envisioned by PVP protection. The overlay over utility 
patent rights seals up that exception. 
In 2013, Monsanto announced a partnership with Novozymes, 
a biological company, to research and develop microbial-based 
products designed to use bacteria and fungi to protect the crops from 
weeds and pests.139 Novozymes already has a biological called 
JumpStart containing a soil fungus that interacts with plant roots and 
                                                     
136. See Hawker, supra note 94, at 139-40 (“Monsanto has already placed its 
RR2Y soybean in commercial production and the product enjoys expanding acreage 
with each passing year.”); see also Monsanto’s Expanded Set of Innovations 
Highlight Long-Term Opportunity and Continued Growth Outlook, MONSANTO
(Aug. 20, 2014), http://news.monsanto.com/press-release/corporate/monsantos-
expanded-set-innovations-highlight-long-term-opportunity-and-conti. 
137. MONSANTO, Q&A: PATENTS (n.d.), available at http://www. 
soybeans.com/pdf/soybeans.com-qa.pdf. Monsanto has also entered into cross-
licensing agreements with other seed partners such as Dow AgroSciences to offer 
other RR2Y stacked products. See Press Release, Dow AgroSciences, Monsanto and 
Dow AgroSciences Reach New Licensing Agreement on Roundup Ready 2 Yield® 
Soybean Technology (June 2, 2010), available at http://www.dowagro. 
com/newsroom/corporate/2010/20100602a.htm; see also Growth Through 
Technology Leadership, DOW, http://www.dow.com/investors/reports/databook/ 
health_agricultural_services.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (noting the “bringing 
together [of] Monsanto’s Roundup Ready 2® technology with LibertyLink® 
herbicide tolerance”).
138. Brief for the American Seed Trade Association as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 17, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) 
(No. 11-796).
139. MONSANTO & NOVOZYMES, THE BIOAG ALLIANCE (n.d.), available at
http://www.novozymes.com/en/about-us/brochures/Documents/BioAg-Alliance-
factsheet.pdf (“Microbial-based products are derived from naturally-occurring 
microorganisms such as bacteria and fungi. They are normally applied to seeds 
before planting, in-furrow or sprayed on crops, and they protect crops from pests 
and diseases and enhance plant productivity and fertility. With faster development 
cycles compared to other agricultural innovations, as well as broad geographic and 
crop applicability, microbial solutions offer tremendous potential to deliver 
sustainable, cost-effective solutions that can increase yield using less input.”).
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increases yield through improved nutrient intake.140 These biologicals 
complement or replace chemical products and represent a growing 
market segment worth $2.3 billion annually with double-digit growth 
each year.141
Monsanto is also offering FieldScripts, a prescriptive-planting 
system. FieldScripts uses soil and weather data from Climate 
Corporation, a Silicon Valley startup Monsanto bought for $1 billion, 
to predict which seed grows best in all twenty-five million fields in 
America.142 The data is used to run machines by Precision Planting, 
another Monsanto acquisition. The machines steer themselves using 
global positioning system technology and plant fields with different 
crop varieties at different depths and spacings, according to weather 
conditions. Yields have increased 5% in just two years and added a 
substantial amount to farmers’ incomes, “a feat no other single 
intervention could match.”143 Others have attempted to follow suit.144
Monsanto’s rise reflects the technological revolution of 
agriculture in America. The progress of science has displaced old 
methods of commerce and reshuffled rights between actors and 
different points of a new value chain. Monsanto is representative of a 
breed of agrobiotech companies created by breakthroughs in gene 
and crop science. Syngenta, Dow, and DuPont also sell seed to 
farmers. These companies thrive on the thirst of farmers desiring 
crops stacked with traits to yield more cash per bushel and more 
crops per acre. Even critics of this revolution concede that those who 
choose to eschew traited crops risk being swept aside by market 
forces.145
                                                     
140. Carey Gillam, Monsanto Deal with Novozymes Aims to Accelerate New 
Crop Products, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid= 
USL1N0JP12U20131210. 
141. MONSANTO & NOVOZYMES, supra note 139.  
142. Digital Disruption on the Farm, ECONOMIST (May 24, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21602757-managers-most-traditional-
industries-distrust-promising-new-technology-digital (“By 2010 its database 
contained 150 billion soil observations and 10 trillion weather-simulation points.”).
143. Id. (“The seed companies think providing more data to farmers could 
increase America’s maize yield from 160 bushels an acre (10 tonnes a hectare) to 
200 bushels—giving a terrific boost to growers’ meagre margins.”).
144. Id. (“Last November another seed producer, Du Pont Pioneer, linked up 
with a farm-machinery maker, John Deere, to beam advice on seeds and fertilisers to 
farmers in the field. A farm-supply co-operative, Land O’Lakes, bought Geosys, a 
satellite-imaging company, in December 2013, to boost its farm-data business.”).
145. See Ghoshray, supra note 4, at 513 (“[T]o eschew GE seeds is almost 
certainly illusory. Few farmers will be able to compete in the mass marketplace 
without using the hardier, pesticide-resistant GE products.”).
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Farmers benefit through Monsanto’s win in less obvious ways. 
The certainty of reward over the life cycle of their products and 
potential for private and government antitrust enforcement may 
encourage greater support from patent owners, which will be crucial 
if farmers are to continue enjoying better seed varieties and access to 
foreign export markets.146 The United States is the largest producer 
and exporter of transgenic grain and crops.147 About 90% of U.S. 
soybeans, cotton, and corn are transgenic.148 Grain traded globally 
accounts for over forty-billion dollars in export revenue annually.149
Whole soybean exports to China alone are worth thirteen-billion 
dollars150 and are expected to account for more than 90% of projected 
growth in global soybean imports.151
All genetically modified crops require regulatory approvals 
before they can be imported into key markets such as the European 
Union and China.152 Monsanto has spearheaded Accord: The Generic 
Event Marketability and Access Agreement, which “sets out the 
rights and duties involved in commercializing patented single-gene 
plant products and encourages patent holders to continue developing 
and commercializing their technology while ensuring international 
regulatory and stewardship responsibilities are maintained.”153
Adopting RR2Y may become crucial for farmers who seek to 
export their crop overseas. As seeds go off-patent, patentees 
rationally lose the incentive to maintain those stewardship 
                                                     
146. Lim, supra note 18, at 215 (noting that the patent system “encourages 
them to participate in the innovation and commercialization of products containing 
traits going off-patent. It also encourages licensing agreements without obliging 
farmers to pay post-expiration royalties, as well as destroy or return seed after 
licenses expire”).
147. AM. SEED TRADE ASS’N & BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., FACTSHEET 1
(2012), available at http://www.agaccord.org/include/facts.pdf. 
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Soy Stats 2014, U.S. Exports: Soy Exports by Customer, AM. SOYBEAN 
ASS’N, http://soystats.com/u-s-exports-soy-exports-by-customersda/ (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2015). 
151. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OCE-2013-1, USDA AGRICULTURAL 
PROJECTIONS TO 2022, at 31 (2013), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/ 
1013562/oce131.pdf. 
152. Hawker, supra note 94, at 146 (“The failure to get approval overseas for 
such crops can lead to significant trade disruption and resulting liability risks.”);
Lim, supra note 18, at 216 (“Transgenic grain exports thus require periodic 
renewals. Approvals in the European Union expire after ten years, and those in 
China expire after three.”).
153. See Lim, supra note 18, at 214.  
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responsibilities. While Monsanto has committed to maintaining 
regulatory approvals until 2021, farmers will have to switch to RR2Y 
or another approved variety to reach export markets.154 In the long 
run, it will not be in Monsanto’s interest to maintain a source of 
generic competition, and it will not likely do so.  
Transgenic crops clearly have their disadvantages. Prior to the 
introduction of Roundup Ready, there were no glyphosate-resistant 
weeds. By 2005, there were six species.155 The repeated use of 
glyphosate has also exerted selection pressure on weeds, giving rise 
to glyphosate-resistant “super weeds.”156 Farmers increase use of 
other types of herbicides and heavy tillage in an attempt to combat 
the problem.157 Similarly, caterpillars have also adapted to toxins 
meant to kill them and were found feasting on Bt cotton crops.158
And there are other problems. The uptake of transgenic crops 
like those covered by Roundup Ready patents lead to biodiversity 
loss, contaminate organic sources, and cause socioeconomic 
upheavals.159 In 2011, organic farmers sought a declaratory judgment 
                                                     
154. K. Sauer, Roundup Ready® Soybean Post-Patent Regulatory 
Commitment Extended Through 2021, MONSANTO (July 8, 2010),
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/roundup-ready-soybean-post-patent-
commitment-extended-through-2021.aspx. 
155. CHRIS BOERBOOM & MICHEAL OWEN, FACTS ABOUT GLYPHOSATE-
RESISTANT WEEDS 5 (2006), available at weedscience.missouri.edu/ 
publications/gwc-1.pdf.  
156. See Micheal D.K. Owen & Ian A. Zelaya, Herbicide-Resistant Crops 
and Weed Resistance to Herbicides, 61 PEST MGMT. SCI. 301, 301 (2005). “Super 
weeds” were detected as early as 1996 in Australia. Woolsey, supra note 24
(“Research shows that the super weeds are seven to 11 times more resistant to 
glyphosate than the standard susceptible population.”).
157. Eight Ways Monsanto Fails at Sustainable Agriculture, UNION 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/food_and_agriculture/our-failing-
food-system/genetic-engineering/eight-ways-monsanto-fails.html (last visited Apr. 
13, 2015); Allyson Martin, Seed Savers v. Monsanto: Farmers Need a Victory for 
Wilting Biodiversity, 24 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 95, 146 (2013) 
(“The need to manage glyphosate-resistance by using other herbicides alongside 
Roundup also undermines another advertised benefit of Roundup—the ability to 
control weeds with only one product.”).
158. Woolsey, supra note 24. 
159. See Ghoshray, supra note 4, at 503-04 (“The fallout of this invention 
has been well-documented through multiple instances of economic harm, 
fundamental reshaping of choice and lifestyle changes for farmers and consumers, 
irreversible loss of biodiversity, pervasive contamination within the environment, 
and irreparable harm to ecology through pollution.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. 
at 504 (“[G]enetically engineered crops propagate pollution via transgenic pathways 
by triggering widespread contamination as they alter and enhance gene flow from 
genetically engineered crops to target organic entities and species.”). The loss of 
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against Monsanto. They argued that Monsanto’s corn caused the loss 
of biological diversity due to crop contamination by genetically 
modified plants, the yet unknown toxic effects from the use of 
glyphosate and Bt toxin produced by Monsanto’s corn.160 The 
Federal Circuit found these concerns irrelevant to the narrow 
question of patent infringement it was asked to decide.161
The modern history of patent law is speckled with instances 
where courts have been asked to weigh extralegal questions of high 
social policy in determining questions of patent eligible subject 
matter and utility. Each time, the courts were content to focus the 
patent law inquiry based on its mandate—to promote the “useful 
Arts,” deferring to Congress to legislate on those other issues.162 As 
Professor Jim Chen noted, patent protection has become a “surrogate 
                                                                                                               
biodiversity has also been exacerbated by the consolidation of agro-biotech firms 
and exclusive dealing restrictions. See Lim, supra note 18, at 149, 201-20 
(discussing antitrust and patent misuse claims against Monsanto).
160. First Amended Complaint at 1-2, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n 
v. Monsanto Co., No.11-cv-2163-NRB (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2011), available at http:// 
www.pubpat.org/assets/files/seed/OSGATA-v-Monsanto-Complaint.pdf; see also
William Neuman & Andrew Pollack, Farmers Cope with Roundup-Resistant Weeds,
N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/energy-
environment/04weed.html?; Aziz Aris & Samuel Leblanc, Maternal and Fetal 
Exposure to Pesticides Associated to Genetically Modified Foods in Eastern 
Townships of Quebec, Canada, 31 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 528, 528-33 (2011).  
161. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Aside from the risk of suit by Monsanto, none of the alleged 
harms caused by contamination is traceable to Monsanto’s enforcement of its 
patents, they could not be remedied by a declaratory judgment, and they cannot 
serve as a basis for jurisdiction in this case.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 901 (2014). 
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 316-17 (1980) (“We are told that genetic research and related 
technological developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may result in a 
loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to depreciate the value of 
human life. . . . The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for 
resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, 
and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot. That process 
involves the balancing of competing values and interests, which in our democratic 
system is the business of elected representatives. Whatever their validity, the 
contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to the political branches of the 
Government, the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts.”); Juicy Whip, 
Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Of course, 
Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions unpatentable for a variety 
of reasons, including deceptiveness. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (exempting from patent 
protection inventions useful solely in connection with special nuclear material or 
atomic weapons). Until such time as Congress does so, however, we find no basis in 
section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility 
simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of the public.”).
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for direct, meaningful engagement of uncomfortable environmental 
issues in agriculture.”163 Patent law is not a one-size-fits-all legal 
solution. It is a legal tool to promote innovation and should be left to 
deal with what it does best. Once that piece is in place, we can 
refocus on finding solutions that directly address the problem.164
One example is the concern over a dearth of competition and 
innovation in the seed market.165 Commentators have traced this to 
“high concentration, single-firm dominance, and strategic conduct 
[that] forecloses rivals from the access to technology that is critical 
for intra-platform competition.”166 Part III examines the “scope of the 
patent” approach that courts have applied in condoning Monsanto’s
activities with scant scrutiny and explains why future cases must 
undertake a more thorough effects-focused analysis of that same 
conduct. 
Separately, as Part II will show, the promise and peril of 
genetically modified crop technology can cause courts to defer 
excessively to patentees like Monsanto. Conversely, the courts may 
be overprotective of consumers like farmers. Bowman opened the 
floodgates to both types of mischief. They must be closed. 
                                                     
163. Chen, supra note 1, at 253. 
164. One that has been seriously considered in recent years is turning bugs 
into livestock. Insects are rich in protein and essential micronutrients. They need 
much less space, emit lower levels of greenhouse gases, are drought resistant, and 
yield more edible protein per unit of feed. Meal made from insects could also 
replace soybeans fed to farm animals, lowering the cost of livestock products and 
freeing up grains for human consumption. See Emily Anthes, Lovely Grub: Are 
Insects the Future of Food?, MOSAIC (Oct. 14, 2014), http://mosaicscience. 
com/story/eating-insects (noting that the key to selling the diet is to process,
disguise, and rebrand the bugs). For example, wax worms that live in beehives and 
eat honeycombs taste “buttery” and “reminiscent of bacon.” They have been 
rechristened “honey bugs” and “honeycomb caterpillars.” See id. (noting that food 
preferences change, pointing to the fact that sushi was seen as a “strange foreign 
dish that showcased raw fish” that “became not just acceptable but trendy in the 
West”).
165. DIANA L. MOSS, AM. ANTITRUST INST., TRANSGENIC SEED PLATFORMS:
COMPETITION BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE? 11-12 (2009), available at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/AAI_Platforms%20and%20Trans
genic%20Seed_102320091053.pdf (“Intra-platform competition involves rivalry 
within platforms whereby firms develop new transgenic seed products, in part, by 
obtaining access to rivals’ patented traits.”).
166. Id. at 14; see also Joseph M. Purcell, Jr., Note, The “Essential 
Facilities” Doctrine in the Sunlight: Stacking Patented Genetic Traits in 
Agriculture, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1251, 1271 (2011) (“Given that the anti-stacking 
provisions in Monsanto’s licenses had the clear effect of restricting competition in 
stacked traits, it stands to reason that these licenses count as denial for the purposes 
of essential facility analysis.”).
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II. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Early on, the Solicitor General had advised the Court not to 
take the Bowman case, warning that it might have unintended 
consequences.167 The Court took the case anyway but tried to confine 
its holding as narrowly as possible. It noted that infringement might 
not be found when the replication occurred outside of the purchaser’s
control or where replication was a necessary but incidental step in 
using the item.168 The opinion also gave particular emphasis to 
Bowman’s premeditated conduct, leading commentators to question 
if the dicta could color the outcome in future cases.169
During oral arguments, the Supreme Court had also inquired 
about the conditional sale doctrine.170 The government’s response 
was that the Court need not rule on it because “[Quanta Computer, 
Inc. v. LG Electronics., Inc.] largely decided the issue” and “the 
Federal Circuit has not applied their previous version of the
[c]onditional [s]ale [d]octrine to enforce the post-sale restrictions 
since this Court’s decision in [Quanta].”171 The Court ultimately 
                                                     
167. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 
18, Bowman v. Monsanto Co, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796). 
168. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769 (“Our holding today is limited—addressing 
the situation before us, rather than every one involving a self-replicating product.”).  
169. Kristen Salvaggio, Patent Law—First-Sale Doctrine Does Not 
Extinguish Patentee’s Rights in Self-Replicating Organisms—Bowman v. Monsanto 
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013), 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 451, 459 (2014) (“While not 
requiring a showing of intent to prove patent infringement, the Supreme Court 
hinted that intent may be an important factor when analyzing cases involving self-
replicating organisms and appeared strongly persuaded by Bowman’s apparent 
intent . . . .”).
170. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-34, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 
11-796), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/11-796-1j43.pdf (“There is this issue in the case where you disagree, 
which is the Conditional Sale Doctrine. I am just wondering, before you finish up, 
could you say a bit about whether that doctrine is causing trouble as it presently 
exists in the Federal Circuit? In other words, could we just ignore that doctrine if we 
wanted to, or is it a very problematic one that we should take this opportunity to do 
something about?”).
171. Id. at 34 (“I think the Court does not need to do something about it in 
this case. I think Quanta largely decided the issue, even though it didn’t say so 
explicitly, and as far as I’m aware the Federal Circuit has not applied their previous 
version of the Conditional Sale Doctrine to enforce the post-sale restrictions since 
this Court’s decision in Quanta.”); see also id. at 47 (“[W]e agree with the 
government that there’s no need for the Court to address the question of conditional 
sales and the extent to which patent law recognizes under some circumstances 
conditional sales because in this case the Federal Circuit did not address that ground 
which we advocated and we still advocate . . . .”).
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declined to address it in its opinion. The Court’s silence will only 
serve to embolden the use of restrictions to convert every sale into a 
license.172 This is an unfair burden to users, who should be entitled to 
use, sell, or otherwise dispose of the items they buy as they wish.173
Both of these issues should be addressed.  
A. A Question of Inadvertence 
The Court focused on Bowman’s knowledge and intent to show 
how he could not have been an innocent infringer. It stressed that 
“Bowman devised and executed a novel way to harvest crops from 
Roundup Ready seeds without paying the usual premium.”174 Unlike 
other farmers, he bought seeds from a grain elevator anticipating that 
many would contain the Roundup Ready trait.175 Bowman’s spraying 
of his field with glyphosate would be irrational unless he knew a 
substantial percentage of soybeans had Roundup Ready traits. He 
“culled any plants without the patented trait” and then harvested 
Roundup Ready soybeans “at a chosen time; tended and treated 
them, including by exploiting their patented glyphosate-
resistance.”176 The Court concluded that “it was Bowman, and not the 
bean, who controlled the reproduction (unto the eighth generation) of 
Monsanto’s patented invention.”177
The Court thus introduced inadvertence as a potentially 
relevant factor in the analysis. To dispel any notion that this focus 
was accidental, the Court went on to add that “[i]n another case, the 
article’s self-replication might occur outside the purchaser’s control. 
Or it might be a necessary but incidental step in using the item for 
                                                     
172. Stern, supra note 20, at 4 & n.5 (transferring of possession of a patented 
product was a sale regardless of whether or not it was “accompanied by what 
purported to be a license”).
173. Guo, supra note 19, at 211 (“It remains unclear to what extent a patent 
owner can use a conditional license to impose restrictions on downstream purchasers 
to avoid patent exhaustion or whether the Quanta opinion has affirmatively rejected 
the view that one can contract around the doctrine.”); Lim, supra note 18, at 195 
(“The Court’s express expunging of Mallinckrodt in Bowman v. Monsanto would 
have been helpful in clarifying the law. More importantly, it would have provided a 
critical avenue out for these farmers, whose rights must now be tested and defined 
by further litigation.”).
174. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769. 
175. Id. at 1763-64 (“Bowman conceded that he knew of no other farmer 
who planted soybeans bought from a grain elevator.”).
176. Id. at 1769. 
177. Id.
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another purpose. . . . We need not address here whether or how the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion would apply in such circumstances.”178
Why did the Supreme Court focus on inadvertence? One 
possibility is that it was anxious to reassure organic farmers and 
others who find genetically modified crops on their land that they 
would not be hauled into court to face an infringement suit. During 
oral arguments, the Justices seemed most concerned about them.179
Another possibility is that it wanted to reassure the public that its 
ruling would not “prevent farmers from making appropriate use of 
the Roundup Ready seed they buy.”180
Transgenic crops spread by a variety of means. This includes 
seed drift, animal droppings, and movement of humans and vehicles. 
These could lead the trait to spread widely.181 Bowman results in a 
risk asymmetry. While farmers remain liable for infringement 
whether they desire the traited seeds or not, Monsanto appears to 
bear no responsibility for harmful changes in soil and potentially 
diminished yields.182 In 1998, organic corn processed into tortilla 
                                                     
178. Id.
179. Justice Kagan wondered about traited seeds contaminating organic crop 
fields and schoolchildren growing soybean seeds for science projects being sued for 
infringement. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 170, at 41 (“[S]eeds can be 
blown onto a farmer’s farm by wind, and all of a sudden you have Roundup seeds 
there and the person—farmer is infringing, or there’s a 10-year-old who wants to do 
a science project of creating a soybean plant, and he goes to the supermarket and 
gets an edamame, and it turns out that it’s Roundup seeds. . . . And, you know, these 
Roundup seeds are everywhere, it seems to me. There’s, what, 90 percent of all the 
seeds that are around? So it seems as though—like pretty much everybody is an 
infringer at this point, aren’t they?”). Justice Scalia was worried about farmers 
unintentionally growing contaminated seeds bought from grain elevators. Id. at 27-
28 (“[L]et me give you another horrible result, and that is if—if we agree with you, 
farmers will not be able to do a second planting by simply getting the 
undifferentiated seeds from—from a grain elevator because at least a few of those 
seeds will always be patented seeds, and no farmer could ever plant anything from a 
grain elevator, which means—I gather they use it for second plantings where the 
risks are so high that it doesn’t pay to buy expensive seed. Now they can’t do that 
anymore because there’s practically no grain elevator that doesn’t have at least one 
patented seed in it.”).
180. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768. 
181. Bagley, supra note 130, at 689-90 (describing the spread of StarLink, a 
Bt pest-resistant corn from 1% of Iowan cornfields to more than half of the fields 
there in only a year, introducing traits that were approved only for animal 
consumption into the processed food supply). 
182. Carey Gillam, Roundup Herbicide Research Shows Plant, Soil 
Problems, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Aug. 14, 2011, 3:32 PM),
http://www.mnn.com/your-home/organic-farming-gardening/stories/roundup-
herbicide-research-shows-plant-soil-problems (reporting that the use of glyphosate 
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chips was rejected by the European Union and destroyed because it
had been contaminated by cross-pollination from a neighboring 
field.183 The shipment was worth half a million dollars.184 In addition 
to export bans, transgenic contamination results in market 
restrictions, lower crop prices, and the loss of organic certification.185
Focusing on intent and control as elements of infringement 
avoids or mitigates these consequences. However, there are at least 
three problems with this focus. Shortly after Bowman was decided, 
the Federal Circuit was presented with an appeal concerning 
Monsanto. The reported decision highlights these three problems. In 
Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., about 
300,000 farmers, seed producers, and agricultural organizations 
members sought a declaratory judgment against Monsanto.186 The 
plaintiffs grew non-transgenic crops, often including certified 
organic corn, soybeans, and canola.187 They had sought an express 
waiver from Monsanto against inadvertent infringement.  
Monsanto refused, pointing them to its website declaration 
undertaking not to sue for inadvertent infringement based on trace 
amounts of patented seed or traits.188 It maintained that it would be 
economically irrational to sue for trace infringement since damages 
would be minimal. The plaintiffs sued.  
The first problem with focusing on inadvertence is that 
infringement is a strict-liability tort. The Federal Circuit noted that 
even one who “(replants) or sells even very small quantities of 
patented transgenic seeds without authorization may infringe any 
                                                                                                               
could be responsible for fungural root disease “that limit crop health and 
production,” as well as “cancer, miscarriages and other health problems in people 
and livestock”).
183. Richard A. Repp, Comment, Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for 
Genetically Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 585, 
591 (2000). 
184. Id.
185. Presumably such harms can be remedied under tort law. See Langan v. 
Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 222 (Wash. 1977) (finding substantial economic 
loss for loss of organic certification). 
186. Aisha Mahmood Haley, Note, The Blame the Beans Defense: Should 
Organic Farmers Look to Patent Exhaustion and Misuse for Protection Against 
Inadvertent Infringement?, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 372, 377 (2014). 
187. Id.
188. Monsanto’s Commitment: Farmers and Patents, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/commitment-farmers-patents.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2015) (“It has never been, nor will it be Monsanto policy to exercise 
its patent rights where trace amounts of our patented seeds or traits are present in 
farmer’s fields as a result of inadvertent means.”).  
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patents covering those seeds.”189 Infringement would result “even 
though that compound’s self-replicating properties might ‘place 
potential infringers in the untenable position of never knowing 
whether their product infringes because even a single undetectable 
[molecule] would infringe.’”190 Intent may be relevant as a defense to 
induced infringement when a defendant believes a patent is invalid, 
but that is a separate issue.191  
Second, the Court’s emphasis on intent and control makes the 
basis for infringement unclear.192 While the Federal Circuit noted that 
Bowman “leaves open the possibility that merely permitting 
transgenic seeds inadvertently introduced into one’s land to grow 
would not be an infringing use,” it also hedged its opinion, deciding 
that it would “assume (without deciding) that using or selling 
windblown seeds would infringe any patents covering those seeds, 
regardless of whether the alleged infringer intended to benefit from 
the patented technologies.”193 At least one commentator has noted 
otherwise, arguing that Bowman emphasized the “importance of 
affirmative action in negating patent exhaustion. An exhaustion 
defense should thus still be available for a farmer who, unlike 
Bowman, only incidentally grew a patented self-replicating 
technology because of genetic drift and pollen blow over.”194
The problem is particularly acute when it concerns traits that do 
not require overt action like Roundup Ready. Monsanto’s
glyphosate-resistant trait is valuable only when paired with 
                                                     
189. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 901 (2014). 
190. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. 
Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
191. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1368-69 
(Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 752 (2014) (mem.). 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) 
(2012) provides that “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be 
liable as an infringer.” See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced 
Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 406 (2006) 
(arguing that good faith belief in invalidity should negate intent). 
192. Peavey, supra note 66, at 486 (“The Court’s focus on Bowman’s active 
participation in selecting for Monsanto’s technology leaves ambiguous whether 
Farmer X’s use should be considered different from Bowman’s, or if Farmer X’s
use, regardless of her passivity, would still entail making and thus infringing.”);
Haley, supra note 186, at 384 (“The emphasis on control suggests that it was the 
crux of the issue—and, potentially, a new gatekeeper to the patent exhaustion 
doctrine. In this rare situation in patent law, intent was relevant.”).
193. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1356. 
194. Haley, supra note 186, at 385.  
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glyphosate.195 Farmers using that trait must do so by spraying 
glyphosate onto their crops, which makes it difficult for them to later 
argue that they did not have knowledge or intent to infringe. 
Bowman’s strategic use of grain elevator seeds for late-season 
planting over eight years is an easy case to pin liability based on 
intent and control.  
It will be considerably more difficult to prove intent and 
control where the patented technology fortifies the seed against 
environmental agents such as drought or insects.196 The same might 
be said for traits that increase yield, such as Monsanto’s own RR2Y. 
Professor Christopher Holman has suggested that farmers caught 
with patented seed could argue that they were trying to save money 
by obtaining cheap seed and had no intention of planting patented 
seed.197 Holman also suggests that farmers could argue that the 
patentee’s own actions rendered infringement unavoidable by 
encouraging widespread adoption of patented seed, “effectively 
pushing the technology into local grain elevators.”198 Given that 
seeds are not separated or marked by grain elevators, this could be a 
commonplace occurrence.  
Third, the wrinkle introduced by the Court’s dicta obfuscates 
the fact that farmers continue to face the threat of suit. It is true that 
Monsanto disclaimed any intent to sue inadvertent users or sellers of 
seeds that are inadvertently contaminated with up to 1% of seeds 
carrying Monsanto’s patented traits.199 This was probably intended to 
cover U.S. Department of Agriculture-certified organic farm or 
handling operations prohibited from using genetically modified 
                                                     
195. In theory, glyphosate can be used without a patented glyphosate-
resistant trait. However, given that this has not been done in a widespread fashion, 
the issue is arguably academic. 
196. Christopher M. Holman, How Real Is the Concern That Seed Patents 
Will Turn Farmers into Inadvertent Infringers?, 33 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 165, 
169 (2014). 
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 168; see also Food, Inc FAQs, MONSANTO, 
http://www.monsanto.com/food-inc/pages/faqs.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (“It 
has never been, nor will it be, Monsanto policy to exercise its patent rights where 
trace amounts of our patented traits are present in farmers’ fields as a result of 
inadvertent means. We have no motivation to conduct business in this manner, nor 
have we ever attempted to conduct business in this manner—and we surely would 
not prevail in the courts if we did.”); Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. 
Monsanto, Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 901 
(2014). 
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seed.200 This was also ostensibly pegged to the 0.9% standard 
allowed for imports into the European Union.201 It is true that the 
Uniform Commercial Code could provide downstream purchasers 
with a claim of derivative liability against the upstream seller, if not 
excluded.202 It is also true that the Federal Circuit noted that 
Monsanto’s declaration had an estoppel effect against it.203
However, the likelihood of transgenic contamination rising 
above that 1% level is real given how farming works in practice.204
The disclaimer is also of limited value. As an initial matter, 
Monsanto would not exclude the possibility of suing famers who had 
no intent or control even if they did not use glyphosate.205 The panel 
also noted “a substantial risk” that farmers “could be liable for 
infringement if they harvested and replanted or sold contaminated 
seed.”206 This was because “about one half of domestic cropland is 
                                                     
200. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1358 (“While the USDA has not 
established an upper limit on the amount of trace contamination that is permissible, 
the appellants argue, and Monsanto does not contest, that ‘trace amounts’ must mean 
approximately one percent (the level permitted under various seed and product 
certification standards).”).
201. Bagley, supra note 130, at 706.
202. See U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (“Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a
merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be 
delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement or the 
like but a buyer who furnishes specifications to the seller must hold the seller 
harmless against any such claim which arises out of compliance with the 
specifications.”).  
203. See Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1358 (stating Monsanto’s
representations not to sue would have estoppel effect). For a view that such pledges 
should be deemed enforceable under a reliance-based theory, see Jorge L. Contreras, 
Patent Pledges 4 (Univ. of Utah Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 93, 2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2525947. 
204. Brief for Farm & Ranch Freedom Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 9, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 
851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 1:11-cv-2163-NRB-RLE), available at
http://cdn.woodprairie.com/downloads/Amici%20Brief%20on%20Standing.pdf 
(“Given the realities of farming . . . it is certain that at least some of the Plaintiff 
farmers already have contamination that exceeds any of those levels.”).
205. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1359 (noting Monsanto was 
noncommittal on “whether it would assert its patents against a conventional grower 
who inadvertently uses or sells greater than trace amounts of modified seed, but 
who, for example, does not make use of the Roundup Ready trait by spraying the 
plants with glyphosate”). But see id. at 1356 (excluding farmers “whose crops 
become accidentally contaminated, and who do not treat their fields with Roundup, 
but who, knowing of the contamination, harvest and replant or sell the seeds”
expressly). 
206. Id. 
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sown with genetically modified crop varieties, and that some crops 
are ninety percent sown with Monsanto’s genetically modified 
seed.”207
Farmers who do not want to use Monsanto’s seed run the risk 
of infringement simply by purchasing seeds from a third-party 
source, and it may be impossible for unwilling users to prevent the 
unauthorized “making” of patented seed given the widespread 
commingling of seed containing the Roundup Ready trait.208 Even the 
Federal Circuit seemed resigned to the fact that the risk of 
infringement is inevitable.209
To protect inadvertent infringers, courts could rely on the fact 
that the farmers did not benefit from the infringement.210 None of the 
300,000 plaintiffs in Organic Seed Growers alleged that they had 
more than 1% of contaminated crop or that they planned “to 
selectively harvest and replant or sell contaminated seeds in a 
manner favoring the reproduction of transgenic seeds. To the 
contrary, the appellants are ‘using their best efforts to avoid’
contamination.”211  
Courts might also cap remedies in view of inadvertent 
infringement. In Monsanto v. Swann, the court awarded damages for 
current planting, but refused to extend those damages to potential 
future damages resulting from planting seed produced from the 
current infringing incident.212 In Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, the court 
                                                     
207. Id. at 1357. 
208. Id. (“Like any other seeds, transgenic seeds may contaminate non-
transgenic crops through a variety of means, including seed drift or scatter, 
crosspollination, and commingling via tainted equipment during harvest or post-
harvest activities, processing, transportation, and storage.” (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. (“[D]espite stringent precautionary 
measures meant to prevent any commingling of modified and conventional seed 
crops, a large majority of conventional seed samples have become contaminated by 
Monsanto’s Roundup resistance trait.”).
209. Id. (“The genetically modified seeds cannot easily be separated from 
conventional seeds; thus, a grower who harvests and uses or sells contaminated 
crops risks incurring infringement liability.”).
210. Salvaggio, supra note 169, at 460 (“For example, if Bowman had not 
sprayed his late-season crop with a glyphosate-based herbicide, he would not have 
utilized the benefit of the invention, thus leaving both parties in the same position 
they would have been in if there had been no unauthorized use at all.”); see also
Peavey, supra note 66, at 485.  
211. 718 F.3d at 1359 (citation omitted).
212. 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 944-46 (E.D. Mo. 2003); see also Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 23 (1997) (noting that the 
jury, on finding that the defendant had not intentionally infringed, awarded only 
20% of the damages sought by the patentee). 
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only allowed injunctive relief and not monetary damages that were 
based on speculative claims.213 Following from the Court’s decision 
in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., courts are now more willing 
to deny injunctive relief in appropriate cases, particularly where an 
injunction would impose substantial hardship on the defendant or the 
public interest.214
While the existence and extent of benefits may impact the 
quantum of damages eventually awarded, the farmer remains liable 
for infringement.215 Suits still cost farmers their legal fees and the 
cost of removing the contamination from their fields, leaving them 
without seed for the following years.216 Risk-averse farmers may end 
up having to purchase a bundle of licenses to avoid inadvertent 
liability for infringement from multiple patentees.217
States such as California have enacted legislation to protect its 
citizens against infringement suits by trait owners. California’s Seed 
Law exonerates farmers from contractual liability  
based on the presence or possession of a patented genetically [modified] 
plant on real property owned or occupied by the farmer when the farmer 
did not knowingly buy or otherwise knowingly acquire the genetically 
[modified] plant, the farmer acted in good faith and without knowledge of 
the genetically engineered nature of the plant, and when the genetically 
engineered plant is detected at a de minimis level.218  
                                                     
213. See 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 758 (N.D. Miss. 2001) (stating that 
quantification of “other damages, including that resulting from previous and 
potential future unlicensed brown bag sales of Monsanto’s patented Roundup 
Ready® and Bollgard® technology, are far less easily determined and computed. 
Equally difficult to discern are the resulting damages due to loss of consumer good 
will, the effect on Monsanto’s efforts to control and steward its technology, and the 
corresponding dampening effect on Monsanto’s research and development activities 
in the agricultural arena” as well as finding that injunctive relief was appropriate 
rather than monetary relief). 
214. 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006).
215. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1356 (“[W]e will assume (without 
deciding) that using or selling windblown seeds would infringe any patents covering 
those seeds, regardless of whether the alleged infringer intended to benefit from the 
patented technologies.”).
216. Jessica Lynd, Comment, Gone with the Wind: Why Even Utility Patents 
Cannot Fence in Self-Replicating Technologies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 663, 679-80 
(2013).  
217. Id. at 680 (“[P]ermitting infringement suits even when the court does 
not award damages creates a system through which the high risk of using 
conventional seeds and being sued due to unintended pollen drift incentivizes 
farmers to use GM seeds.”).
218. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 52305 (West 2009). 
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Maine law has a variation that prohibits a claim for damages 
from farmers found to have infringed based on de minimis amounts 
of traited crop.219 However, commentators agree that such laws are 
vulnerable to federal preemption.220 Less robust state laws stipulate 
procedures patentees have to comply with in order to enter crop 
fields to investigate or provide instructions to prevent cross-
contamination.221
Any real solution must come from Congress. It could enact a 
sector-specific legislative exemption based on the principle of de 
minimis non curat lex to protect against trace infringement. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Bowman noted, incidental uses 
could be exempt, citing a legislative exemption for copyright 
infringement for transitory copies made in the course of using a 
computer.222
European Union law offers an interesting alternative, framing 
the issue as one of statutory subject matter. European law confers 
patent protection only where “the product [is] incorporated and in 
which the genetic information is contained and performs its 
function.”223 In Monsanto Tech, LLC v. Cefetra BV, Monsanto sued 
importers of soymeal prepared from Roundup Ready soybeans.224
Since the patented trait was glyphosate resistance, the soymeal did 
not enjoy patent protection.225 This would not have availed the 
organic farmers who brought their grievance before the Federal 
                                                     
219. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 7, § 1053(1) (2009). 
220. Heimes, supra note 36, at 150 (“To the extent mere possession of a 
patented gene or sequence in the form of a living plant can constitute ‘use’ or 
‘making’ of the patented material, and therefore infringement, these laws would be 
preempted by federal law.”). The Biotechnology Industry Organization’s successful 
challenge of Montana’s Bill with a provision similar to the Californian law on the 
basis that the bill would “‘improperly restrict federal patent and plant variety 
protection rights established by the U.S [sic] Constitution and federal intellectual 
property law’ and would likely ‘be preempted by federal law.’” Id. at 120 (quoting 
Hearing on H.B. 445 Before the H. Agriculture Comm., 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Mont. 2009) (statement in opposition)).
221. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 52301(a), N.D. CENT. CODE § 4-
24-13(2)(a) (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 38-1-45 (2002).
222. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013) (stating that 
reproduction “might occur outside the purchaser’s control” or “might be a necessary 
but incidental step in using the item for another purpose”).  
223. Council Directive 98/44, art. 9, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 19 (EC). 
224. Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech, LLC v. Cefetra BV, 2010 E.C.R. I-
06765. 
225. See Bagley, supra note 130, at 707 (discussing the case).  
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Circuit, but it does identify yet another bog of patent infringement 
that awaits the unwary.  
For now, however, the best farmers can do is not to plan their 
commercial affairs assuming that the Federal Circuit’s decision 
offers any safe haven. They should instead marshal their 
considerable lobbying prowess and push for a legislative safe 
harbor—and hope they are not worth Monsanto’s time. 
B. The Conditional Sale Doctrine  
Monsanto and other seed companies impose “bag-tag” licenses 
on farmers, so called because of tags printed on each bag of seed 
stating prohibitions, including the resale of seed or replanting of 
saved seed.226 The district court in Bowman found that neither the 
grain elevator nor farmers who sold their seeds to it could confer 
these rights to Bowman since they did not have those rights 
themselves.227 The Federal Circuit affirmed.228
This restricted or “conditional sale” doctrine sprang from the 
Federal Circuit’s opinion in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., a 
case decided at the height of patent expansionism.229 At issue was a 
“single use” restriction on a patented medical nebulizer. The patentee 
placed a notice of the restriction on the device as well as its 
packaging. Hospitals paid the defendant to recondition used 
                                                     
226. Bruce Stutz, Companies Put Restrictions on Research into GM Crops,
ENVIRONMENT360 (May 13, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/companies_put_ 
restrictions_on_research_into_gm_crops/2273/ (“Farmers don’t simply buy a bag of 
GM seed from Monsanto, Syngenta, or DuPont. Scientists found their research 
ultimately subject to seed company approval. Instead, they enter into a 
‘Technology/Stewardship Agreement’ with the company that developed it, the fine 
print of which lays out, among other things, the terms under which the seed can be 
used, where it can be grown, where it can be sold (many international governments 
do not allow the sale of GM crops or products made with them), and the brand of 
herbicides that can be used. This ‘bag-tag,’ as it’s known, also specifically restricts 
any use of the seed for research.”).
227. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 839 (S.D. Ind. 2009) 
(citing Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
228. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
229. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust: 
Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 336 (2014) 
(“From the 1980s through to early 2000s, the pendulum swung in the direction of 
strong patent rights.”). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust Policy: 
A Brief Historical Overview 4 (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 05-
31, 2005), available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=869417 
(“[W]e once again live in an era of IP expansionism.”).
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nebulizers in violation of those restrictions.230 The district court held 
that exhaustion applied, reasoning that allowing patentees to impose 
conditions on patented articles post-sale would turn what was in 
substance a sale into a license.231 The Federal Circuit reversed, 
holding that parties were free to structure their dealings as long as it 
was within the scope of the patent rights.232 Since a patent confers a 
basket of rights to the patentee to sell, use, make, import, and offer to 
sell the invention, patentees could also sell patented articles with 
conditions.233
While unconditional sales give patentees “an amount equal to 
the full value of the goods,” with conditional sales “it is more 
reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects 
only the value of the ‘use’ rights conferred by the patentee.”234 Any 
anticompetitive effects extending beyond that scope would not be 
prohibited as long as the restrictions did not violate antitrust law or 
amount to patent misuse.235 Under Federal Circuit jurisprudence, only 
an authorized, unconditional sale exhausts the patentee’s rights in the 
item.236
The conditional sale doctrine has kept exhaustion at bay, 
allowing patentees to sue downstream users who breached these 
restrictions for infringement based on unauthorized uses of the item 
sold.237 The quasi-sale model, upon which the conditional sale 
doctrine rests, derives from the use of licenses to convey the right to 
                                                     
230. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 702.  
231. Id. at 703 (“The court stated that policy considerations require that no 
conditions be imposed on patented goods after their sale and that Mallinckrodt’s
restriction could not ‘convert what was in substance a sale into a license.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
232. Id. at 708-09 (finding post-sale restrictions such as field-of-use 
restrictions enforceable by patent infringement if within the patent scope, and per se 
unenforceable only in cases of price-fixing or tying). 
233. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 529 (“One possible justification for the 
single use only restriction rests on the observation that inherent in the patent grant is 
the right to limit output. A patentee has the right to produce any amount of the 
patented good it pleases, right down to zero. A single use restriction is in fact a type 
of output reduction.” (footnote omitted)). 
234. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
235. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708. 
236. Id. at 706; see also Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 
(N.D. Miss. 2001) (“The exhaustion doctrine only applies where the sale or license 
of the patented invention is an unconditional one.”). This was not the Federal 
Circuit’s first attempt to restrict the scope of a patent defense. See Lim, supra note 
229, at 333. 
237. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708-09.
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use the software but not to reproduce it in contravention of licensing 
terms.238
The seed-trait industry adopted this business model, creating a 
chain of licenses from trait developers to propagators, distributors, 
and farmers, all the while leaving that leash in the hands of the 
patentee.239 Since a license historically also involves the return of the 
good at the end of the license term, Monsanto cherry-picked the 
convenient characteristics of licenses while protesting in its brief to 
the Supreme Court that selling soybeans to farmers was “[t]he only 
practical way to license the Roundup Ready® trait commercially.”240
In contrast with “more traditional technologies” where patentees can 
license uses while transferring title, the seeds “delivering the 
patented technology to licensees are fully consumed when used; they 
cannot be leased or rented because Monsanto could not require 
return of those articles upon completion of the licensed use.”241
Neither was a pure license appropriate, Monsanto asserted, because 
traited beans are produced “only through propagation and cross-
breeding of a seed that already contains the patented invention.”242
As a matter of economic theory, parceling out rights and 
charging users based on the nature and extent of use is generally 
efficient.243 Parties generally settle upon terms reflecting the value a 
buyer places on the bundle of rights the seller is offering. However, 
there are three problems with using the conditional sale doctrine to 
achieve this.  
The first problem is that the Federal Circuit misapplied 
Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court last spoke on patent 
                                                     
238. Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting 
Around Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 
101 (2006) (“Owners of intellectual property now use licenses to transfer chattels 
without transferring many presumed rights, including the right to transfer the chattel 
to another, the right to possession and use without temporal limit . . . .”).
239. Winston, supra note 36, at 453 (“This broad range of control allows the 
seed developer to maintain privity and to ensure that the title to the seed never 
leaves the developer’s hands.”); see also Winston, supra note 238, at 103 (“The 
impact of this circumvention on the public’s rights is startling. For example, by 
licensing instead of selling seed, Monsanto can impose significant post-transfer 
restrictions on the use of the seed, as it did in the McFarling case discussed above, 
thereby completely vitiating the first sale doctrine.”).
240. Brief for Respondents, supra note 92, at 13, 35 n.21. 
241. Id. at 46. 
242. Id. at 47. 
243. Kesan, supra note 102, at 1085 (“Differential pricing allows many more 
transactions to clear in the marketplace than is the case if only unconditional sales 
were allowed.”).
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exhaustion in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.244 The 
patentee granted Intel a chip manufacturing license to its method 
patents that unconditionally authorized Intel to sell the 
microprocessors.245 Intel made microprocessors, which it sold to the 
defendant manufacturer, Quanta, who in turn made computers using 
Intel chips.246 The Court held Intel’s patents were exhausted with 
respect to the chips despite the license expressly forbidding third 
parties from practicing the patents by combining them with non-Intel 
parts.247
Some commentators have characterized Quanta narrowly, 
arguing that defter contract language would impose a post-sale 
restriction on downstream purchasers.248 Had LG prohibited Intel 
from making those sales, the process patents in suit would not have 
been exhausted. However, at least two signs point in the opposite 
direction.  
The first indication comes from the exchange during oral 
arguments in the Bowman case itself. When Justice Kagan invited 
the government to speak to the conditional sale doctrine, the basis for 
it declining to do so was that “Quanta largely [settled] the issue” and 
“the Federal Circuit has not applied their previous version of the 
Conditional Sale Doctrine to enforce the post-sale restrictions since 
this Court’s decision in Quanta.”249 That is not quite correct, since 
the Federal Circuit did rely on the conditional sale doctrine to find 
patent infringement in Bowman.250 Monsanto’s counsel also declined 
to address the issue, wisely preferring to focus liability simply on the 
new “making” as the basis for infringement.251 However, the key 
takeaway here is the government’s basis for not speaking on the 
doctrine: Quanta had set the Federal Circuit right. 
The second indication lies in the reasoning from the oft-cited 
district court opinion in Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark 
International, Inc.252 The district court in that case noted that “from 
the beginning the Supreme Court has recognized a difference 
                                                     
244. 553 U.S. 617 (2008).  
245. Id. at 623-24. 
246. Id. at 624. 
247. Id. at 637-38. 
248. See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing 
Law Jurisprudence: Its Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 237 (2009). 
249. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 170, at 34. 
250. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
251. See supra note 171. 
252. See 615 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Ky. 2009).  
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between end users of patented articles and licensees of the right to 
make and/or sell those articles.”253 The basis for this distinction lay in 
the fact that manufactures make and sell the item containing the 
patentees’ technology and share its exclusive rights.254 In contrast, 
end users obtain the right to use a patented article “‘in the ordinary 
pursuits of life.’”255 They do not exercise any rights directly under the 
Patent Act via a license from patentee. Thus, “when the machine 
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits 
of the monopoly. It passes outside of it, and is no longer under the 
protection of the act of Congress.”256
At this point, the item becomes “private, individual property, 
not protected by the laws of the United States, but by the laws of the 
State in which it is situated.”257 The court concluded that “[t]he 
Supreme Court’s broad statement of the law of patent exhaustion 
simply cannot be squared with the position that the Quanta holding 
is limited to its specific facts.”258 Commentators agree that the 
conditional sale doctrine is no longer good law post-Quanta.259
                                                     
253. Id. at 579, 582 (“In sum, the Supreme Court’s overview of its history of 
statements on the law of patent exhaustion reveals that the Court has consistently 
held that patent holders may not invoke patent law to enforce restrictions on the 
post-sale use of their patented products. After the first authorized sale to a purchaser 
who buys for use in the ordinary pursuits of life, a patent holder’s patent rights have 
been exhausted.”); see also Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873) 
(noting that while the right of licensee–manufacturers to make and sell the coffin 
lids was restricted to the circle often miles around Boston, the right of their 
customers to use the coffin lids was not). 
254. Static Control Components, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 582 (“Language in 
the Mitchell opinion, however, suggests the Court considered the restriction at issue 
to be a condition limiting the right to sell, rather than a post-sale restriction on the 
right of use. For example, the Court wrote that ‘the grantor under whom the 
respondents claim never acquired the right to sell the machines and give their 
purchasers the right to use the same . . . beyond the term of the original patent . . . .’
In this way, Mitchell is distinguishable from the Court’s other cases dealing with the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 550 (1872))); see also id. (“[In] General 
Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., . . . the license from the patent 
owner prohibited the manufacturer from making its initial sales of the patented 
amplifiers to commercial users. Sales to commercial users were thus unauthorized 
and did not result in patent exhaustion.” (citations omitted)). 
255. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) 
(quoting Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852)). 
256. Bloomer, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 549. 
257. Id. at 550. 
258. Static Control Components, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 586; see also
Samuel F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted Defendant: Should Parties Be
Able to Contract Around Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation?, 2014 U. ILL. J.L.
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An intermediary manufacturer licensee remains liable for both 
contractual remedies for breaching the terms of the license and 
patent remedies since a license is nothing more than a covenant not 
to sue.260 In General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.,
the case the Federal Circuit used as the basis for its conditional sale 
doctrine, the Supreme Court was presented with a license to make a 
sound system subject to a post-sale field-of-use restriction for 
noncommercial use.261 It did not concern the sale of a patented item. 
The licensee sold the finished product without restriction in violation 
of the license agreement. Since the first sale of a completed good in 
the transaction was not “authorized” by the patentee, exhaustion did 
not apply.  
As between two corporate entities, the manufacturer and patent 
owner are better placed to bear the burden of allocating risks and 
determining a market-clearing price.262 It may also be asked why 
                                                                                                               
TECH. & POL’Y 445, 448 (“[I]n the years since the Quanta decision, the lower courts 
have generally adopted the broader reading of Quanta.”).
259. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 528 (“The Federal Circuit’s now 
overruled Mallinckrodt decision had departed from Supreme Court precedent by 
permitting a patentee to enforce a post-sale restraint on some patented articles by 
distinguishing unconditional from conditional sales.”); Thomas G. Hungar, 
Observations Regarding the Supreme Court’s Decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. 
LG Electronics., Inc., 49 IDEA 517, 532-33 (2009); Sheff, supra note 95, at 234; Li, 
supra note 19, at 205 (“While the Federal Circuit’s conditional sale doctrine 
provides broad protection to the patent owner by allowing post-sale restrictions to 
prevent exhaustion of the patent owner’s rights, the Supreme Court appears to reject 
the conditional sale doctrine in Quanta by providing downstream purchasers, not 
patent owners, with more protection under the patent laws.”); Heimes, supra note 
36, at 118 (“Since the Scruggs case was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court broadened 
the patent exhaustion doctrine in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,
reversing the Federal Circuit’s narrow application of the [exhaustion] doctrine.”
(footnote omitted)). 
260. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 522 (“When the patentee sells an 
unfinished article that requires application of the patentee’s method patents in order 
to make that particular copy of the article useable or marketable the first sale 
doctrine also applies. Further, both the technology embodied in the article and the 
process patents needed to finish it are exhausted as to that copy.”); see also id. at 
521 (“By contrast, when the patentee licenses production rights to someone else 
there is no inherent limit on the number of patented articles that the licensee can 
make or what their disposition will be. That means that post-transfer conditions are 
essential and generally enforceable, including by means of infringement actions, 
unless they are anticompetitive or in violation of patent policy.”).
261. 304 U.S. 175, 176-77 (1938). 
262. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 524 (“A pure manufacturing license 
without a post-contract restriction would place no limit on the licensee’s ability to 
produce as much as it wished and sell wherever and to whomever it pleased.”).
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contractual remedies against distributors would be insufficient to 
make aggrieved patentees whole. It may be that agreements between 
them require careful drafting to better allocate risks, but that burden 
should not be placed on consumers who live under the threat of a 
patent infringement suit.  
District courts have chafed at being forced to apply the 
conditional sale doctrine.263 As one noted:  
Quanta itself reaffirms the Supreme Court’s articulation of the doctrine of 
patent exhaustion as set forth in the cases discussed in the previous 
section. It represents a change in the law, however, because the Court 
reasserted a broad understanding of patent exhaustion in the face of 
Federal Circuit case law that had narrowed the scope of the doctrine. That 
Federal Circuit case law had been followed as binding precedent by the 
district courts, including this one.264  
The second problem with the Federal Circuit’s conditional sale 
doctrine is that it over rewards patentees. Exhaustion is a doctrinal 
safety valve to prevent extension of the patent right beyond the first 
sale.265 Under the conditional sale doctrine, unauthorized uses of the 
article sold would itself be patent infringement as long as the patent 
was in force, giving patentees an end-run around exhaustion.266
Licensing models more commonly found in software and e-
commerce should only be applied to tangible goods with 
considerable caution. Consumers in the online world show a 
                                                     
263. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, No. 3:00CV-161-P-D, 2009 WL 536833, at 
*2 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 3, 2009) (“[T]he Court is fully cognizant of the wealth of 
persuasive authority which posits the opposite conclusion, e.g. that Quanta’s
holding on the doctrine of patent exhaustion is a substantial limitation on the rights 
of patent holders.”).
264. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 
575, 582-83 (E.D. Ky. 2009). 
265. Garmezy, supra note 126, at 198 (noting that patent exhaustion “works 
to counterbalance the patentee’s monopoly power and prevent anticompetitive 
abuse”).
266. See Eric J. Rogers, The Inexhaustible Right to Exclude Reproduction 
Doctrine, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 389, 406 (2013) (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s
reasoning in Mallinckrodt allows patentees to use contracts to prevent patent 
exhaustion via terms defining an authorized sale and enforce post-sale restrictions 
using patent infringement actions.”); Garmezy, supra note 126, at 198 (“The Federal 
Circuit, however, has developed an opposing doctrine, the conditional sale doctrine, 
under which a patentee may use an enforceable contract to restrict the rights of a 
buyer using a patented article, even after a subsequent sale.”); Ghoshray, supra note 
4, at 506 (“Implicit in the Bowman scenario, then, is Monsanto’s quest for an 
assurance that would seem to go against this basic principle, as it attempts to apply 
the conditional sale exception to the future sale of its patented seed technology in 
perpetuity.”).
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preference for acquiring subscriptions for streaming services. Zip 
cars and bike share schemes are also increasingly popular. However, 
in all these instances, consumers are clearly licensing only the rights 
to use the items and have not acquired ownership rights over them. 
Once consumers stop paying subscription fees, access ceases.  
Seeds sold by Monsanto and its authorized seed partners are 
physically transferred without an expectation for their return. The 
Quanta Court found patents over methods and processes exhausted 
upon an authorized sale. With seeds that contain patented traits, the 
argument that patent exhaustion should apply to resale and uses of 
the seeds that fall short of replication is even more compelling than 
for methods or processes. If the price tag on the seed indeed 
inadequately reflects the cost of the bundle of rights farmers obtain 
as a result, the burden should rest on Monsanto, as the price-setter, to 
justify that it deserves more.267 If patentees can reach deep into the 
tributaries of downstream commerce, they can sue any number of 
downstream buyers who used the item in a manner contrary to the 
conditions placed upon the sale for the duration of the patent.268
Watering down exhaustion to safeguard specific uses from 
exhaustion results in a regime that is both arbitrary and unfair.269
More recently, the Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc. unequivocally noted the “absurd result” that would exist 
if a copyright owner could exercise downstream control even when it 
authorized the first sale.270 Giving patentees the ability to meter 
downstream uses under the threat of infringement goes against the 
expectation that buyers own the rights to use the invention as long as 
                                                     
267. Heimes, supra note 36, at 132 (“A patent on a genetically modified 
plant is commonly a composition of matter patent, the embodiment of which is 
typically in an article or tangible thing (seed) and thus even more likely to fall under 
exhaustion principles upon sale than something more ephemeral like methods or 
processes.”).
268. 2 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW
§ 17:4 (2015) (labelling as “problematic” the Federal Circuit’s “rationale that since 
the patentee had imposed express license restrictions on authorized sales of its 
patented seeds, an ‘unrestricted sale’ for purposes of the exhaustion doctrine had not 
occurred”).  
269. Heimes, supra note 36, at 132 (“They must as well accept the 
consequences, which include being subject to the exhaustion doctrine. Arguments 
that innovation in plant technologies will be stifled if their self-replicating nature is 
not given special status for exhaustion purposes are not likely to carry the day with 
this Court. The Quanta Computer opinion reflects the Court’s skepticism of creating 
exhaustion-free categories for patent protection, as they invite clever claims drafting 
in an attempt to ‘end run’ around the doctrine.” (footnote omitted)).
270. 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1366 (2013). 
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it does not impinge on recoupment in the owner’s primary market. 
Patentees should turn to upstream sellers for redress.  
Third, by turning every sale into a license, the conditional sale 
doctrine impedes the formation of a secondary market for seeds sold 
by Monsanto or its seed partners.271 The U.S. District Court in the 
Northern District of Mississippi noted that the defendants would 
secure “an unfair advantage over all growers who have acted in good 
faith in compliance with their licenses” if a “‘black market’” for crop 
seed were “allowed to exist and to thrive.”272 It concluded that “to 
have patented technology pirated” would “discourage future 
investment in innovative technology” and “is not in the public’s best 
interest.”273 Another court analogized a farmer to a “car-lessor crying 
foul upon discovering he cannot retain the car after his lease 
expires.”274
These are remarkable statements. Not all uses that derogate 
from restrictions patentees placed on users are illegitimate. Farmers 
with the audacity to grow new seed will face the sting of patent 
infringement. In other instances, patentees who authorized the initial 
sale have been rewarded and cannot control subsequent uses.275 It is 
the “ability of buyers to transact in patented articles without fear of 
patent infringement liability” that “encourages vibrant downstream 
market competition.”276
Allowing patentees to control downstream users would erode 
the property rights in the purchased goods and raise the risk of 
                                                     
271. See Mark R. Patterson, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Patent 
Infringement Through Field-of-Use Licensing, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 204 
(2007) (“Part of the problem here may stem from the Federal Circuit’s failure to 
distinguish between contracts and licenses.”).
272. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 760 (N.D. Miss. 2001).  
273. Id. at 760-61. 
274. Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 942 (E.D. Mo. 2003) 
(“They are not in the position of new-car purchaser obliged to purchase a new car 
every year. Rather, they are in the position of a car-lessor crying foul upon 
discovering he cannot retain the car after his lease expires.”).
275. Elsewhere, I have suggested a framework for delineating unauthorized 
“making” from authorized “uses.” In essence, it should fulfill a public notice 
function by being sufficiently clear and certain for patentees and others. Second, it 
should protect the patentee’s monopoly while not stifling reasonable competition by 
taking into account customary expectations. Third, the actor or factor allegedly 
creating the new article is irrelevant. Also irrelevant is how the defendant views or 
markets its products. What is relevant is the relative life expectancies of the patented 
and unpatented portions of the article. See Lim, supra note 18, at 170. 
276. Id. at 168. 
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infringement to an intolerable level.277 It can be difficult for 
consumers to determine whether the item was obtained as a result of 
a license or sale and that the attendant rights of the original buyer 
accrue to the user.278 According to Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, the 
conditional sale doctrine is “excessive given the self-deterring nature 
of harmful reuse restrictions and the alternative explanations for at 
least some of them.”279 It could also lead to “a significant problem of 
hold-up.”280
This hold-up could occur because patentees can sue 
downstream users with sunk investments for patent infringement on 
any number of activities that would have otherwise been allowed by 
patent exhaustion. As it is, suits against customers have been on the 
rise.281 While cases thus far have either required notice to be given or 
observed that notice was in fact given, in theory “innocent 
subsequent purchasers could be sued for patent infringement for 
violating conditions they knew nothing about.”282 The restraints also 
harm competition by reducing output, increasing prices, and 
excluding rivals from the market.283
                                                     
277. Winston, supra note 238, at 108-09 (“As private legislation seeks to 
circumvent established case law on the restraints available after the first sale of an 
article that benefits from the protection given to patents, the balance between public 
rights and owners’ rights tilts in favor of the owners and away from the public.”); 
Lim, supra note 18, at 167-68 (“If patent owners like Monsanto could control every 
use, sale or making of the seeds in the marketplace, the property rights of end-
consumers such as farmers would be eroded, and intermediate service providers 
such as seed cleaners and grain elevators could become contributory infringers.”).  
278. Winston, supra note 238, at 121.  
279. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 531 (“A patentee could certainly warn 
against reuse, but it could not restrain reuse by means of a patent infringement 
suit.”).
280. Id. at 542. 
281. Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law’s Customer 
Suit Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1606-15 (2013). 
282. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 542; see also Love & Yoon, supra note 
281, at 1606-15; Winston, supra note 238, at 121-28 (suggesting five factors to 
make that determination: (1) the terms of the contract; (2) the nature of the right and 
its commercial embodiment; (3) the price structure and time of transfer; (4) IP 
owners’ policies or marketing program; (5) economic realities). 
283. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 493 (“The principal harms that can result 
from post-sale conditions are restraints on competition and restraints on innovation. 
Restraints on competition occur when a practice reduces output, increases prices, or 
unreasonably excludes firms from a market. Restraints on innovation occur when a 
practice acts to hinder rather than to promote innovation, typically by imposing 
limitations on the innovations of others.”).
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Hence, one may conclude that the law on patent exhaustion 
provides that an authorized sale extinguishes all rights to that item.284
In the context of Bowman, the farmer had bought the seeds from a 
grain elevator. The seeds should have been sold clear of any title or 
lien to Monsanto. Patent exhaustion would allow Bowman to sell the 
seeds, even for third-party replanting, without fear of infringement 
inasmuch as he could have used it for feed or resold the seeds.285
Patent orthodoxy would hold that in that case, the third-party 
would be liable only when the progeny seeds bearing the transgenic 
traits were created, and Bowman would be guilty of inducing that 
third-party’s infringement, assuming the required elements were 
made out.286 It is the emergence of the progeny seed bearing the 
patented trait to which infringement attaches, not the use of the seed 
bought from the grain elevator to create new seed that is infringing. 
However, Bowman should not be guilty of direct infringement 
simply for making the sale in breach of the licensing terms.  
Similarly, end users may be liable for “making” a new item 
because patent liability arises from the unauthorized new creation 
and not because of an unauthorized use of the item to effect that 
creation. End users remain outside the reach of patent remedies for 
breaches falling short of that. As Hovenkamp noted, “[i]f the original 
purchaser breached an agreement to provide notice to downstream 
purchasers, then the appropriate remedy would be a breach of 
contract action against the first purchaser.”287
                                                     
284. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).  
285. See Ghoshray, supra note 4, at 506 (“Under the traditional patent 
exhaustion principle, upon the consummation of the sale from the third party to 
Bowman, the patent holder Monsanto would not be conferred any residual control 
over the use of those seeds, including their subsequent distribution.”).
286. In McFarling, the Federal Circuit actually endorsed the view that 
infringement runs from the moment of new creation, not the use of the item against 
contractual restrictions. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1342-43
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Based on the record before us, McFarling plants and grows the 
first-generation seed in an identical fashion whether he intends to sell the second-
generation seed as a commercial crop for consumption or whether he intends to 
replant it. Thus, the Technology Agreement does not impose a restriction on the use 
of the product purchased under license but rather imposes a restriction on the use of 
the goods made by the licensed product.”); see also Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. 
SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) (setting out the requirements for inducement). 
287. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 520; see also Static Control Components, 
Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 586-87 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“This is 
not to say, however, that state contract law may not be invoked. In the Order at 
Record 1008, this Court addressed Static Control’s argument that, regarding Prebate, 
Lexmark could not show any meeting of the minds as required by Kentucky contract 
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A recent Federal Circuit case expressed a more moderate view. 
In LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC, the court 
stated that the “basic principle” underlying exhaustion is that “the 
authorized transfer of ownership in a product embodying a patent 
carries with it the right to engage in that product’s contemplated 
use.”288 Absent were references to the requirement of the sale being 
unconditional and even the requirement of a sale. Rather than be 
bound by formalistic line drawing delineating sales and licenses, the 
court held that exhaustion was triggered when the transferee acquired 
title to the patented item, even if the transaction fell short of a sale.289
Neither was the adequacy of the patentee’s reward a necessary 
condition to triggering exhaustion. To do so “‘would cast a cloud of 
uncertainty’ over every transaction and every patented product.”290
Instead, the court expressed concern that “barring the use of the 
meter with strips manufactured by the accused infringer would bar 
the use of the meters for their contemplated function and extend the 
patent monopoly improperly.”291 What was material was that the 
                                                                                                               
law, and, therefore, Prebate terms could not constitute valid, enforceable contracts 
between Lexmark and it customers.” (citation omitted)); Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 
(No. 06-937) (“Restrictions on downstream use or resale may arise as a matter of 
state contract law, but not patent law . . . . .”); id. at 7 (“The doctrine bars the use of 
patent law (but not contract law) to enforce restrictions on a purchaser’s use or 
resale of a patented article that was purchased from the patentee or from someone 
authorized by the patentee to sell the article.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 521-
22 (“Under the first sale doctrine, when a finished patented article is sold to the first 
purchaser the patentee’s interests in that copy of the article are at an end; any 
limitations on further disposition of the article are governed by contract law and 
state public policy concerning restraints on alienation.”).
288. 734 F.3d 1361, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The perimeters of 
“contemplated use” are bounded by the contractual language on permissible uses as 
well federal preemption by the patent laws.  
289. Id. at 1374 (“Thus, despite frequent references to ‘sales’ and 
‘purchasers,’ the Court has more fundamentally described exhaustion as occurring 
when the patented product ‘passes to the hands’ of a transferee and when he ‘legally 
acquires a title’ to it. . . . Each of these formulations is broad enough to include a 
transfer of title that does not amount to a sale.”).
290. Id. at 1377 (quoting Tessera, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 646 F.3d 
1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that patent exhaustion applied even though the 
seller failed to pay promised royalties to the patentee)); see also Static Control 
Components, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 586 (“[T]his Court is now persuaded that, 
regardless of the fact that Lexmark may not have received the full value of its 
Prebate cartridges, after Quanta Lexmark may not invoke patent law in order to 
enforce its Prebate terms.”).
291. LifeScan Scotland, Ltd., 734 F.3d at 1373. 
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items sold were constructed with the patentee’s permission.292 To 
hold otherwise “would be inconsistent with the doctrine’s underlying 
rationale—to permit the owner of an item who received it in an 
authorized transfer to use it.”293 While LifeScan did not address the 
conditional sale doctrine directly, it creates a rift in the court’s
jurisprudence on licensing restrictions. This rift should be properly 
addressed in a future case either by the Federal Circuit sitting en 
banc or by the Supreme Court.  
Restoring the full scope of exhaustion is an important step to 
circumscribe overreaching by patentees. At the same time, 
Hovenkamp pointed out that exhaustion had a key disadvantage: 
“[O]nce such a sale is found enforcement of the post-sale restraint is 
denied automatically, with no consideration of the restraint’s purpose 
or effect. This means that market power, competitive effects and 
implications for innovation are all irrelevant.”294 Here, he notes that 
antitrust law and patent misuse are more finely calibrated 
instruments better suited to the task.295
III. EXHAUSTION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENT MISUSE
In addition to patent exhaustion, Monsanto has been involved 
in cases where allegations of patent misuse or antitrust violations 
have been raised.296 Even though courts recite that patents “do not 
                                                     
292. Id. at 1374-75 (“A ‘sale’ limitation would indeed be inconsistent with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in McQuewan, where the particular machines at issue 
had never been sold, but had instead been manufactured by the accused infringer 
with the permission of the patentee. Yet that lack of a ‘sale’ was no barrier to the 
application of patent exhaustion. Because the machines had been constructed with 
the patentee’s authorization and were the ‘private, individual property’ of the 
accused infringer, they were ‘no longer under the protection of’ the Patent Act.”
(citations omitted)). 
293. Id. at 1375. 
294. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 541. 
295. Id. at 531 (“Rule of reason analysis under the antitrust laws or perhaps 
patent misuse doctrine seems more appropriate to the task.”).
296. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) 
(discussing how a distributor of agricultural herbicides brought antitrust suit against 
the manufacturer alleging Monsanto conspired with other distributors to fix resale 
prices and terminated plaintiff for price-cutting); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 
1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing a farmer accusing Monsanto of misuse and 
antitrust violations through its “seed grower incentive programs, its seed partner 
license agreements, its grower license agreements, and its alleged refusal to sell 
Roundup Ready® cotton seeds without the Bollgard trait”); Monsanto Co. v. 
McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing a farmer accusing 
Monsanto of misuse and antitrust violations by refusing to allow the “untying” of 
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confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws,”297 challenges against 
Monsanto have fared dismally. Courts rejected antitrust accusations 
on the basis of the “scope of the patent” approach unless there was a 
per se violation, which only happened once.298 Misuse allegations 
fared even worse. No court applying the “scope of the patent” test 
has found Monsanto guilty of misuse.299
Like the law on patent exhaustion, the law on patent misuse has 
been misapplied by the Federal Circuit. According to the Federal 
Circuit, for misuse to be found, the patentee had to have broadened 
“‘the scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.’”300 In 
doing so, the Federal Circuit imported antitrust law’s requirement of 
anticompetitive effects into misuse and reformulated it as an 
“antitrust-lite” doctrine, despite Supreme Court precedent expressly 
rejecting an antitrust basis for misuse and turning instead to patent
policy for that basis.301  
                                                                                                               
“the seed and the trait by permitting the farmer to save and replant ROUNDUP 
READY® seed each year, provided the farmer still pays directly to Monsanto the 
required technology fee, rather than requiring a farmer to purchase both the seed and 
the genetic technology together at the beginning of each growing season”).
297. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) 
(“The patent laws . . . are in pari materia with the antitrust laws and modify them 
pro tanto.”).
298. Based on a Westlaw search of all reported cases where Monsanto was 
named as a party in an antitrust suit. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. E.I. Dupont De 
Nemours & Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1143-44 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (rejecting 
Monsanto’s justification that it was “simply exercising its rights under its patent 
grant,” noting instead that “[w]hile a patent holder enjoys certain statutory rights, 
those rights are not unbounded,” and that conspiring with rivals to fix prices can 
result in an antitrust violation). 
299. A Lexis opinion search was conducted in the Lexis Federal Court 
Cases, Combined database: “patent misuse” or patent w/3 misuse and date (geq 
(1/1/1953) and leq (12/31/2013)) and parsed for cases where Monsanto was a named 
party. 
300. McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1341 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 
157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Only where the conduct exceeded that scope 
would conduct be judged under per se rules or the rule of reason for categories of 
conduct mirroring antitrust law.  
301. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (“But 
the public policy which includes inventions within the granted monopoly excludes 
from it all that is not embraced in the invention. It equally forbids the use of the 
patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent
Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.”), abrogated on other 
grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); see also
Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 493 (“The competitive rationale for the ‘misuse’
doctrine has never been articulated properly in the courts, except for attempts to 
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The Federal Circuit’s proviso that “[i]n the cases in which the 
restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, the patent misuse 
defense can never succeed”302 meant that the test, while appearing to 
be a hybrid test, essentially still adopted the “scope of the patent”
approach. The Federal Circuit affirmed the approach in subsequent 
cases.303 Anticompetitive effects that result, whether in the context of 
an allegation of misuse or antitrust, are excused as being within their 
scope of the rights.  
A.  A Primer on Antitrust and Patent Misuse 
Professor John Duffy noted that “[t]he patent system can best 
be understood in reference to the theories and policies undergirding 
property, competition, and natural monopoly regulation.”304
Exhaustion, antitrust law, and misuse overlap like three circles in a 
Venn diagram.305 Screwdrivers can be used to hammer or pry if 
necessary, but other tools are better suited for the task. It follows that 
exhaustion should be used as part of a legal toolbox.  
The antitrust and patent laws both seek to correct market 
failure: antitrust law by restraining anticompetitive harm and patent 
                                                                                                               
identify it with antitrust policy or to identify the harm as an improper ‘extension’ of 
an IP right.”).
302. McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1341; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP
AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW § 3.2c (2d ed. Supp. 2011 & 2012) (noting that with this statement in 
“Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, the Federal Circuit elevated the broadening rationale 
to a bright-line rule” (citation omitted)). 
303. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“[P]atent misuse covers only activity falling outside of the patent grant, and 
Scruggs did not point to any activity falling outside Monsanto’s patent.”); see also,
e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (describing 
Monsanto’s licensing restrictions as its “prerogative”); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. 
Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (concluding 
that an antitrust claim “does nothing to limit the right of the patentee to refuse to sell 
or license in markets within the scope of the statutory patent grant”); Va. Panel 
Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[B]ecause we 
determine that the conduct underlying the allegations of misuse does not amount to 
patent misuse, the same conduct cannot support a judgment that [the 
patentee’s/licensor’s] conduct violated the Sherman Act.”).
304. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 510 (2004). 
305. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 493 (“While these three doctrines—first 
sale, antitrust, and misuse—originated at different times and addressed different 
issues, they largely merged during the first half of the twentieth century.”).
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law by ensuring sufficient returns to inventors.306 Yet, post-sale 
restraints or litigation to prevent resale in the absence of those
restraints can give rise to all three.307 As discussed in Part II, 
exhaustion seeks to sever the bonds that would otherwise encumber 
end users downstream and overcompensate patentees beyond the 
revenue earned from their first sale.308
                                                     
306. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A 
Reexamination, OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 8), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486633 (“Antitrust Law’s
principal purpose is to correct market failures brought about by lack of competition 
or to discipline activities that seek to limit it. The patent system is intended to 
correct market failures that result when inventors cannot effectively appropriate the 
returns to their inventions.”).
307. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 
(2008) (holding an infringement suit defeated because patentee’s method patents 
exhausted by first sale); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942) 
(holding that resale price maintenance was barred by authorized first sale of item 
that sufficiently embodies patents); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 
08cv1829 WQH (LSP), 2009 WL 684835, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009) (stating 
that the defendant sought declaratory judgment of patent misuse from violation of 
the patent exhaustion doctrine by seeking royalties on wireless communication 
devices).  
308. Ernst, supra note 258, at 479 (noting that patent exhaustion is 
concerned about “innovation because it limits the right of exclusion from being 
passed down the chain of production and distribution. To the extent the right of 
exclusion spreads through the chain of production to prohibit parties who are remote 
from the patent holder from using a licensed product, it can inhibit such third parties 
from innovating by combining the licensed product with their own innovations”).
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Antitrust law is primarily concerned with protecting consumer 
welfare from anticompetitive acts or agreements between entities 
with appreciable market power by maintaining the robustness of 
market competition.309 Antitrust policy believes consumers profit 
from economic growth and are hurt by restrictions that exclude rivals 
without providing offsetting benefits.310 It looks at the world through 
the lens of price theory and seeks direct or circumstantial evidence of 
anticompetitive harm that reduces consumer welfare.311 Antitrust law 
therefore seeks to expand output, increase quality and variety, and 
                                                     
309. Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 
2010) (“[C]onsumer welfare, understood in the sense of allocative efficiency, is the 
animating concern of the Sherman Act.”).
310. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Consumer Welfare in Competition 
and Intellectual Property Law, 9 Competition Pol’y Int’l 53 (2014).  
311. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 116 (1978) (noting that antitrust is based on price theory, which “assures us 
that economic behavior . . . is primarily directed toward the maximization of 
profits”).
Patent 
Exhaustion Antitrust
Patent 
Misuse
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reduce costs.312 Allowing patentees to control prices in goods sold 
could result in allocative inefficiency. In contrast to patent law, 
which proactively encourages promoting innovation through the 
conferment of exclusive rights, antitrust law does not goad patent 
owners to promote competition, only to refrain from injuring it.313
While antitrust law explicitly invites courts to consider the 
effects of firm conduct, the Patent Act is silent about requiring courts 
to do the same with patentees.314 Patent policy stems from the belief 
that consumers benefit from a well-functioning patent system that 
promotes innovation. It is primarily concerned about the generation 
of new ideas, and fostering competition is a beneficial side effect of 
that.315 It “reflects a [careful] balance between the need to encourage 
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition 
without any concomitant” technological advancement.316 Thus, the 
right balance is to narrowly construe patent rights: “Since patents are 
privileges restrictive of a free economy, the rights which Congress 
has attached to them must be strictly construed so as not to derogate 
from the general law beyond the necessary requirements of the 
patent statute.”317
Other aspects of patent law also reflect this quid pro quo. 
Patents must be novel, nonobvious, and adequately disclosed; are 
limited to specific forms of subject matter; and must be useful.318 The 
patent system rewards the first inventor to file, and the patent term is 
generally limited to twenty years from the effective filing date. It 
                                                     
312. See Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 14). 
313. I am grateful to Professor Mike Jacobs for this insight.  
314. For one view on this, see Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 
32) (“To say this more bluntly, the only time patent law pays much attention to 
markets is when the law incorporates antitrust principles.”).
315. Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 
499 (2011) (“IP law’s role as the engine of innovation also gives it an independent 
interest in enhancing competition. Competitive conditions affect a firm’s incentives 
and ability to enter the market with new and innovative products.”).
316. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 
(1989); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (“[A] patent owner may not take the property right granted by a patent and
use it to extend his power in the marketplace improperly, i.e. beyond the limits of 
what Congress intended to give in the patent laws.”); see also Bohannan, supra note 
315, at 479 (noting that the Federal Circuit’s reformulation “undervalues the fact 
that the roots of misuse doctrine lie in IP policy, not in antitrust policy, and IP policy 
has its own reasons for limiting overreaching in IP”).
317. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942). 
318. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112 (2012). 
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incentivizes early and complete disclosure, and it moves the 
technology into the public domain.319
Patent misuse is a defense that shields defendants from 
patentees who attempt to run roughshod over patent policy. While 
also concerned about competition, patent misuse focuses on deterring 
harm to the integrity of the patent system. For instance, patent 
misuse prohibits arrangements that tie up property rights post-patent 
expiration.320 If a patented machine had been sold, royalties are due 
under the pain of patent remedies until expiration and under the pain 
of contractual remedies thereafter.321 Parties may agree to post-
expiration royalties for pre-expiration use of the invention.322 It is the 
extension of the patent right, not the royalty, that is prohibited by 
patent policy.323 Just as in the case of exhaustion, allowing patentees 
to extend their right to sue for patent infringement gives them a 
bargaining chip in negotiations to inflate the royalties they can 
accrue during the life of their patent. The analysis and result is 
                                                     
319. John F. Duffy et al., 2013 National Lawyers Convention: Intellectual 
Property: Intellectual Property, Free Markets, and Competition Policy, 37 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 523, 524 (2014) (observing that patent law “always permits free entry into 
the race to obtain patents. Patent systems encourage technological races to invent, 
and that is one of the major benefits of the patent system. . . . [R]acing to obtain 
patent rights also has a benefit that many people forget about, which is that the 
sooner that the technology is patented, the sooner it enters into the public domain”).
320. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30 (1964) (holding a license 
requiring royalty payment on a machine post-patent expiration unenforceable 
“insofar as” it required such royalties); Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 
70). 
321. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32. 
322. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 496 (2007) (stating that patent misuse “does not 
prohibit intellectual property owners from allowing licensees to satisfy payment 
obligations on a deferred schedule that extends beyond the life of the patent”);
DARYL LIM, PATENT MISUSE AND ANTITRUST LAW: EMPIRICAL, DOCTRINAL AND 
POLICY PERSPECTIVES 107 (2013) (stating that Brulotte is sensitive to “the need to 
allow parties to contract freely”).  
323. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32 (holding that the patentee made “a bald attempt 
to exact the same terms and conditions for the period after the patents have expired 
as . . . for the monopoly period”); id. at 31-32 (holding that the patentee attempted to 
prevent machines from being removed from Yakima County before and after patent 
expiration); see also Lim, supra note 229, at 336 (stating that Brulotte should remain 
good law). 
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consistent in both instances.324 Misused patents are rendered 
unenforceable until the “baleful effects” of the misuse are purged.325
Patent misuse differs from exhaustion because it applies to 
sales, leases, and licenses, thereby reaching corners of commerce 
where exhaustion would not.326 The recent Ninth Circuit decision in 
Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp. provides a useful illustration 
of how patent misuse could operate on facts that would also give rise 
to exhaustion but with a different basis from antitrust law.327
B.  Lessons from Copyright Misuse  
Omega sued Costco for copyright infringement because it sold 
forty-three genuine Omega watches engraved with a copyrighted 
Omega design without Omega’s authorization. The district court 
found that attempting to control the importation and downstream sale 
of Omega watches following an authorized sale amounted to 
copyright misuse. However, the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel 
chose to find for Costco on the basis of copyright exhaustion because 
Costco raised the defense in a filing prior to oral argument.328
                                                     
324. See Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 77) (“Brulotte is really 
nothing more than a variant of the first sale doctrine, applied to post-expiry 
royalties.”).
325. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957) 
(“It is now, of course, familiar law that the courts will not aid a patent owner who 
has misused his patents to recover any of their emoluments accruing during the 
period of misuse or thereafter until the effects of such misuse have been dissipated, 
or ‘purged’ as the conventional saying goes. The rule is an extension of the equitable 
doctrine of ‘unclean hands’ to the patent field.” (citations omitted)).
326. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 511 (“Misuse, another judge-made 
doctrine that was not fully developed until the 1942 Morton Salt decision, could 
apply to both sales and leases of a patented good as well as licenses; thus it applied 
in many situations when the first sale doctrine would not.” (footnote omitted)).
327. 776 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2015).  
328. Id. at 695 (“[A]pplication of the first sale doctrine disposes of Omega’s
claim, resolves this case in Costco’s favor, and conclusively reaffirms that copyright 
holders cannot use their rights to fix resale prices in the downstream market.”); see 
also id. at 694 n.1 (noting Costco raised the argument based on the Supreme Court’s
intervening decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 
(2013)). Copyright exhaustion also provides guidance to the extent of patent 
exhaustion. The Copyright Act provides that copyright exhaustion “modifies the 
copyright owner’s distribution right, but not his reproduction right.” Sheff, supra
note 95, at 252 & n.106 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (“qualifying the 
distribution right of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), but not the reproduction right of 17 U.S.C. § 
106(1)”)). 
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Judge Wardlaw issued a concurring opinion on finding for 
Costco on the basis of copyright misuse329 and found misuse because 
Omega attempted to use its copyright in its design to restrict 
downstream competition in its watches.330 She began by noting that 
the constitutional policy and sole rationale for granting copyright 
protection was “‘to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public 
good.’”331
According to Judge Wardlaw, both antitrust and copyright 
policies were relevant in determining the proper scope of the owner’s
exclusive rights332 and that copyright misuse was judicially crafted 
“to combat the impermissible extension of a copyright’s limited 
monopoly.”333 Thus, copyright misuse “is not limited to discouraging 
anti-competitive behavior,” but to restrain copyright from “‘being 
used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant 
of a copyright.’”334 She concluded that “Omega’s expansion of its 
                                                     
329. Omega, 776 F.3d at 696 (Wardlaw, J., concurring) (chiding the majority 
for “fail[ing] to do justice to the facts presented by this unique lawsuit”); see also id.
(“The district court granted summary judgment and awarded attorney’s fees to 
Costco based on the defense of copyright misuse. The majority affirms the district 
court relying upon the Kirtsaeng-resurrected first sale doctrine; a doctrine we held 
inapplicable the first time around, and which the parties did not brief or argue in this 
appeal.”).
330. Id. at 701 (“Omega attempted to use the copyrighted Globe Design to 
decrease competition in the U.S. importation and distribution of its watches by it and 
its authorized dealers—an obvious leveraging of a copyright to control an area 
outside its limited monopoly on the design.”).
331. Id. at 698 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 
151, 156 (1975)); see also id. (“‘Implicit in this rationale is the assumption that in 
the absence of such public benefit, the grant of a copyright monopoly to individuals 
would be unjustified.’” (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (2014)); id. (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes 
reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”).
332. Id. at 699 (“An owner’s attempt to impermissibly expand his lawful 
protection from competition contravenes not only the policy of the copyright laws, 
but also the central purpose of the antitrust laws.”).
333. Id.  
334. Id. (quoting Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th 
Cir. 1990)); see also Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 
640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The argument for applying copyright misuse beyond the 
bounds of antitrust, besides the fact that confined to antitrust the doctrine would be 
redundant, is that for a copyright owner to use an infringement suit to obtain 
property protection, here in data, that copyright law clearly does not confer, hoping 
to force a settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an opponent that may 
lack the resources or the legal sophistication to resist effectively, is an abuse of 
process.”).
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copyright-like monopoly eliminated competition from unauthorized 
watch retailers like Costco, thereby allowing [it] to control . . . the 
retail pricing of Seamaster watches sold in the United States. . . . 
[S]uch an outcome directly controverts the aims of copyright law.”335
Judge Wardlaw’s reasoning stands in contrast to the Supreme 
Court’s antitrust opinion in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., which overturned its own per se prohibition against 
resale price maintenance in favor of a rule of reason analysis.336 The 
majority justified its decision on the basis that antitrust policy 
favored interbrand competition over intrabrand competition, which 
was promoted by the resale price maintenance restrictions.337 Also in 
contrast to antitrust law, intent was relevant to the determination of 
liability.338 Judge Wardlaw rejected Omega’s argument that 
anticompetitive motives were irrelevant on the basis that the 
“definition [of] ‘use’ includes an inquiry into [its] purpose.”339 The 
facts showed that customers could buy Omega’s watches at 35% less 
at Costco but for Omega’s lawsuit. This “reduction of intrabrand 
price competition for uncopyrightable Omega watches” constituted 
misuse.340
In essence, Judge Wardlaw undertook an effects-based analysis 
of Omega’s conduct. This echoes the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, requiring lower courts to 
apply the rule of reason in determining whether settlements between 
patentees and potential generic rivals violated antitrust law.341 There, 
                                                     
335. Omega, 776 F.3d at 704 (Wardlaw, J., concurring). 
336. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
337. Id. at 890-92. According to the Court, intrabrand competition 
encouraged retailers to invest in services or promotional efforts that aid 
manufacturers in competing against their rivals. Resale price maintenance also gave 
consumers more tiered price and quality options, which free riding retailers might 
eliminate. Id.  
338. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 
1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (refusing to inquire into the patentee’s intent “so long as 
that anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory patent 
grant”).
339. Omega, 776 F.3d at 701 (Wardlaw, J., concurring). 
340. Id.  
341. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 
433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); see also United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668-72
(3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing the 
alleged anti-competitive effects through direct evidence via raised prices, lower 
output or quality, or in the alternative, circumstantial evidence of market power; 
then the defendant must offer pro-competitive justifications; and then the plaintiff 
can refute that the restraint is unnecessary to achieve the stated objective). In 
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the Court debunked the notion that conduct within the “scope of the 
patent” circumscribes antitrust scrutiny only to instances where there 
was sham litigation or fraud on the patent office. The Court was clear 
that even if the patents in suit were valid and infringed, it wanted 
explanations for those settlements.342 Like Judge Wardlaw, the 
Actavis Court also stated that the appropriate scope of patent rights 
was defined with reference to both patent and antitrust policies.343
It is worth pausing briefly to deal with the objection that 
Actavis only applies to cases within the Hatch–Waxman 
framework.344 As an initial matter, just because the Court articulated 
                                                                                                               
contrast, per se prohibitions condemn specific practices such as horizontal price 
fixing or market divisions that are “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.” See
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
342. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (“Solvay’s patent, if valid and infringed, 
might have permitted it to charge drug prices sufficient to recoup the reverse 
settlement payments it agreed to make to its potential generic competitors. And we 
are willing to take this fact as evidence that the agreement’s ‘anticompetitive effects 
fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.’ But we do not agree 
that that fact, or characterization, can immunize the agreement from antitrust 
attack.” (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 
F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012))); id. at 2237 (“Although the parties may have 
reasons to prefer settlements that include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust 
question is: What are those reasons? If the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to 
share patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some other 
justification, the antitrust laws are likely to forbid the arrangement.”); see also id. at 
2244 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority seems to think that even if the patent 
is valid, a patent holder violates the antitrust laws merely because the settlement 
took away some chance that his patent would be declared invalid by a court.”).
343. Id. at 2225 (majority opinion) (“[T]o refer simply to what the holder of 
a valid patent could do does not by itself answer the antitrust question. . . . [I]t would
be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s
anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, and not against 
procompetitive antitrust policies as well. Both are relevant in determining the scope 
of monopoly and antitrust immunity conferred by a patent . . . .”).
344. The Hatch–Waxman Act was designed to encourage entry by generics 
who would assert drug patents that were invalid or not infringed by their 
bioequivalent offering. To incentivize challenges, the Act allowed the first 
successful challenger to share a 180-day duopoly with the patentee. Studies indicate 
that prices fall by as much as 80% compared to those pre-generic entry. See UNITED 
STATES, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS (2014), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-other-
international-competitionfora/generics_us_oecd.pdf (updating statistics on 
pharmaceutical pricing in the wake of generic entry); see also, e.g., Kevin D. 
McDonald, Because I Said So: On the Competitive Rationale of FTC v. Actavis, 
ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 36, 42 (“Perhaps the only good news for these courts is 
that the Actavis ‘analysis’ by its terms applies only to Hatch-Waxman patent 
cases.”).  
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its holdings within Hatch–Waxman litigation does not automatically 
mean that they do not have more general application. Recently in 
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., the Court rejected 
the Federal Circuit’s long-standing practice of reviewing district 
court patent claim construction rulings without deference.345 Teva
involved drug patents litigated under the same Hatch–Waxman 
framework as Actavis.346 Notwithstanding this, commentators have 
noted that “Teva could have broad-ranging implications for clients in 
the procurement and enforcement of their patent rights.”347  
Similarly Actavis was hailed by Professor Michael Carrier as 
potentially “one of the most important patent/antitrust rulings of all 
time.”348 Professor Mark Lemley also observed that the Court’s
conclusion that patent scope is defined by both patent and antitrust 
policy is “a very different conception of the rule of antitrust vis-à-vis 
patents than we’ve had in certainly the last 40 years, which has been 
that patent law decides what its scope is and then antitrust polices the 
boundaries to make sure you don’t extend that scope.”349 Based on 
this, he predicted that “patent and antitrust are headed for a much 
more dynamic interaction . . . in trying to decide what the proper 
                                                     
345. 135 S. Ct. 831, 833 (2015).  
346. See, e.g., Daniel E. Yonan & Jon E. Boljesic, Practice Considerations 
Post Teva v. Sandoz, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 30, 2015),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/practice-considerations-post-teva-v-sandoz 
(“Sandoz, as a generic pharmaceutical challenger under the Hatch–Waxman Act, 
attacked the patent as indefinite because it contained claim language describing an 
active pharmaceutical ingredient having a ‘molecular weight of 5 to 9 
kilodaltons.’”).
347. Id.; see also David C. Berry, Supreme Court Limits Federal Circuit’s
Ability to Revise Claim Construction on Appeal, PATLIT BLOG (Jan. 21, 2015),
https://www.primaryopinion.com/articles/supreme-court-limits-federal-
circuit%E2%80%99s-ability-revise-claim-construction-appeal (“[Teva] is likely to 
introduce important strategic issues in patent cases, especially relating to conduct of 
claim construction proceedings.”).
348. Michael Carrier, The U.S. Supreme Court Issues First Ruling on 
Antitrust Legality of Reverse-Payment Drug Patent Settlements (Actavis), E-
COMPETITIONS (July 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2293867; see also Supreme 
Court Issues Significant Patent Antitrust Decision Rejecting the “Scope of the 
Patent” Rule, Perkins Coie (June 18, 2013),
http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/pubs_Detail.aspx?publication=869018d4-0267-
49b4-8c26-991255646b19 (describing Actavis as “the most significant patent 
antitrust decision in decades . . . The implications of the decision beyond reverse 
payment cases are yet to be determined”).  
349. IP Law and Innovation with Mark A. Lemley and A. Douglas Melamed,
STAN. LAW. (Nov. 14, 2014), http://stanfordlawyer.law.stanford.edu/2014/11/ip-law-
and-innovation-with-mark-a-lemley-and-a-douglas-melamed/. 
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scope of a patent right is.”350 Since Actavis is the first patent/antitrust 
ruling the Court made in the Hatch–Waxman context these 
observations would make no sense at all if observations about the 
“scope of the patent” test were limited only to that context.  
Looking at the opinion itself, the Court dealt with the “scope of 
the patent” issue in the first portion of Part II.A of its opinion before 
moving to settlement agreements generally in the second potion of 
Part II.A. In Part II.B, the court applied its analysis to reverse 
payments within the Hatch–Waxman framework. In summing up its 
analysis and dismissing the “scope of the patent” approach in Part 
II.A (prior to dealing with settlement agreements), it stated that  
In short, rather than measure the length or amount of a restriction solely 
against the length of the patent’s term or its earning potential . . . this 
Court answered the antitrust question by considering traditional antitrust 
factors such as likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market 
power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the 
circumstances, such as here those related to patents. Whether a particular 
restraint lies “beyond the limits of the patent monopoly” is a conclusion
that flows from that analysis and not . . . its starting point.351  
None of the precedents cited by the Court itself in justifying its 
preference for an effects-focused analysis over the “scope of the 
patent” approach had anything to do with Hatch–Waxman litigation. 
Finally, a careful reading of both the majority and dissent shows that 
both sides were gridlocked over the broader question—whether 
settlements within the patent scope should be scrutinized at all.352
Further afield in Lundbeck, the European Commission recently 
concluded in the context of a regime that did not operate under 
Hatch–Waxman framework that patent settlements between drug 
patentees and their generic rivals were subject to scrutiny under 
competition law.353 All these signs point to a change in a shift away 
                                                     
350. Id.
351. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231-32 (2013) 
(citation omitted).
352. Id. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The point of antitrust law is to 
encourage competitive markets to promote consumer welfare. The point of patent 
law is to grant limited monopolies as a way of encouraging innovation. Thus, a 
patent grants ‘the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention.’
In doing so it provides an exception to antitrust law, and the scope of the patent—
i.e., the rights conferred by the patent—forms the zone within which the patent 
holder may operate without facing antitrust liability.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980))). 
353. See Bernardine Adkins & Samuel Beighton, Paying for Delay and 
Patent Settlement Arrangements - the European Commission (at Last) Publishes the 
Lundbeck Decision, WRAGGE LAWRENCE GRAHAM & CO. (Jan. 29, 2015), 
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from the “scope of the patent” approach beyond the Hatch–Waxman 
framework.  
Patents are rarely coextensive with monopoly power. To the 
extent they create barriers to competition, these barriers may simply 
be a function of the exclusionary rights conferred by the patent. At 
the same time, it is remarkable that the application of antitrust law to 
patentee conduct within the scope of their patents should be 
remarkable at all. It is hornbook law that even validly obtained 
patent rights are subject to other laws, whether they are health and 
safety regulations imposed under the Food and Drug Authority or 
consumer protection laws enforced by the Federal Trade 
Commission.  
In surveying the history of judicial scrutiny of patent rights, 
Professor Jorge Contreras observed the twentieth century is full of 
instances where companies were found to have abused patent rights 
despite acting within their “scope.”354 Just like any other property-
owning business, they must account for their actions even when they 
fall within the scope of the patents. The Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit in United States v. Microsoft Corp. deemed Microsoft’s
argument that lawfully acquired intellectual property rights cannot 
give rise to antitrust liability as “border[ing] upon the frivolous.”355 It 
explained that it “is no more correct than the proposition that use of 
one’s personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to 
tort liability.”356 The Supreme Court has also been unequivocal that 
patent cases should not treated differently from their non-patent 
counterparts.357
                                                                                                               
http://www.wragge-law.com/insights/paying-for-delay-and-patent-settlement-
arrangements-the-european-commission-(at-last)-publishes-th/ (“The fact that a 
patent (if found to be valid and infringed) grants the patent holder a right to exclude 
products falling within the scope of the patent does not mean that the patent holder 
necessarily complies with EU competition law by using any method to achieve the 
same exclusionary outcome.” (emphasis omitted)). 
354. Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND, ANTITRUST L.J.
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2374983.  
355. 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
356. Id.
357. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) 
(requiring the Federal Circuit to give deference to claim construction determinations 
based on findings of fact); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (clarifying that an “exceptional case” within meaning of the 
Patent Act’s fee-shifting provision was the same as the standard generally applicable 
in civil actions); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) 
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Post-Actavis, formalistic line drawing based on the “scope of 
the patent” approach is past its legal shelf life.358 And it is for the 
better. Any approach carving out broad zones of immunity risks 
being both over- and under-inclusive. One treatise author warned 
that  
a patentee could circumvent the patent exhaustion doctrine altogether by 
simply imposing resale price, territorial, or other competitive restrictions 
on what subsequent purchasers can do with its patented product even after 
they have paid full value for the product, and then argue that the restraint 
is immune from antitrust challenge because the product is patented.359
On the one hand, conduct outside of the scope that may benefit 
consumers or promote innovation may be condemned. On the other 
hand, judges’ hands are tied if faced with restrictions that distort 
market competition or hurt innovation. The term “scope” also 
nothing to provide courts with a rule that can be comprehensively 
and consistently applied, particularly with licensing agreements that 
contain terms that are not expressly stated in the patent instrument.360
Actavis reflects the maturity and confidence of a court willing 
to eschew treating patentees with kid-gloves in favor of a more 
challenging but doctrinally robust approach. Courts no longer have 
the option of tiptoeing around calls to address harmful effects of 
activity taking place within the scope of patents owned by Monsanto 
or another patentee.361 The treatment of patent misuse allegations 
                                                                                                               
(holding that injunctions in patent law should be granted in accordance with the 
principles of equity common to other areas of the law). 
358. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 
466-67 (1992) (“Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than 
actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law.”); Lim, supra note 
18, at 202-03 (“Since patent misuse analysis typically starts with the analysis of 
patent scope, the doctrine will likely have to be rethought in light of Actavis as 
well.”).
359. HOLMES, supra note 268, § 17:4. 
360. Bohannan, supra note 315, at 496 (“Most contract terms cover practices 
that technically fall outside the scope of the patent grant—otherwise, a contract 
would be unnecessary—but certainly not all of these practices are harmful to IP 
policy.”); see also id. (noting that the beyond-the-scope test does not provide a 
meaningful way to determine which of these terms lies within the scope of the grant 
and which do not). Courts have applied “patent scope” at least three different ways. 
First, it can be defined by the claims in a patent instrument. Second, it can be 
defined physically by the embodiment of the invention, quintessentially in tying 
cases. Third, it can be defined temporally by the duration of the patent. See LIM,
supra note 322, at 391-404. 
361. See, e.g., Salvaggio, supra note 169, at 460-61 (“While antitrust and 
patent misuse were not issues on appeal in this case, Monsanto has gained an 
extreme amount of market power and has received favorable treatment in the courts 
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against Monsanto tracking the “scope of the patent” approach also 
requires rethinking.  
IV. MONSANTO THROUGH THE LENS OF ACTAVIS
We owe much to Monsanto and other agrobiotech companies. 
Calls for greater scrutiny are understandably met with reservation. 
After all, as the adage goes, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” But those 
skeptics need only look as far as other corporate leviathans—from 
tech giants like IBM,362 Microsoft,363 and Qualcomm364 to drug 
companies like Servier,365 Reckitt,366 and Solvay367—to know that 
innovation and patent abuse are not mutually exclusive.  
How can vigilance against harm to competition or innovation 
policy goals be balanced against preserving incentives to innovate
and freedom to conduct business? One approach is to carve out a 
zone of immunity, intervening only in narrow instances such as 
fraud, sham litigation, or tying.368 The alternative is to look at 
                                                                                                               
while maintaining a high degree of control over its goods following sale; the 
inability of existing limiting doctrines to capture or apply to the nature of 
Monsanto’s goods yields a prime example of whether new limiting doctrines would 
need to be created to reign in the almost unconditional protection the company 
currently enjoys.”).
362. See Rachel Konrad, IBM and Microsoft: Antitrust Then and Now, CNET 
NEWS (June 7, 2000, 2:50 PM), http://news.cnet.com/IBM-and-Microsoft-Antitrust-
then-and-now/2100-1001_3-241565.html.  
363. See id.  
364. See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case for Patent Misuse, 51 
IDEA 559, 582 (2011) (discussing the case).  
365. See Mark Rosman & Seth Silber, DOJ’s Investigation into Generic 
Pharma Pricing Is Unusual, LAW360 (Nov. 12, 2014, 5:44 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/595444/doj-s-investigation-into-generic-pharma-
pricing-is-unusual. 
366. See Jonathan H. Hatch & Robert P. LoBue, Court Allows “Product 
Hopping” Claims to Proceed in Suboxone Litigation Based on Allegations of 
Removal of Prior Formulation and Disparagement of Generic Competition,
ANTITRUST UPDATE (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.antitrustupdateblog.com/blog/court-
allows-product-hopping-claims-to-proceed-in-suboxone-litigation/. 
367. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
368. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 
1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in 
the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder may enforce 
the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed 
invention free from liability under the antitrust laws. We therefore will not inquire 
into his subjective motivation for exerting his statutory rights, even though his 
refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an anticompetitive effect, 
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whether the patentee’s justification in exercising its rights was 
merely a pretextual front for anticompetitive conduct as the Court 
did in Actavis.369
The former is easy to administer since drawing a large box and 
refusing to act on anything happening inside it means mostly doing 
nothing. A rule is clearer and provides certainty; a standard more 
precisely tracks policy goals, but its administration is more 
complex.370 Operationalizing a standard “tread[s] a fine line between 
detailed prescription and inchoate principle.”371 Managing what is 
inside the box—moving from rules to a standards-based approach—
involves more dicey determinations of why, when, and how. But it is 
more likely to bring about nuanced outcomes better aligned with 
policy goals. 
This Part uses past cases where Monsanto had been accused of 
patent misuse or antitrust violations as an anecdotal canvas to 
illustrate how the effects-based standard can be successfully 
operationalized. It focuses on three critical features of that standard. 
The first feature is that the standard must be supported by a 
coherent theory of harm to competition or innovation. Monsanto was 
most vulnerable under a theory of foreclosure. Antitrust 
commentators accuse Monsanto of leveraging its market power in 
the trait market to foreclose competition in the traited seed market 
through its anti-stacking provisions.372 In comparison to antitrust 
                                                                                                               
so long as that anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory 
patent grant.”).
369. See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (noting that the reverse payments at 
issue were “unusual”); Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 
F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Neither the aims of intellectual property law, nor 
the antitrust laws justify allowing a monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business 
justification to mask anticompetitive conduct.”); see also Data Gen. Corp. v. 
Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that the 
presumption of legitimacy can be rebutted by evidence that the monopolist acquired 
the protection of the intellectual property laws in an unlawful manner).
370. Allen R. Kamp, Jurisprudence: A Beginner’s Simple and Practical 
Guide to Complex Legal Theory, 2 CRIT: CRITICAL STUD. J. 62, 76, 78-81 (2009) 
(discussing the “good” and “bad” attributes of rules and standards).
371. Id. at 77 (citation omitted). 
372. See Lina Khan, How Monsanto Outfoxed the Obama Administration,
SALON (Mar. 15, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/03/15/how_ 
did_monsanto_outfox_the_obama_administration/ (“Several experts agree that the 
strongest case the DOJ could have brought against Monsanto would focus on how it 
has used its monopoly in one market—the provision of genetic traits—both to 
exclude rivals and to gain advantage in another market: the breeding and retail of 
seeds.”).
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harm, patent misuse harm focuses on abuses of the patent right in 
contravention of patent policy. There is no need to show market 
power unless it is related to the tying of patented and unpatented 
goods, where the Patent Act specifically requires it.373 Under both 
antitrust and misuse theories of harm from foreclosure, access is 
based on circumscribing the patentee’s right based on supervening 
patent or antitrust policy. The terms of access may be determined by 
expert opinion, as they routinely are.  
The second feature is that the one alleging the harm must show 
that patentees like Monsanto have or are at least capable of effecting 
that harm. Antitrust law requires the showing of actual harm or, in 
the alternative, market power. Patent misuse does not require a 
showing of market power. The ability to effect the harm alleged thus 
rises and falls with the credibility of the theory of foreclosure alleged 
as long as the conduct supporting that theory is undisputed. The third 
feature is that the approach should contain heuristics to make it 
administrable, such as harm to competition and innovation, and a 
shifting of burdens informed by judicial experience and economic 
learning in appropriate cases.  
A.  Developing a Theory of Harm 
By the time Actavis prohibited market division agreements in 
the market for the patentee’s drugs, its primary market, lower courts 
had already prohibited activities that foreclosed competition in 
related secondary markets in a number of antitrust cases.374 But how 
do these precedents inform past cases involving Monsanto? 
As an initial matter, restrictions on seed saving, the restriction 
at issue in Bowman, are the least controversial. Since future 
generations of seeds would rely on Monsanto’s patents, no-
replanting restrictions could simply be another way of saying that 
unauthorized “making” of new seeds would attract patent 
                                                     
373. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012) (“No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief 
for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of . . . 
condition[ing] the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented 
product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a 
separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market 
power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license 
or sale is conditioned.”).
374. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84-85 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (finding tying Internet browser to operating system to be illegal). 
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infringement.375 However, as discussed in Section II.B, the 
restrictions should add nothing to Monsanto’s right to sue for 
infringement under the conditional sale doctrine. These private 
servitudes cannot be readily identified nor their value ascertained. 
Such costs and uncertainties should not be borne by end users but 
rather by a manufacturer and patentee negotiating at arm’s length.376
Suits against consumers previously sanctioned under the conditional 
sale doctrine should now attract scrutiny and, where appropriate, 
condemnation.377
Monsanto’s other restrictions, previously sanctioned by courts, 
should be reexamined. These include technology fee payments,378
restrictions on seed use,379 offering discounts for carrying its seeds as 
a proportion of the distributors’ inventory, restrictions preventing 
seed distributors from carrying or marketing rivals’ seeds,380 and anti-
stacking provisions.381 These restrictions undercut the argument that 
                                                     
375. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298-99 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“Monsanto has a right to exclude others from making, using, or selling its patented 
plant technology, and its no replant policy simply prevents purchasers of the seeds 
from using the patented biotechnology when that biotechnology makes a copy of 
itself. This restriction therefore is a valid exercise of its rights under the patent 
laws.” (citation omitted)); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (N.D. 
Miss. 2001) (“Without the prohibition against the saving of seed for replanting or 
resale, Monsanto’s patent would soon be rendered useless by virtue of the potential 
for exponential multiplication of the seed containing its patented technology.”).  
376. See Love & Yoon, supra note 281, at 1631-35 (arguing that it would be 
more efficient for patentees and manufacturers to litigate the patent lawsuit). 
377. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO L.J. 
885, 932-50 (2008) (discussing why licensing servitudes running with personal 
property are harmful, even in the absence of anticompetitive effects sufficient to 
result in antitrust violations). 
378. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 517 F. Supp. 
2d 1125, 1137 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (“Courts considering the issue have held generally 
that the technology fee payments required by Monsanto’s licensing agreements with 
seed growers, restrictions stipulated in the licensing agreements and restrictions on 
seed growers’ use of the seed incorporating Monsanto’s traits, are within the scope 
of Monsanto’s patent rights and therefore do not violate antitrust law.”); Scruggs,
459 F.3d at 1340-41 (“Monsanto’s uniform technology fee is essentially a royalty 
fee, the charging of which is also within the scope of the patent grant.”).  
379. See Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1340-41 (requiring the use of Roundup with 
Roundup Ready). 
380. Christopher Leonard, Monsanto Stomps Down Budding Seed 
Competitors, USA Today (Dec. 14, 2009, 10:51 AM), http:// www.usatoday. 
com/money/industries/food/2009-12-14-monsanto-practices_N.htm.  
381. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 575 (N.D. Miss. 
2004) (holding that such restrictions were “clearly field of use restrictions which fall 
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farmers want Monsanto’s seed for its own sake, weakening the nexus 
between the commercial success of Roundup Ready and 
justifications based on rewarding innovation.  
Anti-stacking restrictions seem particularly pernicious because 
they threaten to foreclose precisely the sort of cumulative innovation 
that injects competition through new and better products. This theory 
of harm has received significant traction. DuPont had intended to 
commercialize its Optimum GAT (OGAT) trait, which improved 
yields stacked with Monsanto’s Roundup Ready trait.382 Monsanto 
sued DuPont for patent infringement, obtaining a billion dollars in 
damages even though not a single stacked soybean had been sold 
because it was based on a hypothetical negotiation.383 Monsanto and 
DuPont settled with the latter dropping its antitrust suit against 
Monsanto in exchange for stacking rights.384
Monsanto had also been the target of antitrust investigations by
state and federal antitrust agencies for anticompetitive licensing 
restrictions involving patented traits and herbicides and refusing to 
allow varietal trait stacking.385 State and federal agencies eventually 
closed their investigations after Monsanto made several 
commitments.386 While Monsanto’s private settlements are a move in 
the right direction, they have no precedential value and do nothing to 
clarify when and how access should be granted as well as on what 
terms. 
                                                                                                               
within the scope of the patent monopoly and are, therefore, lawful”); Scruggs, 459 
F.3d at 1339. 
382. See Bernard Chao & Jonathan R. Gray, A $1 Billion Parable, 90 DENV.
U. L. REV. ONLINE 185, 185 (2013) (“DuPont had made no money for any sales of 
infringing seeds and Monsanto had lost no sales of its seeds because of DuPont’s
infringement. Nevertheless, the jury awarded one billion dollars in damages to 
Monsanto.”).  
383. Id. at 186-88 (discussing the reasonable royalty calculation).  
384. Andrew Pollack, Monsanto and DuPont Settle Fight over Patent 
Licensing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/ 
business/monsanto-and-dupont-settle-fight-over-roundup-ready-technology.html?_ 
r=0 (“Under the terms of the agreement, announced Tuesday, DuPont will pay 
Monsanto at least $1.75 billion over 10 years for the rights to technology for 
genetically engineered soybeans that are resistant to herbicides.”).
385. Pollack, supra note 132 (“Critics, including some competitors, say that 
Monsanto has great leverage over the seed business and growers through restrictive 
contracts that must be signed to use Monsanto’s genes or to grow the genetically 
modified crops.”).  
386. Khan, supra note 372 (“Those close to the investigation also note that it 
became easier for officials to justify inaction because Monsanto cleaned up its act as 
soon as authorities came knocking.”).
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As a matter of antitrust law, one plausible theory of harm is the 
essential facilities doctrine. Generally, there is no duty to license 
rivals.387 However, antitrust law prohibits vertically integrated 
companies from creating or maintaining their market power through 
limiting access to patented technology needed to compete in a 
secondary market.388
In MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone & 
Telephone Co., the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 
where the owner denies access to competitors of an essential facility 
it controls that cannot be practically or reasonably duplicated, and 
that it can feasibly provide access to, antitrust law can require 
compulsory sharing of that facility.389 In Bellsouth Advertising v. 
Donnelly Information, the court noted that although the essential 
facilities doctrine has been applied predominately to tangible assets, 
there is no reason why it could not apply to intellectual property.390
While the Supreme Court is agnostic about an “essential facilities 
doctrine,”391 it has recognized terminating a profitable course of prior 
dealing is evidence of the profit sacrifice element of a 
monopolization claim.392
An alternative antitrust theory of harm is Monsanto’s refusal to 
license facilitates monopolization. In Data General v. Grumman 
Systems Support, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit used an 
                                                     
387. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
388. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 141-44, 156-59
(1948) (tying patented machines and copyrighted films); Image Technical Servs., 
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
Kodak’s refusal to sell patented parts to ISOs constituted monopoly leveraging from 
parts to servicing). But see In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox Corp., 
203 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that Xerox’s refusal to sell patented 
parts to ISOs did not violate the antitrust laws). 
389. 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983) (condemning AT&T’s refusal 
to grant competing suppliers of long distance telephone services access to local 
telephone facilities that it controlled).  
390. 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 999 
F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993).  
391. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 411 (2004) (“We have never recognized such a doctrine, and we find no 
need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here.” (citation omitted)). But see 1
HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 13.3c1 (2d ed. Supp. 2014)
(calling out the Court for engaging in “revisionist history”).
392. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (“[U]nilateral termination of a voluntary (and 
thus presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a willingness to forsake 
short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.”).
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approach that seemed prescient of Actavis.393 It sought to read the 
copyright and antitrust statues in light of each other by scrutinizing 
the exercise of the exclusionary rights under copyright law, but 
requiring the antitrust plaintiff to rebut the presumption that the 
copyright owner’s refusal to license was justified.394 This approach 
was also endorsed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Image Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak Co.395 In Kodak, the 
Ninth Circuit found the justification pretextual and adopted long 
after the fact.396
In either case, an argument for court-mandated access will soon 
run into resistance. The Supreme Court in Verizon Communications 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP warned that compelling 
firms “to share the source of their advantage” is in “tension” with 
antitrust policy for three reasons.397 First, it “may lessen the incentive 
for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically 
beneficial facilities.”398 Denying a lawful monopolist the fruits of its 
monopoly could diminish its incentive to innovate in the first 
place.399 Thus, as Judge Learned Hand cautioned, “[t]he successful 
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon 
when he wins.”400 Second, it “requires antitrust courts to act as 
central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other 
terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill suited.”401 Third, it 
could “facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion.”402
The third objection may be swiftly dealt with. Catastrophic side 
effects are a possible but rare occurrence in medical treatment. 
                                                     
393. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st 
Cir. 1994). 
394. Id. at 1187.  
395. 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997). 
396. See id. at 1219-20.
397. 540 U.S. at 407-08.
398. Id. at 408. 
399. Id. at 407 (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the 
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an 
important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly 
prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first 
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To 
safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be 
found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive 
conduct.”).
400. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 421, 430 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
401. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. 
402. Id.
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Doctors, informed by experience and scientific knowledge, make a 
call on whether intervention is better than inaction. Similarly judges, 
informed by experience and legal knowledge, make a call on whether 
collusion is likely and whether its effects would be so extreme as to 
warrant inaction. In the real world, it is difficult to imagine warring 
litigants suddenly becoming conspirators-in-arms when one of the 
parties was compelled to share its competitive advantage because the
other squealed to the courts.  
The first objection is particularly pronounced with patent law 
because “[t]he tension between the objectives of preserving 
economic incentives to enhance competition while at the same time 
trying to contain the power a successful competitor acquires is 
heightened tremendously when the patent laws come into play.”403
According to Hovenkamp, the basis for the “scope of the patent” test 
was a response to “unreasonably hostile” antitrust policy.404 This 
“walled garden” thus “protected the patent from significant antitrust 
overreaching.”405
The “walled garden” approach echoes the broad patent scope 
advocated by Professor Edmund Kitch.406 Under Kitch’s “prospect 
theory,” broad patents that allow patentees to coordinate their 
activities with other firms post-grant will encourage patentees to 
invest in development without fear that rivals would steal their 
work.407 The patent right should extend beyond the reward 
commensurate to the disclosure in the patent but rather “reaches well 
beyond what the reward function would require.”408 Enhanced 
efficiency “turns not upon the size of the firm, but its dominance 
over a fruitful technological prospect.”409
                                                     
403. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1981).  
404. See Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 10, 11) (“The ‘beyond 
the scope’ formulation is a relic of a bygone approach to antirust and regulation . . . 
which regarded regulation as ‘ousting’ antitrust from the regulated market 
altogether.”).
405. Id. (manuscript at 10).  
406. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 
J.L. & ECON. 265, 271-75 (1977) (analogizing patents to mining claims over 
minerals). I am grateful to Professor Josh Sarnoff for an illuminating discussion on 
Kitch.  
407. See id. at 266, 276-77; Duffy, supra note 304, at 440 (“Kitch’s
justification for the patent system was thus forward-looking: The function of the 
patent system is to encourage investment in a technological prospect after the 
property right has been granted.”).
408. Kitch, supra note 406, at 267. 
409. Id. at 286. 
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Kitch is correct that patent scope influences technological 
development, both in the sense of individual inventions like 
Roundup Ready and a future line of improvements extending from it, 
such as stacked traits. However, contrary to what Kitch suggests, 
granting broad rights to an initial inventor like Monsanto may not 
induce more effective development and future invention.  
The work of Professors Robert Merges and Richard Nelson 
provides doctrinal justification for access. They expressed concern 
that “broad patents could discourage much useful research.”410 This is 
because “[o]nce a firm develops and becomes competent in one part 
of a ‘prospect,’ it may be very hard for it to give much attention to 
other parts, even though in the eyes of others, there may be great 
promise there.”411 They therefore concluded that “many independent 
inventors will generate a much wider and diverse set of explorations 
than when the development is under the control of one mind or 
organization,”412 and advocate that “[it] is much simpler to grant 
roughly identical licenses to all who will pay a standard rate.”413
Roundup Ready through widespread adoption has become an 
industry standard or de facto standard essential patent. A trait like 
Roundup Ready may appear to be a product of discrete innovation by 
Monsanto. However, where it has a variety of new applications, its 
innovation trajectory is more cumulative, and dissemination can be 
improved through licensing and cross-licensing. In short, a wider 
talent pool can only be brought in with real competition.  
DuPont had argued that by refusing to license those traits for 
“stacking” within the seeds sold, Monsanto unlawfully excluded 
competition, allowing it to set the minimum prices for seed without 
                                                     
410. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of 
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 870 (1990). 
411. Id. at 873; see also id. at 875 (“In our own research, we have not found 
a single case where the holder of a broad patent used it effectively through tailored 
licensing to coordinate the R&D of others.”).  
412. Id. at 873 (“The only way to find out what works and what does not is 
to let a variety of minds try. If a property right on a basic invention covers a host of 
potential improvements, the property right holder can be expected to develop the 
basic invention and some of the improvements.”).
413. Id. at 874-75; see also id. at 907 (“The holder of a patent on a broad 
prospect opened by advances in science need not attempt to control the development 
of that prospect in any detail. Instead, she could license widely and collect royalties. 
. . . This approach is normally more conducive to the development of multiple 
applications than where the patent holder restricts entry.”).  
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significant impact on its market share.414 Access to the Roundup 
Ready trait would allow DuPont and others to offer stacked seed. 
Seen in this light, the argument that the essential facilities doctrine 
could apply to require compulsory access to traits like Roundup 
Ready becomes more compelling.415
Alternatively, an argument for access may be made on the basis 
of patent misuse. While patent misuse can be difficult to navigate,416
it ameliorates the disadvantages in antitrust enforcement because it 
renders the affected patent unenforceable. As one treatise noted, “[i]t
may be that the pressure to use the essential facilities doctrine to 
compel licensing of patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
terms will be lessened by the availability of equitable remedies that 
can achieve the same end in appropriate cases without invoking the 
mechanism of antitrust law.”417
With patent misuse, there is usually no need to set conditions 
for access. By rendering the patent temporarily unenforceable, the 
patentee has every incentive to reach a licensing agreement with the 
potential entrant. Courts can arrest attempts at patent hold-outs by 
unwilling licensees in the same way they can prevent hold-outs by 
opportunistic licensors. By focusing on unfair competition and harm 
to innovation, misuse can give a more flexible and holistic treatment 
to the misconduct. 
Professor Christina Bohannan has argued that foreclosure is 
misuse’s main mandate.418 This includes foreclosure that results in 
unfair competition, restraints on innovation, and impinges on the 
                                                     
414. Defendants’ Amended Answer & Counterclaims at 19, Monsanto Co. v. 
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., No. 4:09-cv-00686 (ERW) (E.D. Mo. Nov. 16, 
2012). 
415. Cole, Horton & Vacca, supra note 107, at 320 (arguing that “patents 
governing GM seeds should be deemed de facto standard-essential patents (de facto 
SEP), when certain requirements are met” with the result that “[o]nce the GM seed 
has been labeled a de facto SEP, courts can find an implied license between 
Monsanto and farmers” (footnote omitted)); see also Purcell, supra note 166, at 
1271 (“Given that the anti-stacking provisions in Monsanto’s licenses had the clear 
effect of restricting competition in stacked traits, it stands to reason that these 
licenses count as denial for the purposes of essential facility analysis.”).
416. Lim, supra note 229, at 363 (“[C]ritics argue that the vagueness of 
misuse detracts from commercial certainty needed by businesses and innovators.”).
417. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 391, § 13.3c3. 
418. Bohannan, supra note 315, at 478 (“I argue that if misuse is really to be 
used as an instrument to effectuate IP policy and is to be confined to those practices 
that are serious enough to warrant its severe remedy, misuse should be focused on 
foreclosure.”).
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public domain.419 In these areas, patent and copyright policies share 
the same wellspring.420
Foreclosure has been a particular pernicious problem because it 
impedes the advance of technical progress that is the raison d’être of 
patent rights. The Constitution mandates that exclusive rights granted 
under patent law promote technological progress, but those rights 
occasionally impede that very progress.  
The Supreme Court noted that “a page of history is worth a 
volume of logic.”421 Vested business interests have resisted 
derivative, incremental, and sometimes exponentially disruptive use 
of their intellectual property. Just as photocopies did not decimate 
the printing business and the online music stores did not destroy the 
recording industry, circumscribing the intellectual property owner’s
control over the emergence of new and useful products can only 
promote the kind of technological progress inimical to economic 
prosperity. Unlike Bowman, who merely sought to replicate the trait 
to avoid paying Monsanto for its seed, those that license traits like 
Roundup Ready that have become de facto standards can only serve 
to expand the universe of possible offerings to consumers and foster 
more vigorous competition between seed companies.  
Other commentators have identified other harms, including 
preventing economic loss that occurs in defensive research activities 
in patent circumvention and impediments to innovation from 
awarding patents to early stage inventors at the expense of late-stage 
inventors.422
In practice, this means that, as with Judge Wardlaw’s opinion 
in Omega, the presence of contractual or antitrust issues should not 
derail parallel considerations of patent misuse. An action for breach 
                                                     
419. Id. at 500 (describing misuse “that foreclose[s] others from (1) 
competing in a particular market; (2) producing technology that they are otherwise 
lawfully entitled to develop (i.e., restraints on innovation); or (3) accessing 
information or technology that rightfully belongs in the public domain” (footnote 
omitted)); see also id. at 501-25 (describing how they are applied to tying, restraints 
on innovation and non-compete agreements, post-expiration royalties, reach-through 
agreements, and licenses restricting access to public domain technology).  
420. For another area where the two streams of intellectual property have 
commingled, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
913, 936-37 (2005) (importing the theory of harm from inducement patent 
infringement into the copyright context). 
421. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).  
422. Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent 
Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 400 (2003). 
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of contract or an exclusive dealing restraint flows from a licensing 
provision empowered by the patent right.  
Patent misuse proscribes abuses, which include physical or 
temporal extensions, causing anticompetitive effects, as well as other 
abuses such as vexatious litigation, which do not.423 Patentees who 
place a burden on downstream innovation through an overextension 
of their patent rights contravene patent policy in a similar way that a 
claim covering an abstract idea would preempt use of the approach in 
all fields and would effectively grant a monopoly over the idea.424
The technological merits of the invention are irrelevant.425
In the context of stacking, an argument may be made that 
patent policy allows derogation from patentees’ right to appropriate 
returns.426 Where the party seeking access is offering “a different, 
better product,” commentators have argued that this kind of 
competition is consistent with patent policy.427 Where the patentee 
                                                     
423. See LIM, supra note 322, at 374-76.  
424. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) 
(“We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of 
pre-emption.”); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 
S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (“[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a 
patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”); id.
at 1301 (expressing “concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by 
improperly tying up the future use of” building blocks of human ingenuity).  
425. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013) (“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery 
does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”); Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under 
Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 117, 133 (2005) (“The 
misuse doctrine was a special form of punishment devised for over-reaching 
patentees who were using their patents to monopolize something other than the 
invention.”).
426. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (allowing 
experimental use for “‘amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry’” (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000))); see also Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 
No. 4:09cv00686 (ERW), 2010 WL 3039210, at *10 (E.D. Mo. July 30, 2010). The 
defendants argued that experimental use allowed them to study and improve upon or 
design around the Roundup Ready trait. Id. at *7. The court found that the 
exemption was “very narrow” and “strictly limited” to “‘amusement, to satisfy idle 
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.’” Id. at *10 (quoting Madey, 307 F.3d 
at 1361-62). It found the defense “plainly inapplicable” because the stacked soybean 
and corn seed had commercial implications and is directly in line with the 
defendants’ business operations in making seed products. Id.  
427. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual 
Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (2014) (“Market substitution 
is important because a use that does not interfere with the plaintiff’s market in some 
way generally does no relevant harm. Technical similarity is also important because 
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refuses to offer a new product in a secondary market for which there 
is potential consumer demand without a legitimate justification, the 
foreclosure could impede technological progress by denying a 
potential entrant the input necessary for it to do so.428 Restrictions on 
one inventor to take the next step forward because of another 
inventor’s overreaching disrupts the balance envisioned by patent 
policy. 
Mention should be made about 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4), which 
has potential for mischief on this issue of refusals to license. The 
Federal Circuit in Scruggs relied on § 271(d)(4), which immunizes 
patentees who refuse to license their technology from “misuse or 
illegal extension of the patent right.”429 As an initial matter, it should 
be noted that § 271(d)(4) applies only to unilateral and unconditional 
refusals to license. Refusals to license that involve price-fixing and 
other conditions are subject to ordinary antitrust and misuse rules.430
One overlooked point is that patent policy requires any refusal 
relying on § 271(d)(4) to be constitutional. Since the Patent Act 
subsists on the constitutional mandate to promote technological 
progress, cases interpreting § 271(d)(4) to sanction refusals to license 
hamper that progress and must themselves be unconstitutional.431
                                                                                                               
not all acts that interfere with a plaintiff’s market are problematic. A defendant who 
enters the market with a different, better product, for instance, may erode the market 
for the plaintiff’s product, but the law should not prohibit that competition.”
(footnote omitted)). 
428. Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone 
Wars: Triangulating the End Game, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 70 (2014) (“[C]ourts 
are increasingly intolerant of hold-ups and hold-outs.”).
429. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
430. See Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 10) (“As a matter of 
competition policy, the ‘beyond the scope’ formulation makes little sense. Antitrust 
is concerned with practices that are not authorized by other statutory provisions and 
realistically reduce output and raise price.”); see also id. (manuscript at 14) (“[T]he 
Patent Act does not authorize product price fixing, market divisions unrelated to 
production licenses, predatory pricing in patented goods, anticompetitive 
acquisitions, resale price maintenance of patented goods, ties in the presence of 
market power, exclusive dealing, or infringement suits based on patents that the 
owner knows or should know are invalid or unenforceable under the circumstances. 
The Patent Act expressly permits unilateral refusals to license, but does not say 
anything about concerted refusals to licenses . . . .” (footnote omitted)); HOVENKAMP
ET AL., supra note 391, § 6.5. 
431. Where there are multiple reasonable interpretations of a statute, the one 
that avoids constitutional issues would be chosen. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 
U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (“[The canon of constitutional avoidance] is a tool for 
choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on 
the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises 
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That settles the first objection to requiring access. What of the 
second objection—the difficulty of setting a rate for access and the 
task of ongoing supervision? The reluctance to undertake a more 
onerous inquiry led courts adopting the “scope of the patent”
approach to assume without supporting data that the price paid to 
Monsanto reflected only the cost for their specific “use.”432 For 
example, in Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, the district court concluded that 
Monsanto “would apparently never permit Ralph to save seed for 
replanting or transfer at any price” because it had not done so 
before.433 Since courts had always given Monsanto carte blanche to 
dictate its terms, it never had to do otherwise.434
A patent is not a fiat to extract every iota of value from the 
invention, only a means to appropriate what is necessary to 
incentivize innovation. For the court in Ralph to reach its conclusion 
based only on the absence of past conduct ducks the more pertinent 
question of what it costs the agrobiotech industry to produce new 
traits and varieties as well as what it ought to cost. This opaque 
revenue structure makes it difficult to judge whether the price 
charged is commensurate with the particular use right conferred.  
There is little, if any, information about how patents perform in 
the agrobiotech industry, how patents are valued, and how the 
welfare of users and licensees can be improved. Here, parallels may 
be drawn between the drug and agrobiotech industries.435 Both have 
similar cost and market structures: high sunk costs and barriers to 
entry, with few market players. The cost of developing new products 
and the ease of misappropriation have been touted as the backbone 
argument for a robust application of patent rights.  
                                                                                                               
serious constitutional doubts.”); see also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 
(1883) (“Proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government requires the 
courts of the United States to give effect to the presumption that [C]ongress will 
pass no act not within its constitutional power.”).
432. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298-99 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
433. 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Monsanto Co. v. 
Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 574-75 (N.D. Miss. 2004), aff’d, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006). 
434. Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1384.  
435. Amanda Welters, Note, Striking a Balance: Revising USDA Regulations 
to Promote Competition Without Stifling Innovation, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
407, 423, 426 (2012) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act is a viable regulatory framework for 
the agricultural industry. The similarities between the pharmaceutical and 
agriculture industries, and the effectiveness of the Hatch-Waxman Act in the 
pharmaceutical industry, suggest that use of such a framework would be successful.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  
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Agrobiotech companies invest an estimated fifty to a hundred 
million dollars annually to research, develop, and market traits and 
varieties.436 A study by the Center for the Study of Drug 
Development at Tufts University pegs the cost of drug development 
at $2.6 billion annually.437 Observers say the figure is so high 
because it includes the cost of drugs that failed to win regulatory 
approval, trial complexity and scale, a focus on chronic and 
degenerative diseases, and higher failure rates.438
A similar study for the agrobiotech industry will better allow 
calibration of royalties between various uses and a better allocation 
of rights between patentees and users. Indeed, the Court had 
instructed that “[a]ntitrust analysis must always be attuned to the 
particular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue.”439
More information on the cost and revenue structure of the 
agrobiotech industry would help courts have a better sense of 
whether the restraint was necessary. Courts and antitrust enforcers 
can take the presence of those irregularities into consideration in 
their deliberations without dictating prices sold.440
Where appropriate, the courts can use that information to set 
the terms for access as well. The excuse that judges cannot set those 
terms is simply unconvincing. Courts are regularly faced with the 
task of quantifying both past and future damages, whether in patent 
or antitrust law. They are aided in this task by economic experts who 
provide technical and economic data that help courts understand how 
markets and technologies work. Antitrust agencies today boast small 
armies of economists, and private parties regularly seek the 
assistance of economic consultants. Similarly, judges and juries in 
                                                     
436. Sorting Out the Facts Behind Stacks, MONSANTO, http://www. 
monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/gene-stacks-facts.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2015). 
437. The Price of Failure, ECONOMIST (Nov. 29, 2014), http:// 
www.economist.com/news/business/21635005-startling-new-cost-estimate-new-
medicines-met-scepticism-price-failure.  
438. One example is Gilead, which was recently sued in a class action 
lawsuit where it was accused of charging “exorbitant” prices for its blockbuster 
hepatitis C drug Sovaldi. Each pill costs $1,000 and each twelve-week course 
$84,000, compared to between $50,000 and $70,000 for the same twelve-week 
course in some European countries. Andrew Pollack, AbbVie Deal Heralds Changed 
Landscape for Hepatitis Drugs, N.Y. Times (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2014/12/22/business/pharmacy-deal-heralds-changed-landscape-for-hepatitis-
drugs.html?_r=0. 
439. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 411 (2004). 
440. Id. at 408 (observing that courts are “ill suited” to act as “central 
planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing”).
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patent cases rarely have any technical background and yet must deal 
with construing claims over complex technology with the help of 
experts. The reliance on experts is routine. It stretches credulity to 
think that the combined brainpower of experts cannot offer courts an 
educated determination on what fair terms for granting access might 
look like.  
Assuming that the terms of access need to be judicially 
determined, the system is largely self-policing once they have been 
set. The aggrieved party can determine if the deviation from 
prevailing cost limitations is so egregious that it warrants the cost of 
bringing a complaint for contempt. Its interests are aligned with the 
public and stand as their proxies. Courts thus need not actively 
supervise patentees. They need only respond to charges of contempt, 
which they are again well-versed to rule upon. 
The more accurate reason for judicial restraint is harder to 
prove. Foreclosure cases can be difficult to adjudicate because they 
invariably involve tradeoffs. When patentees such as Monsanto 
control technology that rivals could use to make different or better 
products, the case for granting access is a strong one. Where the 
harm to competition and innovation are likely to be present, 
shielding the patentee’s conduct from scrutiny is dangerous. If 
innovation plays a central role in economic growth, legal outcomes 
that harm innovation also dampen it significantly.441 At the same 
time, weakening the patentee’s control over its primary market, and 
even secondary ones, may dampen its incentive to invest in further 
innovation. Ill-defined boundaries of legality may deter efficiency-
enhancing novel business practices.442
Even though antitrust law relies heavily on economic evidence, 
how that evidence is interpreted will be influenced by individual 
values.443 Professor Marina Lao observed that ideological differences 
                                                     
441. See Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 45-46) (giving the 
example of how the Wright brothers used doctrine of equivalents to “shut down the 
superior technology contained in the Curtiss airplane . . . [which] may have delayed 
the development of a military-worthy United States aircraft until after World War 
One was over”).
442. Thomas A. Lambert, Defining Unreasonably Exclusionary Conduct: 
The “Exclusion of A Competitive Rival” Approach, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1175, 1192 
(2014). 
443. Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL 
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164, 164 (Harvey J. Goldschmid, H. Michael 
Mann & J. Fred Weston eds., 1974) (“The old adage ‘seeing is believing’ contains a 
double measure of truth, for there also is much merit in the notion that ‘believing is 
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have a particularly strong influence with exclusionary conduct 
“because the competitive effects of various forms of dominant firm 
conduct are often unclear, and the theories offered to support either 
permissive or restrictive standards are inconclusive.”444
For instance, the appropriate amount of deference courts should 
give to patentees like Monsanto will turn to a significant extent on 
the position one takes in the Schumpeter–Arrow debate. 
Schumpeterians believe that dominant firms are more innovative 
than firms in competitive markets.445 In contrast, Arrow argued that 
dominant firms were already earning supra-competitive profits and 
had little to gain from innovation, making competition the real driver 
of innovation as firms innovate to remain competitive.446
Unfortunately, neither economic theory nor empirical evidence 
conclusively supports either side.447
                                                                                                               
seeing.’ Facts must be placed into a system of belief before they yield to 
interpretation.”).
444. Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 649, 653 (2014) (“In this context, it is almost inevitable that a policymaker’s
values will influence which theoretical models she will choose, whether her default 
is to intervene or not intervene if the theories and the evidence are indeterminate, 
what types of evidence she would consider relevant, and so forth. Her core 
economic and political beliefs will also likely affect her perspective on the aggregate 
social costs of false negatives relative to false positives, which will impact her 
judgment on whether liability should be found in a particular case or, indeed, 
whether a particular case should be brought in the first place.” (footnote omitted)).
445. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-
106 (3d ed. 1950) (arguing that a monopolist has less concern that rivals would be 
able to appropriate its innovative ideas and successfully compete with the 
monopolist, and this incentivizes the monopolist to engage in research and 
development); see also Spencer Weber Waller & Matthew Sag, Promoting 
Innovation, 100 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2479569 (“Taking Schumpeter 
seriously means designing a legal and regulatory system which maximizes the 
incentives and opportunities for challengers to innovate to displace incumbents 
while minimizing incentives and opportunities for incumbents (who may have once 
been challengers) from engaging in exclusionary conduct that degrades the 
opportunities and incentives for future challengers to dislodge them.”).
446. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 609 (1962). 
447. See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Competition and Innovation, in 1 ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 577, 583 
(Wayne Dale Collins et al. eds., 2008) (“Economic theory does not provide 
unambiguous support either for the view that market power generally threatens 
innovation by lowering the return to innovative efforts or for the Schumpeterian 
view that concentrated markets generally promote innovation . . . .”); Douglas H. 
Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust 
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Another ideological strain underlying the “scope of the patent”
approach and decisions like Trinko may be represented by the 
Chicago school of antitrust and its concern that proscribing excessive 
pricing could interfere with markets’ price-setting mechanism and 
with the signaling and rationing functions it carries out.448 In contrast, 
the post-Chicago school advocates a more interventionist brand of 
antitrust.449 One specific concern is the ability to raise rivals’ costs, 
which forces the rivals affected to raise prices and reduce output, in 
turn profiting the dominant firm whose goods suddenly seem cheaper 
or more readily available.450 Foreclosure is one manifestation of this 
strategy.451 Those who subscribe to Schumpeter and the Chicago 
school will counsel against intervention while those who subscribe to 
Arrow and the post-Chicago school will favor it.  
The case for acting against allegations of foreclosure will be 
stronger where the party alleging the harm can show that the patentee 
has the ability to effect that harm. Antitrust law measures this ability 
through direct and circumstantial evidence of anticompetitive effects. 
Patent misuse does not require market power, except in tying cases. 
Instead, similar to the analysis for copyright misuse seen in Omega,
the analysis focuses more on the plausibility of a coherent theory of 
harm to innovation resulting from an abuse to the patent system.  
                                                                                                               
Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4-5 (2012) (arguing that the empirical literature 
supports neither Schumpeter’s nor Arrow’s hypothesis); Michael L. Katz & Howard 
A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 22 (2007) (“The 
literature addressing how market structure affects innovation (and vice versa) in the 
end reveals an ambiguous relationship in which factors unrelated to competition 
play an important role.”).
448. See Lim, supra note 229, at 331-34 (tracing the influence of the 
Chicago school on the self-restraint exhibited by judges in antitrust and patent 
misuse cases); ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER,
ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION 
POLICY 66 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that the Chicago school viewed most markets as 
self-correcting, and supernormal profits would induce entry and erode market share). 
449. See Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical 
Conduct: Where Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S.
ANTITRUST 141, 143, 145-52 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (summarizing the post-
Chicago rebuttal to the Chicago school on exclusionary conduct). 
450. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive 
Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 
213-14 (1986).  
451. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition 
Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 511-15 (1999) 
(arguing that the net harms from foreclosure are worse the allowing the refusal to 
grant access). 
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B.  Ability to Effect the Harm  
Prior to Actavis, the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works Inc. 
v. Independent Ink, Inc. opened a crack to an effects-focused analysis 
when it eliminated the presumption that patents necessarily confer 
market power.452 Illinois Tool Works shifted the analysis from one of 
per se illegality to a rule of reason analysis. This made it more 
difficult for antitrust plaintiffs, who now had to prove market power 
through economic evidence. The Court also identified a synergistic 
relationship between antitrust law and patent misuse since the market 
power presumption migrated from the latter into antitrust law.453
Actavis shifted the analysis from one of per se legality to a rule 
of reason analysis. How would this have changed the approach taken 
in earlier cases involving Monsanto? The District Court for the 
Northern District of Mississippi in Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs found 
Monsanto could not have market power in the trait market because it 
was synonymous with the market encompassed by its patent scope.454
It dismissed the claim that Monsanto had market power in the market 
for traited seeds because it refused to include the sales of any of its 
                                                     
452. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc. 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006); see 
also, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“Although a patent confers a lawful monopoly over the claimed invention, its value 
is limited when alternative technologies exist.” (citation omitted)).
453. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 39 (“Our opinion in International Salt
clearly shows that we accepted the Government’s invitation to import the 
presumption of market power in a patented product into our antitrust 
jurisprudence.”); see also id. at 42 (“While the 1988 amendment does not expressly 
refer to the antitrust laws, it certainly invites a reappraisal of the per se rule 
announced in International Salt.”).
454. 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 582 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (finding that Monsanto 
“cannot be held liable under the antitrust laws for the natural monopoly afforded 
under the Patent Act” for “monopoliz[ing] and/or attempt[ing] . . . monopoliz[ation 
of] the market for Roundup Ready soybean and cotton [traits]”), aff’d, 459 F.3d 
1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (“Although [the ‘605] patent does not explicitly claim seed containing a 
Roundup Ready genetic trait, it claims plant cells having that genetic trait, and 
farmer-grown Roundup Ready soybeans undisputedly contain such cells. Thus, as in 
the case of the ‘435 patent, Monsanto’s ‘605 patent reads on both purchased and 
farmer-grown Roundup Ready soybeans. There is no patent misuse in the license 
terms for either patent.”). Monsanto Co. v. Swann, No. 4:00-CV-1481 CEJ, 2001 
WL 34079480, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 19, 2001) (“The Roundup Ready® technology 
that is involved in this litigation is owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not 
violate the Sherman Act by reason of a monopoly it has over its own product.”).
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licensees.455 In its view, Monsanto only had 25.6% of the soybean 
market and 0% of the cotton market.456 Finally, without separately 
undertaking analysis of the glyphosate market, the court proceeded 
to dismiss monopolization claims related to that market because 
“none of Monsanto’s conduct . . . could reasonably be considered 
anti-competitive.”457 The Federal Circuit affirmed without reference 
to the court’s analysis of market power.458
As a matter of antitrust law, Monsanto’s admission in an earlier 
case that it could unilaterally dictate prices to seed partners and 
farmers based on its patents should give antitrust enforcers cause for 
pause.459 Market definition is only necessary as part of the inquiry 
about circumstantial effects of market power if there is no evidence 
of direct effects.460 Direct evidence of harm includes rising prices and 
restricted output, while circumstantial evidence of harm depends on 
finding high market shares in a properly defined market coupled with 
anticompetitive conduct through exclusionary or exploitative 
conduct.461
Antitrust law does not condemn high prices per se and indeed 
condones monopolists charging “as high a rate as the market will 
                                                     
455. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (“Monsanto’s market share must be 
determined solely on the quantity of goods and/or services Monsanto sold to 
consumers. At best, only the market shares of Monsanto’s wholly owned 
subsidiaries are to be included.” (citation omitted)).
456. Id.; see also Monsanto Co. v. Trantham, 156 F. Supp. 2d 855, 864 
(W.D. Tenn. 2001) (making similar findings). 
457. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 583.
458. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  
459. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (“Monsanto states that as the patent holder it decides unilaterally the terms on 
which its patents are licensed and its product sold under the Technology 
Agreements. Monsanto explains that the seed companies that are licensed by 
Monsanto to produce and sell the modified soybean seed have no control over the 
terms of the Technology Agreements that Monsanto requires of farmers who choose 
to purchase the Monsanto seed.”).
460. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 
2000) (“The Supreme Court has made it clear that there are two ways of proving 
market power. One is through direct evidence of anticompetitive effects. The other, 
more conventional way, is by proving relevant product and geographic markets and 
by showing that the defendant’s share exceeds whatever threshold is important for 
the practice in the case.” (citation omitted)). 
461. Market power, the ability to raise prices above those that would prevail 
in a competitive market, Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 
n.46 (1984), is essentially a “‘surrogate for detrimental effects.’” Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (quoting 7 P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 429 (1986)). 
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bear.”462 Despite the rhetoric that patentees like Monsanto can charge 
as much as they wish,463 the government is clearly concerned about 
price irregularities.464 Between 1995 and 2011, Monsanto’s soybean 
seed prices increased 325%, largely due to licensing fees.465 While 
higher prices do not in themselves indict an antitrust defendant, they 
are probative of direct anticompetitive effects.466 Ostensibly, any 
company that can profitably increase prices 325% without fear 
consumers will switch to a substitute warrants further investigation 
as to the nature and extent of its market power.467
Further, while Monsanto has cross-licenses with 200 seed 
companies, competition has been described as a “fiction.”468 Seed 
                                                     
462. Berkey Photo, Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
463. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 574-75 (N.D. Miss. 
2004) (“Monsanto urges its technology fees are simply royalties and that the patent 
laws permit it to charge any royalty it chooses. Monsanto’s position is correct. The 
patent laws permit a patentee to ‘exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the 
leverage of that [patent] monopoly.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964))), aff’d, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006). 
464. See, e.g., Luke M. Olson & Brett W. Wendling, The Effect of Generic 
Drug Competition on Generic Drug Prices During the Hatch-Waxman 180-Day 
Exclusivity Period (Fed. Trade Comm’n, Working Paper No. 317, 2013), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/estimating-effect-entry-
generic-drug-prices-using-hatch-waxman-exclusivity/wp317.pdf; Gillian Mohney, 
Generic Drug Price Sticker Shock Prompts Probe by Congress, ABC News (Nov. 
21, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/generic-drug-prices-
skyrocketing-lawmakers-warn/story?id=27060992. 
465. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, SEED GIANTS VS. U.S.
FARMERS 16 (2013), available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/seed-
giants_final_04424.pdf. 
466. See Berkey Photo, Inc., 603 F.2d at 296; Martin, supra note 157, at 144-
45 (“The exorbitant increase in the cost of Monsanto seeds claims a greater share of 
farmers’ operating costs, gross crop income, and net return per acre.”); CTR. FOR 
FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 465, at 18 (quoting Dr. Charles 
Benbrook, agricultural economist: “‘If these GE seed price and income trends 
continue, the consequences for farmers will be of historic significance, as dollars 
once earned and retained by farmers are transferred to the seed industry’”).
467. McEowen, supra note 94, at 652 (“Anticompetitive concerns are 
heightened if the licensing agreements operate as a substantial barrier to potential 
competition in trait and transgenic seed markets or have the effect of increasing the 
price of seed while simultaneously concentrating the seed market amongst fewer 
firms.” (footnote omitted)).
468. Elizabeth I. Winston, A Patent Misperception, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 289, 305 (2012); see also MOSS, supra note 165, at 24 (describing joint venture 
agreements “that restrict the licensing of one partner’s technology outside the 
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companies are tied by licensing restrictions much in the same way as 
farmers are.469 The high cost of research and development as well as 
regulatory barriers make entry by rival developers of traited seeds 
difficult.470 Other circumstantial indicia of market power include the 
presence and degree of barriers to entry as well as barriers to 
expansion.471 The Justice Department had released a report in May 
2012 highlighting the fact that farmers faced high prices and 
increasingly limited options for seeds as a result of companies’
merger activities.472
It is appropriate to define the market for patented traits, as 
opposed to the market for traited seed, when those rights are 
marketed separately from the products in which they are used.473
Courts have rarely done so and only when the patent is itself an 
industry standard.474 The fact that Monsanto commanded the market 
                                                                                                               
agreement, thus impeding rivals’ access to that technology for the purposes of 
developing competing products”).  
469. See John Hession, Biotech Consolidation: Is There Light in the Tunnel?,
MASS HIGH TECH (June 25, 2009, 3:39 PM), http:// www.bizjournals. 
com/boston/blog/mass-high-tech/2009/06/biotech-consolidation-is-there-light-
in.html?page=all; see also Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 44 (“A few big 
multinationals (led by Monsanto and DuPont) dominate the club. Each of the 
oligopoly firms controls a network of subsidiary firms. The remaining ‘independent’
seed companies are tied by patent licensing and other arrangements to the oligopoly 
networks, and rely on those networks for patented seed varieties and GMO traits.”).
470. Ronald & McWilliams, supra note 26, at A19 (noting that regulatory 
costs have been pushed up “to the point where the technology is beyond the 
economic reach of small companies or foundations that might otherwise develop a 
wider range of healthier crops for the neediest farmers”).
471. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). 
472. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND AGRICULTURE: VOICES FROM THE 
WORKSHOPS ON AGRICULTURE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN OUR 21ST CENTURY 
ECONOMY AND THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD 18 (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/283291.pdf; see also Tom Philpott, DOJ 
Mysteriously Quits Monsanto Antitrust Investigation, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 1, 2012,
7:03 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/tom-philpott/2012/11/dojs-monsantoseed-
industry-investigation-ends-thud (warning that firm dominance in the 
agrobiotechnology industry promotes a “high degree of concentration, high and 
rising prices, limited choice, [and] stagnant innovation”).
473. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES 
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.2.2, at 9 (1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (defining the relevant market 
for traits involves identifying “the smallest group of technologies and goods over 
which a hypothetical monopolist of those technologies and goods likely would 
exercise market power—for example, by imposing a small but significant and 
nontransitory price increase”).
474. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314, 316 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
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for glyphosate-resistant traits and licensed numerous seed partners 
for trait stacking satisfies this requirement. The Court should also 
have taken into account glyphosate-resistant traits deemed 
substitutable with Roundup Ready.475
Commonly recited figures for Monsanto’s market share in 
traited seeds are as follows: soybean seeds at 90%, corn at 80%, and 
cotton at 90%.476 Monsanto also controls 60% of the wholesale 
licensing market for patented seed varieties.477 It did not make a 
difference whether farmers bought the seed from Monsanto or its 
licensees. This was probably because, unlike the court who was 
blinkered by the “scope of the patent” approach, they understood that 
the dynamics of the traited-seed market were such that Monsanto 
would commandeer the material terms of their sales to farmers.  
With respect to the market for glyphosate herbicides, the 
Supreme Court had found Monsanto guilty of price-fixing in that 
market just over a decade before based on Monsanto having 15% of 
the corn herbicide market and 3% of the soybean herbicide market.478
While anticompetitive harm still needs to be proven, this should have 
at least given the Court cause to consider that Monsanto may well 
still have market power in the glyphosate market owing to patents, 
other intellectual property rights, or other market advantages.479
Finally, the fact that farmers have a variety of other seed 
choices to pick from does not by itself answer the question of 
                                                     
475. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 473, § 3.2.2, 
at 10. Technology substitutes include “other technologies and goods which buyers 
would substitute at a cost comparable to that of using the licensed technology” if a 
monopolist raised the price of its technology. Id.
476. Mitchell, supra note 117 (noting that Monsanto owns “about 80% of 
U.S. corn and more than 90% of U.S. soybeans are grown with seeds containing 
Monsanto’s patented seed traits (whether sold by Monsanto itself or by licensees)”);
April Davila, Monsanto’s Cotton Strategy Wears Thin, OUR WORLD (Aug. 26, 
2011), http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/monsantos-cotton-strategy-wears-thin. 
477. DUPONT/PIONEER HI-BRED INT’L, COMMENTS OF DUPONT/PIONEER HIǦ
BRED INTERNATIONAL REGARDING AGRICULTURE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
ISSUES IN OUR 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY 4 (2010), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/atr/public/workshops/ag2010/comments/254990.pdf. 
478. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 755-56 (1984). 
479. Id. at 765 (finding Monsanto and its distributors agreed to maintain 
resale prices and terminate price-cutters). The case was also significant in laying 
down “plus factors” that required plaintiffs to show direct or circumstantial 
“evidence that tends to exclude the possibility” that the parties were acting 
independently. Id. at 764. 
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whether those products are true substitutes to traited seed.480 In an 
age where rivals are planting crops supercharged with modified 
traits, farmers that rely on conventional seed risk “being left in the 
dust.”481 A farmer eschewing those traits could no more compete 
against rivals using traited seeds than a horse and buggy could 
substitute the planes, trains, and automobiles we take for granted 
today. Indeed, the reason for the significant price decrease in 
conventional seeds is precisely because its technological irrelevance 
has led to a precipitous fall in demand. Even though consumers may 
find organic and genetically modified produce interchangeable, high 
production costs prevent organic farmers from offering large-scale, 
competitively priced alternatives.482
Patent misuse does not require its complainant to show market 
power. It is sufficient to prove that the conduct supporting the theory 
of harm had in fact occurred. Thus according to Judge Wardlaw in 
Omega, the defendant simply had to show that the copyright owner 
had in fact used its copyright to prevent parallel importation to raise 
the defense of copyright misuse.483 The inquiry is obviously fact-
specific, and the ingredients required to validate the defendant’s
narrative will depend on the theory of harm alleged.  
The price of a more sophisticated discourse is complexity. 
Critics have noted that the antitrust rule of reason can be confusing 
and even inconsistent, giving lower courts and litigants few clear 
rules.484 It turns on economic analysis that is sometimes 
                                                     
480. See, e.g., Monsanto v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(finding no sale of future seed not conditioned to buying seed in suit or impediments 
preventing switching to “over two hundred commercial sources of soybean seed, 
including several herbicide-resistant soybeans” available); see also id. (“[A] 
purchaser’s desire to buy a superior product does not require benevolent behavior by 
the purveyor of the superior product. Nor does an inventor of new technology 
violate the antitrust laws merely because its patented product is favored by 
consumers.”).
481. Tempe Smith, Note, Going to Seed?: Using Monsanto as a Case Study 
to Examine the Patent and Antitrust Implications of the Sale and Use of Genetically 
Modified Seeds, 61 ALA. L. REV. 629, 647 (2010) (“In order for farmers in today’s
society to survive, they must be willing to embrace these technological advances, or 
they risk being left in the dust because of their inability to produce product at the 
same rate and at the same cost as those farmers who do embrace technology.”).
482. I am grateful to Professor Mark Patterson for this insight.  
483. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 
2015).  
484. See Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 
465 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Unfortunately, the Grinnell test is not of much assistance in 
resolving particular cases. Every competitor seeks to capture as much business as 
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“impenetrable.”485 Jurors have been “overwhelmed, frustrated, and 
confused by testimony well beyond their comprehension,” and “at no 
time did any juror grasp—even at the margins—the law, the 
economics, or any other testimony.”486 These are legitimate concerns, 
but they are not intractable. The framework can be made sufficiently 
clear so that businesses can operate without complicated and 
uncertain balancing exercises, except at the fringes. 
C.  Improving Administrability 
Since the beginning, Congress tasked the courts to build the 
analytical framework for antitrust law.487 Since “the means of illicit 
exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad,” this 
was necessary.488 In the hundred years since the antitrust laws were 
enacted, they have adopted doctrines linked to market performance 
or expectations.489 The antitrust rule of reason has to make the 
                                                                                                               
possible.”); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 253, 255 (2003) (noting that these verbal formulae “are not just vague but 
vacuous” because they “are utterly conclusory, failing to identify a coherent norm 
that provides any real help in distinguishing bad behavior from good or even in 
knowing which way certain factual conclusions cut”).
485. Bill Baer, Connecting the Antitrust Dots: In Praise of Herb Hovenkamp,
100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 1, 3 (2014). 
486. Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New 
Media, and Deviancy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54 (1995). 
487. Diane P. Wood, The Responsibility of the Judiciary in the 
Implementation of Competition Policy, in POLICY ROUNDTABLES: JUDICIAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW 27, 27 (1996), available at http://www. 
oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/1919985.pdf (“From the 
time the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, it has been understood as a ‘common 
law’ type of statute, a statute setting forth very general propositions, that the Judges 
in common law fashion would implement and develop on a case by case basis.”); 
see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931) (describing 
the Federal Trade Commission Act’s prohibition on “unfair methods of competition”
as a phrase that “do[es] not admit of precise definition,” and that “the meaning and 
application . . . [would] be arrived at by . . . ‘the gradual process of judicial inclusion 
and exclusion’” (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877)));
United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) 
(noting that the Clayton Act “was deliberately couched in general and flexible 
terms” and that it was incumbent on the judiciary to fashion “a coherent body of 
substantive law out of the [c]ongressional policy and language”).
488. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en 
banc) (per curiam). 
489. Baer, supra note 485, at 3 (“This consensus on how best to maximize 
consumer welfare owes much to the contributions of economists and legal scholars 
who, beginning in the 1950s, argued that many of the antitrust decisions of that 
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analysis more administrable, and these can be adapted to patent 
misuse analysis. 
The first way is through the filter of an antitrust injury. 
Weeding out frivolous antitrust claims or misuse defenses at an early 
stage can protect patentees while ensuring that legitimate complaints 
are given full and fair consideration. The second is through the use of 
a truncated analysis where judicial experience and economic learning 
give courts the confidence to shift the burden of explaining the 
conduct to the patentee. 
The “antitrust injury” was devised by courts to filter out 
complaints by injured rivals that do not hurt consumers, and it 
requires a nexus between the anticompetitive effects and the act.490
That conduct must go beyond excluding rivals and harm the 
competitive structure.491 Courts focus on evidence of competitive 
effects and efficiencies in the motion to dismiss and summary 
judgment stages in burdens of pleading, production, and proof.492
The antitrust injury requirement aligns private litigation to 
antitrust law’s interest in promoting consumer welfare. It prevents 
plaintiffs from using antitrust suits as a means to impair rivals.493
Other factors in assessing antitrust standing include “the directness 
                                                                                                               
period lacked sound economic foundations.”); Duffy, supra note 319, at 542 
(“[W]hat a move from per se legality or per se illegality towards the rule of reason 
means is something like what it is meant in every other area of antitrust law that has 
moved from per se treatment to the rule of reason: more rigorous economic analysis, 
more attention to economic evidence rather than less.”).
490. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–O–Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 
(1977) (explaining that antitrust injury is “injury of the type the antitrust laws were 
[designed] to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants’ acts 
unlawful”); Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The 
Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 735 (2012)
(“Oftentimes, the filtering process commences with challenges to standing that 
evaluate the plaintiff’s ability to allege ‘antitrust injury,’ and many cases fail to 
overcome even this first hurdle.” (footnote omitted)); see also Brunswick Corp., 429 
U.S. at 488 (holding that plaintiffs had not established antitrust injury where they 
sought to recover for “profits they would have realized had competition been 
reduced” but for the defendant’s pro-competitive activities); Atl. Richfield Co. v. 
USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (stating that an injury “causally 
related to an antitrust violation . . . will not qualify as ‘antitrust injury’ unless it is 
attributable to an anticompetitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny”).
491. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 488. 
492. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (requiring the 
complaint to “possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief’”
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2))). 
493. Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 308, 313-14 (D.D.C. 
2011). 
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of the injury, whether the claim for damages is ‘speculative,’ the
existence of more direct victims, the potential for duplicative 
recovery and the complexity of apportioning damages.”494
The antitrust injury requirement has been applied in the 
essential facility context. As the court in The David L. Aldridge Co. 
v. Microsoft Corp. put it, “[a] facility is essential under the antitrust 
laws only when it is vital to both the plaintiff’s individual 
competitive viability and the viability of the market in general.”495
Plausibility is the key, as the allegation must nudge the claim 
“across the line from conceivable to plausible.”496 The complaint 
must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”497
Commentators have noted that the “antitrust injury” filter “generally 
works well to sort the strong cases from the weak cases,” preventing 
plaintiffs from proceeding to trial.498
Even though courts are already throwing out misuse defenses 
for sloppy lawyering, the process can be improved. Motions to strike 
or dismiss in misuse cases have risen from 3% between 1953 and 
1962 to 31% between 2003 and 2012.499 A survey of reported misuse 
cases between 1953 and 2012 “showed an astounding lack of 
awareness” on what is required for defendants to survive dismissal.500
For example, in Monsanto Co. v. Boggs Farm Centers, Inc., the 
district court struck the defendants’ misuse claim because it did 
“nothing more than make a conclusory allegation of patent misuse,”
“omitted any short and plain statement of facts and failed totally to 
allege the necessary elements of the alleged claim.”501
Patent misuse could incorporate a similar heuristic to safeguard 
against “innovation injury.” In patent misuse cases, the defendant 
                                                     
494. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 806 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). 
495. 995 F. Supp 728, 753 (S.D. Tex. 1998). 
496. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
497. Id. at 556; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(explaining that a complaint falls short when it does not “contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). 
498. See, e.g., Gavil, supra note 490, at 735-36. 
499. See LIM, supra note 322, at 305-06.
500. Id. at 307. 
501. No. 4:10CV286 (HEA), 2010 WL 4792103, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 
2010); see also Monsanto Co. v. Swann, No. 4:00-CV-1481 (CEJ), 2001 WL 
34079480, at *3-4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 19, 2001) (dismissing the defendant’s misuse 
claim for failure to identify with specificity allegations claimed to constitute patent 
misuse). 
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similarly stands before the court as a proxy for the public interest.502
Like the fair use defense, patent misuse safeguards the public domain 
and restrains overreaching.503 Over time, an effects-focused 
framework should better help patent attorneys offer courts better 
articulated grounds for raising the misuse defense.504 This is 
important because a patent defendant raising a misuse defense is 
standing as proxy for the public interest. Hence, the more 
information the court has, the better position it will be in 
adjudicating between the parties while taking into account the public 
interest. 
The second way an effects-focused analysis can be made more 
administrable is through the use of a truncated approach. Truncation 
provides an efficient method of addressing conduct that can be 
condemned without costly argument and deliberations.505 Courts 
adopt an approach similar to truncation when there is direct evidence 
of anticompetitive effects.506 Conversely, where a restraint is 
                                                     
502. See Lim, supra note 229, at 379 (reporting a judicial interviewee’s
observation that “even a rogue infringer does the public a service by exposing a 
patentee’s egregious conduct”).
503. Id. at 319 (“Patent misuse may be analogized to the fair use defense in 
copyright law.”). 
504. Procter & Gamble Co. v. CAO Grp., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-337, 2013 WL 
5353281, at *4-6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2013) (noting it is the adverse effect upon the 
public interest that disqualifies patentees from maintaining the suit, regardless of 
whether the particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent). 
505. Timothy J. Muris & Brady P.P. Cummins, Tools of Reason: Truncation 
Through Judicial Experience and Economic Learning, ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 
46, 50 (“Truncation remains an important tool, both to promote efficient antitrust 
enforcement against those few restraints that can be condemned based on prior 
judicial experience and current economic learning without detailed and expensive 
consideration of market issues, and to prohibit restraints that are shown through 
appropriate direct evidence to cause substantial anticompetitive effects.”).
506. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 416 F.3d 29,
34-38 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Truncated analysis falls along the continuum between a full 
rule of reason and per se treatment. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 
U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (“The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive 
effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend 
to make them appear. We have recognized, for example, that ‘there is often no 
bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis . . . .’” (quoting Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26
(1984))); see also David Eisenstadt & James Langenfeld, The Role of Economics in 
Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 52, 52 
(“Typically, reference to economic theory or published quantitative evidence is used 
to demonstrate that such restraints will harm consumers by increasing price or 
reducing output, absent some clear offsetting efficiency explanation.”).
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ancillary and necessary for the procompetitive effect, courts have 
also blessed it in a “‘twinkling of an eye.’”507
The burden shifting may be critical for courts to obtain the 
information they need to fully decide on the merits of a case. An 
empirical study conducted by Professor Michael Carrier found that 
courts in antitrust cases did not balance anything 96% of the time 
when they applied the rule of reason.508 Rather, courts “typically 
dismiss[ed] the case at any one of the three stages that precedes the 
ultimate balancing.”509 A decade later, Carrier’s updated study noted 
that courts disposed of 97% of their cases at the first stage on 
grounds that the plaintiff failed to show anticompetitive effects.510
Only in 2% of the cases does the balancing actually take place, and it 
was done in “a cursory fashion.”511 This is anecdotally affirmed by 
case commentators.512
                                                     
507. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203-
04 (2010) (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 109 n.39) (finding 
the shared interest in the success of the football league and in maintaining a 
competitive balance among athletic teams justified a “defendant’s quick look 
approach”).
508. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the 
Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1267-68 (reviewing all 495 rule of reason 
cases between 1977 and 1999). 
509. Id. at 1268-69 (finding that 84% of cases are disposed of at the initial 
stage, where the plaintiff must show a significant anticompetitive effect resulting 
from the restraint; 3% of cases found the restraint illegal because the defendant 
failed to show procompetitive justifications for the restraint; 1% of cases were 
dismissed because the plaintiff could not show the restraint was unnecessary to 
achieve the objectives or that the objectives could be achieved by alternatives “less 
restrictive” of competition). 
510. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 
21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828, 831 (2009).
511. Id.
512. See, e.g., Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, 
the Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 
ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 445-47 (2006) (“The [Microsoft] court actually compared 
effects only when analyzing Microsoft’s restrictions on computer manufacturers’
modifications of the Windows start-up screens. This conduct, which impeded rivals 
but the court found justified by substantial efficiencies, involved agreements also 
subject to Sherman Act Section 1’s rule of reason. By contrast, when analyzing 
Microsoft’s unilateral ‘product design’ conduct . . . the court, while using the 
language of comparing effects, in fact avoided that inquiry. Rather than compare 
effects, the court found in some instances no anticompetitive effect, in some no 
justification, and in others no rebuttal to the justification. . . . Revealingly, the 
Microsoft court also appeared to protect certain conduct as essentially per se lawful. 
. . . In other words, the court determined that impeding rivals through conduct 
deemed to reflect only efficiency was, in effect, protected ‘superior skill, foresight, 
and industry.’” (footnote omitted)). 
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Commentators studying the Court’s Actavis decision explain 
why it makes sense in certain cases to place the burden of production 
on antitrust defendants.513 They note that  
[a]llocating the burden to the defendant to provide justifications for a 
settlement also makes sense: it would be unreasonable and inefficient to 
expect a plaintiff to prove the absence of any convincing justification 
without requiring the defendants first to narrow the scope of the facts and 
justifications at issue by making their case.514
Where the patentee made a sufficient sizable payment, the 
court will accept that as a proxy for possible anticompetitive harm 
and require the patentee to justify that payment.515
The Supreme Court had instructed that “it is normally not 
necessary to litigate patent validity.”516 Rather, courts can turn to the 
presence of a payment from the patentee to the generic as 
circumstantial evidence of anticompetitive effects.517 Hovenkamp 
described the sort of reverse payments described in Actavis as a 
“prime example” of conduct “highly likely to harm consumer 
welfare.”518 They create little duopoly cartels between the patentee 
and potential generic entrant by shielding the patent from challenge, 
no matter how weak it is.519 These payments contravene antitrust 
                                                     
513. Aaron Edlin et al., Actavis and Error Costs: A Reply to Critics, 14 
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 4 (2014) (“The Court’s repeated use of the terms 
‘unexplained’ or ‘unjustified’ to modify ‘large reverse payments’ suggests that such 
payments are not illegal if appropriately justified, and that the burden is on the 
defendant to justify (i.e., explain) them.”).
514. Id.
515. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236-37 (2013) 
(“The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of course, that even a 
small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment. But, be that as it may, the payment 
(if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition. And, as 
we have said, that consequence constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm. In a 
word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate 
for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration 
of the validity of the patent itself.”).
516. Id. at 2236. 
517. Id. (“[W]here a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified 
anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely [has] the power to bring that harm about in 
practice. . . . [T]he ‘size of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a 
prospective generic [challenger] is itself a strong indicator of [such] power . . . .’” 
(citation omitted)); see also id. at 2236-37 (noting that a large, “unexplained reverse 
payment can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without 
forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the [patent’s] validity”).
518. See Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 19). 
519. Id. (manuscript at 26) (noting that most reverse payments occur over 
“secondary . . . patents on new dosages, new treatments or new combinations of 
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policy because the market division agreements provide no 
cognizable procompetitive justifications such as joint production, 
distribution, or sharing of technology. Nor are there “legitimately 
conflicting” litigation claims where parties could act as proxies for 
the public; here their interests in settling are merely pre-textual.520
Actavis rejected a truncated approach simply on the existence 
of a reverse payment and advocated one that placed the burden on 
the patentee and generic drug company receiving that payment to 
account for disparities between the payment and expected litigation 
costs. In doing so, the Court used an unexplained large payment as 
circumstantial evidence of anticompetitive harm.521 Similarly, 
patentees in Monsanto’s position would be made to bear the burden 
of justifying their conduct once conduct consistent with possible 
anticompetitive harm is shown. This incentivizes patentees to adduce 
evidence for courts to more fully consider the merits of the case 
which would not have been made available had the burden of 
production not shifted.  
Courts have occasionally paid more attention to analyzing 
licensing restraints. For instance in Scruggs, the district court 
rejected an allegation of tying on the basis that Monsanto had 
required use of Roundup and Roundup Ready crops because 
Roundup “was the only EPA-approved herbicide that could be used 
on Roundup Ready crops during that period.”522 Once competing 
glyphosate herbicides met EPA labeling requirements for “over-the-
top” use, Monsanto’s license agreements allowed those to be used.523
The Federal Circuit affirmed on appeal.524 Similarly, in Trantham,
the court found that Monsanto offered a “superior product . . . that 
has been warmly received by the seed producers, retailers, and 
individual farmers.”525
                                                                                                               
well-established drugs,” which are declared invalid or not infringed 70% of the 
time); see also id. (manuscript at 19) (“This is why the Supreme Court acted 
correctly when it held that such agreements could be condemned without necessarily 
inquiring into questions about patent validity or infringement.”).
520. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931).  
521. Actavis, 133 S. Ct at 2236-37. 
522. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 577 (N.D. Miss. 2004), 
aff’d, 459 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
523. Id.
524. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The 
record shows that Monsanto’s competitors sought and obtained regulatory approval 
and that when they did, Monsanto modified its contracts accordingly.”).
525. Monsanto Co. v. Trantham, 156 F. Supp. 2d 855, 863 (W.D. Tenn. 
2001). 
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However, these are exceptions rather than the norm. There may 
indeed be good reasons for prohibiting stacking, such as a gene or 
trait degradation.526 If Monsanto or another patentee refuses to 
license a patent covering a technology standard because doing so 
would threaten its reputation or the integrity of its products, it will be 
best placed to proffer that evidence. The key is whether the patentee 
is leveraging control over patented traits to control ancillary spheres 
that fall outside of its primary market. Similarly, if the EPA revokes 
product registrations for failing to meet stewardship standards or if 
targeted pest or weeds develop resistance to the traits in question, the 
patentee should also be required to produce evidence supporting that 
assertion.527 In Scruggs, the district court assumed those assertions 
warranted the grant of an injunction against the infringer–farmer.528
This mirrors a similar “rule of reason” approach advocated by 
patent law commentators and used by the Supreme Court when 
deciding patent cases. For example, Professor Peter Lee observed 
that multifactor balancing tests set out by the Supreme Court in 
patent law can impose high information costs on lower courts and 
suggested that those costs can be mitigated by clearly structuring the 
expected inquiry.529 One example, Lee suggests, is to delineate a set 
of weighted factors with a view that a later decision provides the 
base from which to build a better vantage point for the next court.530
It also signals to litigating parties the factors to focus on or how to 
conduct business to preemptively avoid a challenge.531
                                                     
526. VANDY HOWELL ET AL., COMPETITION AND INNOVATION IN AMERICAN 
AGRICULTURE 42 (2009), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/ 
documents/monsanto.pdf (noting that Monsanto has argued that “stacking” its GMO 
traits with GMO traits from competing sources may impair the performance of its 
GMO traits in some cases). 
527. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 576-77 (finding the restriction was 
necessary to comply with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA) 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (2012)); see also id. at 577 (“Because Roundup was 
the only product labeled for use ‘over-the-top’ of Roundup Ready crops between 
1996 and 1998, it was the only EPA-approved herbicide that could be used on 
Roundup Ready crops during that period. Beginning in 1999, Monsanto’s license 
agreements and/or technology use guides authorized the use of any competing 
glyphosate herbicide which met EPA labeling requirements for ‘over-the-top’ use as 
a permissible alternative to Roundup.”). 
528. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 758 (N.D. Miss. 2001). 
529. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 66-68 
(2010). 
530. Id.
531. Other areas of complex litigation such as those involving FRAND-
encumbered patents have benefitted from well-reasoned decisions that both provide 
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Patentees who argue that defendants have infringed on their 
claimed invention because variations between the two are 
insubstantial may be prevented from doing so if the prosecution 
history of the patent shows that they had surrendered the equivalent 
during prosecution.532 In order to overcome this bar, patentees need 
to show that the amendment was due to reasons that were 
unforeseeable, affected the claim tangentially, or was made due to 
some other reason owing to linguistic constraints.533 The goal is to 
get relevant information from the parties and to place the burden on 
the one best suited to provide that information. 
Like antitrust law, a truncated approach to patent misuse can be 
developed through economic and judicial learning. One instance 
where burden shifting might be appropriate is where a defendant can 
show that a patentee controlling an industry standard is using 
through antistacking restrictions to prevent the emergence of a new 
product not offered by the patentee itself. Once the defendant shows 
that access to the patent technology is required, the burden should 
shift to the patentee to show why refusing access is justified by 
patent policy considerations. Unlike with antitrust law, impact on 
market competition, while relevant, is not essential to the analysis.  
A second instance could be the use of the conditional sale 
doctrine to curtail patent exhaustion. The Federal Circuit’s intention 
to infuse a balancing mechanism into the misuse doctrine was 
directionally correct, but cabining it within the antitrust rule of 
reason was doctrinally indefensible and the Federal Circuit was
simply wrong in its application of Supreme Court precedent.534
Where the presence of a conditional sale clause is proven, the burden 
should shift to the patentee to explain it. In an appropriate case, the 
                                                                                                               
the basis for further refinement and minimize the cognitive burdens involved in the 
inquiry. See id.
532. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
740 (2002) (“[W]hen the court is unable to determine the purpose underlying a 
narrowing amendment—and hence a rationale for limiting the estoppel to the 
surrender of particular equivalents—the court should presume that the patentee 
surrendered all subject matter between the broader and the narrower language.”). 
533. Id. at 740-41 (“The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time 
of the application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than a 
tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be some other reason 
suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the 
insubstantial substitute in question. In those cases the patentee can overcome the 
presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of equivalence.”).
534. Lim, supra note 229, at 332-34.  
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court could decide to sever the offending clause, uphold the rest of 
the license, and leave the patent’s enforceability intact.535
A third instance could be based on classic forms of misuse such 
as tying, post-royalty extensions and market division agreements. 
Each of these instances finds justification for intervention based on 
judicial experience.536 Again, the court could spare the patentee from 
the consequences of misuse if it can show that patent policy is 
furthered by siding with the patentee. Since patent policy favors the 
public benefit over private interests, the burden on the patentee will 
predictably be a heavy one, but at least for the patentee, it will be 
preferable to the swift condemnation it would currently face. 
In assessing the consistency of an explanation to patent policy, 
economics can help the analysis. Innovation economics is a growing 
branch of economics doctrine that pursues higher productivity 
through greater innovation and looks beyond input resources and 
price signals to economic growth.537 An empirical study shows that 
misuse is most often alleged in cases involving tying, licensing 
restrictions, and vexatious litigation.538 Future studies parsing 
through those cases can identify the features that lead to their 
condemnation or acquittal and identify appropriate instances where 
the burden shifting may be shifted based on economic theory. These 
studies can assist courts in articulating more analytically robust 
opinions that are also better aligned to policy goals. 
As much as predictability is a desired trait, liability 
determinations under misuse or antitrust cannot be formulaically 
                                                     
535. For an example in the context of royalty extensions, see Cordance Corp. 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 310, 336-37 (D. Del. 2010) (“[E]ven 
assuming that Cordance’s contractual agreements did constitute patent misuse per se
under Brulotte, it does not follow that the court need render the ‘710 patent 
unenforceable in its entirety. The court might invalidate only the post-expiration 
passive royalties. And here, any final extension that would put the GSP Agreement 
beyond the term of the ‘710 patent has not yet been and might never be exercised.”). 
536. Lim, supra note 229, at 309. (“Examples of patent misuse include tying, 
package licensing, and horizontal price-fixing and territorial allocationsunder the 
guise of sham patent licenses.”).
537. See ROBERT D. ATKINSON & STEPHEN J. EZELL, INNOVATION 
ECONOMICS: THE RACE FOR GLOBAL ADVANTAGE 297 (2012) (“Innovation 
economists focus on the actual processes of production and innovation, such as 
trying to determine why firms develop and adopt new technologies and what 
policies can spur them to do more. . . . [I]nnovation economics holds that while 
markets are important, left to themselves they will not produce the amount of 
innovation and growth possible without supplementation by strong public 
innovation policies.”).
538. LIM, supra note 322, at 6, 14. 
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applied. As Justice Holmes reminded us, the life of the law is 
experience, not logic.539 Those who emphasize the paramount 
importance of certainty at the expense of justice must realize that the 
law on patent misuse and the antitrust laws are advanced by 
judges.540 Each time there was an advance in the law, it was because 
of “the bold spirits who were ready to allow it if justice so 
required.”541
Ultimately, an effects-focused approach requires litigants to 
provide more information and invites judges to think a little harder in 
light of judicial experience and economic learning.542 As cases are 
litigated, the boundaries of permissible payments will be mapped 
out, guiding settling parties and allowing antitrust agencies to plan 
their resources more efficiently.543 The framework itself must adjust 
and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life, for the avenues 
by which the progress of innovation and competition may be stalled,
but are never closed. 
                                                     
539. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (John Harvard 
Library 2009) (1881). 
540. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898-
99 (2007) (“As courts gain experience considering the effects of these restraints by 
applying the rule of reason over the course of decisions, they can establish the 
litigation structure to ensure the rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints 
from the market and to provide more guidance to businesses. Courts can, for 
example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where 
justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit 
anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones.”); Gavil, supra note 
490, at 734-35.
541. Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 KB 164 (“On the one side 
there were the timorous souls who were fearful of allowing a new cause of action. 
On the other side there were the bold spirits who were ready to allow it if justice so 
required. It was fortunate for the common law that the progressive view prevailed.”).
542. 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 382 (3d ed. 2010) 
(“We thus have no choice except to make the best judgments we can, guided by the 
statutory purpose, our knowledge of the economy, generally accepted economic 
principles, and the facts of the case.”).
543. Brenna E. Jenny, Information Costs and Reverse Payment Settlements: 
Bridging the Gap Between the Courts and the Antitrust Agencies, 30 SANTA CLARA 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 231, 299 (2014) (“By broadcasting a range of payments that they 
will generally consider to be low risk, courts allow parties to react accordingly when 
structuring a settlement.”); see also William E. Kovacic, THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY: THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF BETTER 
PRACTICES 59 (2009), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/public_statements/federal-trade-commission-100-our-second-century/ 
ftc100rpt.pdf (describing how the FTC’s ability to achieve its mission of protecting 
consumers depends on efficient allocation of agency resources). 
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CONCLUSION
The new normal is one where American farmers no longer save 
their seed. It resulted from declining government funding and the rise 
of private interests in meeting the demands placed on modern 
agriculture. The advances in agricultural technology will benefit 
farmers and consumers of their produce. 
While the Supreme Court correctly found for Monsanto in 
Bowman, future cases must iron out the two kinks it left behind. 
First, inadvertence cannot shield a farmer from patent infringement. 
Second, authorized sales exhaust all rights to seed sold, even when 
they are transacted conditionally. In cases involving antitrust and 
misuse, patentees can no longer rely on courts applying a formalistic 
analysis of patent scope.  
Post-Actavis, courts will look to both antitrust and patent 
policies in determining whether the restraint is legal. Whether 
Actavis succeeds in catalyzing a more careful balance between the 
rights of agrobiotech patentees and the rest of society depends on 
litigants and judges. They will have to understand the logic and 
limits of an effects-focused framework and have the confidence to 
push those limits when necessary. While the task will not be easy, 
stakeholders can do no worse than squander the opportunity given to 
them by failing to try. Our future depends on it. 
Postscript: Acting sua sponte, the Federal Circuit on April 14, 
2015 ordered en banc briefing on the issue of patent exhaustion in 
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc., 785 F.3d 
565 (Fed. Cir. 2015), sua sponte hearing en banc Nos. 2014-1617, 
2014-1619. One of the two questions it has posed for itself is to 
consider whether to overrule Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,
976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), in light of Quanta Computer, Inc. v. 
LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), “to the extent it ruled that 
a sale of a patented article, when the sale is made under a restriction 
that is otherwise lawful and within the scope of the patent grant, does 
not give rise to patent exhaustion[.]”

